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INTRODUCTION 
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) 1 was 
developed in consultation with leading scholars, and, from its 
inception, has been hailed as the solution to one of this century's 
celebrated dilemmas of federalism, the so-called "problem of the 
interstate child. " 2 This is the conundrum presented by those for­
mally adjudicated child custody disputes in which the child or the 
contestants have contacts with more than one state: Which, if any, 
custody decisions will be enforced outside the state where they 
were made? 
The UCCJA's drafters. believed that the existing patchwork of 
state jurisdictional rules, by their very multiplicity, encouraged 
contestants to relocate in order to relitigate child custody cases. 
Through the UCCJA, the drafters intended to substitute a single 
enforceable and orderly regime; they believed such a regime 
would "remedy th[e] intolerable state of affairs where self-help 
and the rule of 'seize-and-run' prevail rather than the orderly 
processes of the law,"3 and ensure that custody decisions were 
heard "in the most convenient and proper place from the point of 
view of gathering evidence."4 Early scholarly writing about the 
Act reflected the drafters' optimism, which most later assessments 
of the Act's operation have maintained.5 Nevertheless, as frus-
I 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 115-331 (1988). The National Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws originally promulgated the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) in 1968. 
2 Albert Ehrenzweig coined the phrase "interstate child." See Albert A. 
Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation: A Plea for Extralitigious 
Proceedings, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1, 1 (1965) [hereafter Ehrenzweig, Uniform 
Legislation]. For a full exposition of the problem, see generally Albert A. 
Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L. REV. 345 
(1953) [hereafter Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition]; Leonard G. Ratner, 
Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REv. 795 (1964) [hereafter 
Ratner, Federal System]. 
3 UCCJA Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 117. 
4 Proceedings [of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws] in Committee of the Whole, Uniform Child Custody Act 17 
(Aug. 3, 1966) (statement of W J. Brockel bank, Chairman, Special 
Committee on Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act). 
5 See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CoNFLICT OF LAws 163-67, 178 (1991); Edward 
E. Bates, Jr. & James E. Holmes, The Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act: 
Progress and Pitfalls, 17 GA. ST. BJ. 72 (1981); Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, 
Interstate Custody: Initial jurisdiction and Continuing jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 
14 FAM. L.Q 203 (1980) [hereafter Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody]; Brigitte 
M. Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act and 
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trated practitioners and judges by now suspect,6 the UCCJA has 
not provided a consistently reliable solution to the problem of the 
interstate child. 
Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, joint Custody, and Excessive Modifications, 65 
CAL. L. REv. 978 (1977) [hereafter Bodenheimer, Progress Under the UCCJA]; 
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody 
Litigation: Modification of Custody In and Out of State, 46 U. CoLO. L. REv. 495 
(1975) [hereafter Bodenheimer, Rights of Children]; Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, 
The Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught 
in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1207 (1969) [hereafter Bodenheimer, 
Legislative Remedy]; Brigitte M. Bodenheimer & Janet Neeley-Kvarme, 
jurisdiction Over Child Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REv. 229 (1979); William V. Dorsaneo III, Due Process, Full Faith and 
Credit and Family Law Litigation, 36 Sw. LJ. 1085 (1983); Henry H. Foster & 
Doris J. Freed, Child Snatching and Custodial Fights: The Case for the Uniform 
Child Custody jurisdiction Act, 28 HASTINGS LJ. 1011 (1977); Friedrich K. 
Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TuL. L. REv. 553 
(1989); Barry Kuten & Roberta Fox, Closing the Custody Floodgate: Florida 
Adopts the Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 409 
(1978); Lucy S. McGough & Anne R. Hughes, Charted Territory: The Louisiana 
Experience with the UCCJA, 44 LA. L. REv. 19 (1983);Johnj. Sampson & Harry 
L. Tindall, The Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act Comes to Texas-As 
Amended, Integrated and Improved, 46 TEx. BJ. 1096 (1983); Eric Stein, 
Uniformity and Diversity in a Divided-Power System: The United States' Experience, 
61 WASH. L. REv. 1081 (1986); Kathleen M. Duncan, Note, Children: Child 
Custody: The Case for Enactment of the Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act in 
Oklahoma, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 107 (1980); Evelyn L. Kosicki, Note, Child 
Custody jurisdiction in Ohio-Implementing the Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction 
Act, 12 AKRON L. REV. 121 (1978); Gail F. Moulds, Note, The Uniform Child 
Custody jurisdiction Act: Is It Working in Florida?, 13 STETSON L. REv. 431 
( 1984); Elizabeth C. Shuff, Comment, The Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act 
in Virginia, 14 U. RICH. L. REV. 435 (1980). 
But see Russell M. Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: jurisdiction, Recognition 
and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REV. 711 (1982) (criticizing parts of UCCJA as 
ineffective and unconstitutional); Leonard G. Ratner, Procedural Due Process 
and jurisdiction to Adjudicate: (a) Effective-Litigation Values vs. the Territorial 
Imperative (b) The Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 363 
(1980) [hereafter Ratner, Procedural Due Process] (suggesting, in the 
alternative, amending or reinterpreting certain provisions of UCCJA); 
Family Law: Courts Adoption of the Uniform Child Custody jurisdiction Act Offers 
Little Hope of Resolving Child Custody Conflicts, 60 MINN. L. REV. 820 (1976) 
(noting that most important issues are committed to courts' discretion). 
6 See, e.g., Emanuel A. Bertin, Relocation: No Common Ground; All States Agree 
That What s Good for the Child Is What Counts-but That s All They Agree On, F AM. 
Anvoc., Winter 1989, at 6; Dennis J. Jacobsen, A Judge Looks at Relocation: 
What Works in Court?, FAM. Anvoc., Winter 1989, at 30; Peter M. Walzer, 
jurisdiction: Maneuvering Through Complex Rules, FAM. Anvoc., Winter 1990, at 
16. 
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The UCCJA is a success in the sense that every state has 
adopted it without substantial alteration. 7 It now applies to all 
child custody litigation with interstate features. In too many 
7 See ALA. CoDE §§ 30-3-20 to -44 (1989 & Supp. 1991); ALASKA STAT. 
§§ 25.30.010 to .910 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 8-401 to -424 (1989 
& Supp. 1991); ARK. CooE ANN. §§ 9-13-201 to -228 (Michie 1991); CAL. 
Civ. CooE §§ 5150-5174 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 14-13-101 to -126 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 46b-90 to -114 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 13, 
§§ 1901-1925 (1981 & Supp. 1991); D.C. CooE ANN. §§ 16-4501 to -4524 
(1989 & Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.1302 to .1348 (West 1985 & 
Supp. 1992); GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 74-501 to -525 (Harrison 1981 & Supp. 
1989); HAW. REV. STAT.§§ 583-1 to -26 (1985); IDAHO CoDE§§ 32-1101 to-
1126 (1983 & Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, n 2101-2126 (Smith­
Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1991); IND. CoDE ANN. §§ 31-1-11.6-1 to -24 (West 
1979 & Supp. 1991); IowA CooE ANN.§§ 598A.1 to .25 (West 1981 & Supp. 
1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1301 to -1326 (1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 403.400 to .620 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1990); LA. REv. 
STAT. ANN.§§ 13:1700 to :1724 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); ME. REv. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 19, §§ 801-825 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991); Mo. FAM. LAw CooE 
ANN. §§ 9-201 to -224 (1984 & Supp. 1991); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 
209B, §§ 1-14 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); MICH. STAT. ANN.§§ 27A.651 to 
.673 (Callaghan 1986 & Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518A.01 to .25 
(West 1990 & Supp. 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-23-1 to -47 (1972 & 
Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.440 to .550 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 
1992); MoNT. CooE ANN. §§ 40-7-101 to -125 (1991); NEB. REv. STAT. 
§§ 43-1201 to -1225 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 125A.010 to .250 (1979); 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 458-A:1 to :25 (1983 & Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. 
ANN.§§ 2A:34-28 to -52 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 40-
10-1 to -24 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw§§ 75-a to -z 
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50A-1 to -25 (1989); 
N.D. CENT. CoDE §§ 14-14-01 to -26 (1981); OHIO REv. CooE ANN. 
§§ 3109.21 to .37 (Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, 
§§ 501-527 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 109.700 to .930 
(1989); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 5341-5366 (1981 & Supp. 1991); R.I. 
GEN. LAws§§ 15-14-1 to -26 (1988 & Supp. 1991); S.C. CoDE ANN.§§ 20-7-
782 to -830 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1991); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws ANN. 
§§ 26-5A-1 to -26 (1984 & Supp. 1991); TENN. CoDE ANN.§§ 36-6-201 to-
225 (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51 to .75 (1986 & Supp. 1991); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45c-1 to -26 (1987 & Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 15, §§ 1031-1051 (1989); VA. CooE ANN. §§ 20-125 to -146 (Michie 
1990); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 26.27.010 to .910 (West 1986 & Supp. 
1991); W. VA. CooE §§ 48-10-1 to -26 (1986 & Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 822.01 to .25 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991); WYo. STAT.§§ 20-5-101 
to -125 (1987 & Supp. 1991). 
For a partial catalog of state variations from the text of the UCCJA, see 
Christopher L. Blakesley, Child Custody-jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMORY 
L.J. 291, 316-25 (1986). 
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cases, however, it has merely added a layer of formal complexity 
(and, consequently, of uncertainty and expense) to interstate cus­
tody disputes, without producing either predictability or repose.8 
It has neither standardized state jurisdictional decisions nor dis­
couraged (and penalized) self-help. Litigants not subject to direct 
coercion by the court that rendered a custody decision can still 
evade an unwelcome decision with judicial assistance from 
another state's courts. 
Any assessment of the UCCJA is complicated by the Parental 
Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA),9 a federal statute that 
addresses precisely the same problem. Notwithstanding its popu­
lar name, the PKPA's most important provisions implement the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause. The PKPA requires states to defer 
to one another's custody decrees when specific criteria (derived 
from the UCCJA in most respects) are met. 10 At least forty-three 
states had adopted the UCCJA by the time the PKPA became 
effective. 11 The PKPA's sponsors hoped the legislation would 
force states that had not yet adopted the UCCJA to reach the 
same results as states that had, and would plug what they per-
s In this article, I use the term "repose" to refer to a forum's refusal even 
to consider a request to modify a custody decision, whether the decision is 
made by the forum or a foreign court. In the intrastate context, repose is 
often considered important to the best interests of the child. In the 
interstate context, repose is thought to discourage parents from moving 
from state to state with their children in search of more favorable custody 
decisions. 
9 Pub. L. No. 96-611 §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3568 (1980) (codified in scattered 
sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. I 1989)). 
10 See Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA) § 8(a), 94 Stat. 
3569-71 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988)). In addition to these 
provisions and a general statement of purposes in § 7, 94 Stat. 3568, the 
PKPA amends 42 U.S.C. § 663 to make the Parent Locator Service available 
for tracing an absent parent or child in connection with state or federal 
parental kidnaping prosecutions and with the making or enforcing of 
custody orders. See PKPA § 9, 94 Stat. 3571 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 663). It also "interprets" 18 U.S.C. § 1073, the crime oflnterstate 
Flight to Avoid Prosecution, to apply to parents subject to state felony 
prosecution for kidnaping their children. See PKPA § 10, 94 Stat. 3573. 
11 The latest date that the PKP A could have become effective was July 1, 
1981, the effective date specified in Pub. L. No. 96-611 § 2, 94 Stat. 3567. 
Because Pub. L. No. 96-611 also contains technical amendments to the 
Social Security Act entirely unrelated to the PKPA, see Pub. L. No. 96-611 
§§ 1-5, 11,94 Stat. 3566-68,3573-74 (codified in scattered sections of26 
and 42 U.S.C.), however, some courts have concluded that the PKPA 
became effective on December 28, 1980, its enactment date. See, e.g., 
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1992] Tragedy of the Interstate Child 851 
ceived as loopholes in the UCCJA! 2 Unfortunately, the sponsors' 
critique of the UCCJA was inadequate. The PKPA replicates 
some of the UCCJA's defects, and its attempts to improve on the 
UCCJA create additional problemsY Although the PKPA raises 
new issues of statutory interpretation and interstate deference 
(adding further to the complexity and expense of multistate cus­
tody litigation), it has not solved the problem of the interstate 
child any more than the UCCJA did. 
This article's thesis is that the UCCJA and PKPA have not elim­
inated jurisdictional competition because a federal system such as 
ours cannot achieve both of the Acts' two main instrumental 
goals-preventing or punishing "child-snatching" and promoting 
well-infon:ned decisions. Our system commits custody decisions 
to sovereign states, which make and modify the decisions accord­
ing to indeterminate precepts. Such a system will inevitably cre­
ate some version of the problem of the interstate child; so long as 
these features of our system persist, legislation cannot solve the 
problem. Therefore, although this article proposes amendments 
to the UCCJA designed to increase its effectiveness, in the alter­
native, it urges legislatures to repeal both the UCCJA and the 
PKPA, in order to eliminate the superfluous delays and transac­
tion costs that impede the courts' search for justice in individual 
child custody cases. 
This article begins by examining the fundamental nature of the 
problem that these statutes were intended to remedy. 14 It then 
reviews the history of our understanding of the problem15 and 
traces the development of reforming legislation, paying particular 
attention to the courts' interpretations of the statutes. 16 The arti-
Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1550-51 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 
u.s. 174 (1988). 
Forty-three states had adopted the UCCJA by 1980. HANDBOOK OF THE 
NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws AND 
PROCEEDINGS 523 (1980). By 1981, all United States jurisdictions had 
adopted the UCCJA except Massachusetts, Mississippi, Texas, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. HANDBOOK OF THE 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws AND 
PROCEEDINGS 4 70 ( 1981). 
12 See Henry H. Foster, Child Custody jurisdiction: UCCJA and PKPA, 27 
N.Y.L. Sen. L. REv. 297, 300-04 (1981). 
13 See infra part IV. 
14 See infra part lA. 
15 See infra part lB. 
16 See infra parts II-IV. 
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de concludes with proposals for further reform. 17 
I. THE "PROBLEM OF THE INTERSTATE CHILD" 
The "problem of the interstate child" is the jurisdictional 
conundrum presented by formally adjudicated child custody18 
disputes in which the child or the contestants have contact with 
more than one state: When, if at all, will a custody decision made 
in one state be enforced in another? This question arises when 
more than one forum seeks to adjudicate a dispute concerning 
the same child, and it raises four distinct jurisdictional issues. 
Two of these issues, "initial" and "continuing" jurisdiction, con­
cern the jurisdiction of the first state to consider the case. The 
other two, "enforcement" and "modification" jurisdiction, con­
cern the jurisdiction of another, subsequent, state. 
The first time a parent19 seeks judicial resolution of his or her 
child's custody, the issues raised by this implicit assertion that the 
chosen forum has "initial jurisdiction" are relatively simple. In 
broad terms, the court must decide whether the forum has suffi­
cient connection with the parents and the child to render a deci­
sion. After the initial custody decree has been made, the decree 
court may adjudicate any subsequent custody disputes only if it 
has "continuing jurisdiction."20 If a court in another state is 
asked to enforce the first state's decree, this raises both the issue 
1 7 See infra part V. 
18 "Custody" encompasses the entire bundle of non-economic parental 
rights: living with the child, visiting with the child, and making decisions 
about the child's education, medical care, discipline, associations, religious 
training, and so forth. Custody rights are commonly allocated between a 
child's parents when they divorce; these rights may also be altered by 
guardianship proceedings, abuse and neglect proceedings, adoption 
proceedings, see Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial 
Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, 
at 226, and juvenile delinquency proceedings. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 
(1966). 
19 This discussion assumes that the only possible child custody litigants 
are the child's parents, though solely for rhetorical ease. In fact, the child 
custody contest may be waged between a parent and some other natural 
person, between two non-parents, or between the state and one or more 
natural persons. The jurisdictional issues remain the same whether or not 
the contestants are parents. Both the UCCJA and the PKPA apply to all 
child custody litigation. See PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3471 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § l738A(b)); UCCJA § 2 & cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 133. 
20 See Dale F. Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 
LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 819, 825 (1944). 
HeinOnline -- 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 852 1991-1992
 
1992] Tragedy of the Interstate Child 853 
of the first state's jurisdiction to make the disputed order and the 
issue of the second state's "enforcement jurisdiction. " 21 Finally, 
if a second state is asked to modify, rather than enforce, a custody 
decree made in another state, this raises the issue of the second 
state's "modification jurisdiction. " 22 All of these jurisdictional 
issues may be litigated in the court whose jurisdiction is chal­
lenged, or collaterally in some other court. 
The most troublesome aspect of the problem is that, because 
courts sitting in different states may resolve the question of their 
own, or another state's, jurisdiction in each of these situations dif­
ferently, parties who are unsuccessful in one forum may be 
rewarded for relitigating in another; worse still, to the extent that 
a litigant's chance of success is improved if she brings the child 
with her when she moves, the law tends to undermine the stability 
of families as well as of judicial decisions. The problem was first 
named and studied in the middle years of this century (as soon as 
custody litigation became common in the United States).23 
Although this was not explicitly recognized then, the problem 
arises from fundamental features of our legal system rather than 
from particular laws. The next section describes this core of the 
problem. 
A. The Core of the Problem 
1. The Limits of Federalism 
Although the problem is usually analyzed as if it were produced 
by particular laws, in fact the problem is imbedded in the very 
structure of our legal system. When the problem is stripped of 
technical details, it is easy to understand why it has been so intrac­
table. Some form of the problem is inherent in a federal system 
like ours, which allocates child custody adjudication to autono-· 
mous state tribunals,24 so long as custody litigants, like other citi-
21 A court has enforcement jurisdiction if it may enforce a custody order. 
This question is now governed by the UCCJA. 
22 A court has modification jurisdiction if it may modify a custody order. 
This question is also now governed by the UCCJA. 
23 Ehrenzweig, Uniform Legislation, supra note 2, at l. Perhaps not 
coincidentally, the automobile began to make interstate migration cheaper 
and easier beginning in the 1920s. See FRANK DoNOVAN, WHEELS FOR A 
NATION 162-63 (1965). For an early scholarly description of the problem of 
the interstate child, see generally Herbert F. Goodrich, Custody of Children in 
Divorce Suits: The Conflict of Laws Problem, 7 CoRNELL L. REv. l (1921). 
24 This would be true whether the tribunal were a court, a master, a 
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zens, may move freely from state to state, and our courts continue 
to use the best interests of the child-or any other indeterminate 
test-to reach custody decisions that are modifiable during the 
child's minority. 
In such a system, whenever one parent moves away from the 
other, with or without the children, the move itself may be seen as 
changing circumstances sufficiently to justify a modification. The 
move also ensures that more than one forum will have at least a 
colorable interest in resolving any ensuing dispute over custody 
or visitation. With each interstate move, a new state becomes 
interested in the child's welfare or in the parent's custodial rights, 
yet the interests of states already concerned with the dispute, the 
child, or the litigants, do not necessarily diminish. 
Before the UCCJA and PKPA, the states subscribed to a variety 
of jurisdictional theories, in effect giving any forum with an inter­
est in an interstate custody dispute a rationale for seeking to 
resolve it.25 Moreover, under applicable Supreme Court prece­
dents, no state was bound to enforce another state's prior custody 
decision.26 Leonard Ratner, who first proposed a uniform law to 
reform the problem of the interstate child, believed that this radi­
cal jurisdictional indeterminacy, and the litigants' consequent 
uncertainty about the proper forum, caused litigants and their 
children to move in search of a more favorable forum. 27 He con­
cluded, therefore, that if all the states adopted uniform jurisdic­
tional rules and cooperated in requiring their courts to defer to 
custody determinations made in states with proper jurisdiction 
under such uniform rules, both the uncertainty and the jockeying 
for a better forum would end. 28 
Both the UCCJA and the PKPA follow Ratner's model. The 
accumulating decisions under these statutes demonstrate, how­
ever, that the problem of the interstate child has not been solved. 
States following these statutes' commands still render custody 
decisions to which other states, also relying on these statutes, 
family service agency, a court clinic, or an individual expert in children's 
needs, so long as each state's tribunal were independent of tribunals in 
other states. 
25 See infra part IB 1. 
26 See infra part IB2. 
27 See Leonard G. Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate Child Custody 
Problem: A Reply to Professor Currie and A Proposed Uniform Act, 38 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 183, 196-205 (1965) [hereafter Ratner, Legislative Resolution]. 
28 /d. at 183. 
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refuse to defer. Courts continue to review custody decisions' 
merits before deciding whether to enforce or modify the deci­
sions. Litigants may therefore still improve their positions by 
moving away from a state of adverse decision. Most distressingly, 
competent attorneys (even after thorough research) remain 
unable either to predict whether a court will deem itself jurisdic­
tionally empowered to decide a custody matter, or to advise their 
clients whether a custody decision will be binding in states other 
than the one where it was made. Although faulty design and poor 
drafting contribute to these statutes' failure, such flaws are not 
the fundamental cause of their ineffectiveness. The problem of 
the interstate child was never resolvable by Ratner's model. 
There are two paramount constraints on any solution to the 
problem of the interstate child. First, each state's courts are sov­
ereign within state boundaries and powerless outside them. 
Therefore, any state's judgment will have extraterritorial effect 
only if another independent sovereign gives it that effect. That is, 
another state's courts must subordinate the local interests in the 
dispute to the interests of a foreign state.29 Second, any solution 
must balance two important and incompatible objectives derived 
from modem substantive custody law: flexibility, and certainty in 
the dual senses of predictability and repose. 
The incompatibility of flexibility with certainty is an important 
tension in the internal law of the several states, but so long as a 
custody dispute is before a single sovereign the two objectives can 
be balanced and the tension resolved in each particular case. 
When a party's interstate move brings a custody case before the 
courts of a second sovereign, however, the competing needs of 
each jurisdiction may predude a solution. The next section 
shows how this works. First, it shows how substantive custody law 
tends to subvert predictability and repose even in intrastate cases; 
second, it shows how this tendency is magnified to unmanageable 
proportions in interstate cases. 
2. Substantive Custody Law 
a. Single-State Custody Cases 
In the middle years of this century, when scholars first noticed 
29 Although a forum's own interest in federalism, as expressed by the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause, might have been interpreted to mandate such 
cooperation, the law developed otherwise. See infra note 68 and 
accompanying text. 
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the problem of the interstate child, some states had substantive 
custody rules that favored one party over the other.30 With a few 
notable exceptions, this is no longer the case.31 We have by now 
evolved what is in effect a uniform substantive child custody law: 
30 During this period the courts were shifting from paternal preference to 
the tender years doctrine to the search for the best interests of the child. See 
infra note 32. Nevertheless, in 1944 Professor Stansbury asserted that "the 
applicable internal laws of the several states ... do not differ enough to 
create problems of choice of law." Stansbury, supra note 20, at 819. 
31 The most striking exceptions concern the effect on custody of a 
parent's extra-marital sexual encounters. In some states, a custodial parent 
who has a lover may lose custody solely on that basis. See, e.g., Jarrett v. 
Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 423-426 (Ill. 1979) (mother's open cohabitation 
with man makes award of custody to her improper), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 
(1980); Beck v. Beck, 341 So. 2d 580, 582 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (mother's 
"open and public adultery with her paramour" renders her unfit for 
custody); Parker v. Parker, 158 A.2d 607, 610 (Md. 1960) (mother's adultery 
raises strong presumption against her fitness for custody); Boykin v. Boykin, 
370 S.E.2d 884, 886 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (citing mother's "flagrant" 
promiscuity as reason to award custody to father); cf. Primm v. Primm, 409 
So. 2d 1288, 1290 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (court may require mother to keep 
her lover and her children apart as condition of custody); In re G.B.S. & 
A.L.S., 641 S.W.2d 776, 777-78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (not error to condition 
custody on father's not cohabiting with woman); Hanson v. Hanson, 187 
N.W.2d 647, 648-49 (Neb. 1971) (court may give legal custody to state, 
physical custody to mother, to ensure mother desists from post-divorce 
affairs). But see Helgenberger v. Helgenberger, 306 N.W.2d 867, 869 (Neb. 
1981) (sexual conduct determinative only when it affects children's welfare); 
Whaley v. Whaley, 399 N.E.2d 1270, 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (requiring 
proof of causal connection between parent's sexual conduct and harm to 
child); In re Walter, 557 P.2d 57, 57 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (improper to 
condition custody on mother's not cohabiting with a man);J.B. v. A.B., 242 
S.E.2d 248,256 (W.Va. 1978) (if sexual misconduct is not "outrageous," it 
is not relevant). 
Similarly, although some states will never give custody to a homosexual 
parent, see, e.g.,Jacobson v.Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981) (custody 
changed because mother is lesbian); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985) 
(award of custody to actively homosexual father error of law), others have 
held that a parent's sexual orientation is relevant to a custody determination 
only if it is adversely affecting the child. See, e.g., Birdsall v. Birdsall, 243 
Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1988) (parental homosexuality no bar to visitation); 
Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980) (mother's lesbianism 
alone insufficient to deny her return of custody); In re Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 
886 (Wash. 1983) (en bane) (parental homosexuality no bar to visitation); 
Schuster v. Schuster, 585 P.2d 130 (Wash. 1978) (en bane) (lesbian 
cohabitation in violation of prior custody decrees insufficient to warrant 
change of custody). See generally Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation 
and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1508, 1630-40 (1989) (examining factors, 
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the courts must try to achieve the best interests of the child. Liti­
gants do not travel from state to state in search of more favorable 
substantive law. Formally, the law is the same everywhere. Why, 
then, do litigants continue moving to other states to avoid 
adverse custody decisions? Because substantive custody law does 
not decide cases, and all custody decisions are modifiable. Liti­
gants move to get yet another day in court, lured by the indeter­
minacy of substantive custody law's best interests ideal into 
believing that a different tribunal will reach a more favorable 
result. 
Modem child custody law is characterized by a tension between 
certainty and flexibility. The tension is clearly evident in the 
modem goal of making custody decisions "in the best interests of 
the child." That phrase heralded the nineteenth-century shift 
from the feudal rule, which required courts to place a child in her 
father's custody, to our present child-centered inquiry.32 The 
feudal rule exalted certainty over flexibility. It was, if nothing 
else, easy to understand and apply. "The best interests of the 
child" is neither. There is no consensus-legal, scientific, or soci­
etal-·as to either the "best" outcome for children or even as to 
including sexual orientation, that influence courts in . resolving custody 
disputes). 
32 Early American cases echoed their English models in treating the 
father as the natural guardian of his child who had an alienable property 
right in the child's custody as well as in any income from the child's work. 
See, e.g., Bermudez v. Bermudez, 2 Mart. 180 (La. 1812) (awarding custody 
to father after mother left); State v. Barney, 14 R.I. 62 (1883) (holding that 
father may assign infant's custody to paternal grandmother over mother's 
objections). But cf. State ex rei. Neider v. Reuff, 2 S.E. 801, 803 (W. Va. 
1887) (noting father's unalienable right to custody and control of minor 
child). Beginning in the mid-1800s, however, some courts conditioned the 
father's rights on the child's well-being. See, e.g., State ex rei. Paine v. Paine, 
23 Tenn. (4 Hum.) 523 (1843) (denying custody to morally unfit father). But 
see, e.g., Ely v. Gammel, 52 Ala. 584 (1875) (granting custody to adulterous 
father). At approximately the same time, concern for very young children's 
welfare led some courts to place them with their mothers. See, e.g., State v. 
Stigall, 22 NJ.L. 286 (1849) (awarding custody of one- and three-year-old 
children to mother, but custody of five-year-old to father). These doctrines 
gradually evolved into a more general concern for the child's "best 
interests." See, e.g., State ex rei. Neider v. Reuff, 2 S.E. 801, 802-06 (W.Va. 
1887) (noting general rule that father is entitled to custody of minor 
children, but awarding custody to mother under developing best interests 
standard) .. See generally MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GovERNING THE HEARTH 234-
42 (1985) (discussing shift from father-oriented, property-based custody 
standards to standards that emphasize child's best interest). 
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the conditions most likely to produce any desired result. Rather, 
in our pluralistic society many different, conflicting, strongly-held 
opinions exist on both those questions. 
Given this plurality of opinion, the litigants in every case may 
dispute both what outcome would be "best" for a particular child 
and what means are most likely to achieve any desired outcome.33 
Using whatever facts and arguments seem appropriate in a partic­
ular case, judges must develop a case-specific standard for each 
custody decision, and then must apply this standard to the very 
facts that were used to generate it.34 The "best interests of the 
child" is therefore, at best, an ideal rather than either "a rule"35 
or "a standard. " 36 A court can neither reach nor rationally 
approach "the best interests of the child." In virtually any case, 
another equally diligent tribunal might reach a different 
decision. 37 
Moreover, in most states custody decisions are freely modifia­
ble whenever a judge determines that the child's welfare requires 
a change of custody. Evaluating whether a second judge has 
made a wiser decision than the first is at least as difficult as evalu­
ating the result in the first instance. Modem custody litigation is 
therefore characterized by great discretion for judges and corre­
spondingly great uncertainty for litigants. It exalts flexibility over 
predictability to an extreme degree on the assumption that super­
ficially similar cases need not be decided alike because no two 
cases can be meaningfully similar. 
Reformers dissatisfied with this system have often focused on 
making the flexibility of the best interests ideal fulfill its promise 
of individual justice. This motivation underlies attempts to 
increase the sophistication of case-specific standards by educating 
and supporting the decision-makers. Many states now give 
33 See Mnookin, supra note 18, at 232-37. 
34 /d. at 231. 
35 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law AdJudication, 89 
HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1687-88 (1976) (defining rule as "a directive to an 
official that requires him to respond to the presence together of each of a 
list of easily distinguishable factual aspects of a situation by intervening in a 
determinate way"); Mnookin, supra note 18, at 231 n.21 (stating that the 
"best interests of the child" is neither a rule nor determinative of a rule). 
36 See Kennedy, supra note 35, at 1688 ("A standard refers directly to one 
of the substantive objectives of the legal order."). 
37 Because of the standard's indeterminacy, this would be true whether 
the tribunal were a court, a master, a family service agency, a court clinic, or 
an individual expert in children's needs. 
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judges who make custody decisions institutionalized access to 
advice from professionals staffing court clinics and probation 
departments.38 Some also give judges ample opportunity to 
develop wisdom in specialized family courts.39 
Unfortunately, even wise and sophisticated flexibility can be 
systemically destabilizing. However well the best interests ideal's 
flexibility may serve the goal of justice in the individual case, it 
endangers the entire system's legitimacy. Every custody decision 
based on a case-specific standard is vulnerable to the charge that 
it represents merely one judge's personal predilections rather 
than the rule of law.40 Litigants and counsel are chronically dis­
satisfied with such flexibility. This dissatisfaction is reflected in 
the latter's perennial attempts to identify common patterns in 
custody decisions,41 in settlements based on the parties' risk-tak­
ing preferences rather than on "the law,"42 and in the increasing 
use of nonjudicial decision-making processes.43 
The system's need for legitimacy in the face of the substantive 
standard's radical indeterminacy therefore creates a counter­
vailing need for certainty-for predictability or, at a minimum, for 
repose. Because the best interests ideal renders custody results 
unavoidably unpredictable, the system's need for legitimacy has 
become focused on the goal of repose. Explicit pleas for repose 
are made by those who advocate limiting the courts' power to 
modify existing custody orders.44 Some child psychologists agree 
38 See Robert J. Levy, Custody Investigations in Divorce Cases, 1985 AM. B. 
FouND. REs. J. 713, 714. 
39 !d. 
40 Jeff Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate 
Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q 1, 3 (1984). 
41 See generally, e.g., id. (identifying common patterns in 241 reported 
1982 appellate custody decisions nationwide). 
42 See Mnookin, supra note 18, at 230-37. But see Sally B. Sharp, 
Modification of Agreement Based Custody Decrees: Unitary or Dual Standard, 68 VA. 
L. REv. 1263 (1982) (arguing that custodial arrangements reached by 
parental agreement are wiser and better-informed than judicial 
determinations or expert opinions). 
43 See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal 
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727, 728 (1988). 
44 Although the modem trend is toward requiring a "substantial" or 
"material" change of circumstances for modification, see Uniform Marriage 
and Divorce Act§ 409, 9A U.L.A. 628 (1987); Atkinson, supra note 40, at 5, 
some states require much less, see, e.g., Parten v. Parten, 351 So. 2d 613, 615 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (modifying custody order on basis of facts unknown to 
judge at first trial); accord Hill v. Hill, 620 P.2d 1114, 1119 (Kan. 1980); 
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with the often-heard argument that, because stability is in chil­
dren's best interest, modifications should be difficult to obtain.45 
Nevertheless, the best interests ideal undermines the goal of 
repose by requiring that, to protect the child from unforseen and 
unforeseeable dangers, custodial decrees must remain perpetu­
ally modifiable.46 Thus, the ordinary tendency of custody law, 
even when litigation takes place entirely within one state, is 
towards flexibility even at the cost of systemic legitimacy. This 
tendency is greatly magnified in multistate litigation. 
b. Special Characteristics of Multistate Custody Cases 
Multistate child custody cases are very often true conflicts,47 in 
which two or more states have a genuine interest in resolving 
matters, each in its own way. All true conflicts are notoriously 
and inherently difficult, but child custody conflicts are especially 
so. A court must decide not which state's law to apply but 
whether to hear the case at all. In this context, flexibility means 
holding another hearing; certainty means enforcing an existing 
order or deferring to a proceeding that is pending elsewhere. 
In principle, every state court has an interest both in flexibility 
(to respond to the forum's interest in the dispute by doing justice 
in the particular case) and in certainty (to protect the legitimacy 
of the court and of the system of justice generally). In any partic­
ular multistate case, however, the need for flexibility will seem 
most urgent to the court with a local child before it exhibiting all 
Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); In re Potts, 
699 P.2d 799, 800 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). 
45 Indeed, perpetual uncertainty in custodial arrangements may be more 
dangerous for children than judicial inflexibility is, because" 'poor parental 
models are easier to adapt to than ever shifting ones.'" Bodenheimer, 
Legislative Remedy, supra note 5, at 1209 (quoting ANDREW S. WATSON, 
PsYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 197 (1968)); accord May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 
528, 541-42 ( 1953) (stating that children need to be free of "incessant tug 
of war between squabbling parents"); JosEPH GoLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD, & 
ALBERT j. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 31-39 (1973). 
46 See, e.g., Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 612 (1958) (Frankfurter,]., 
dissenting). 
47 A state is "interested" in having its law applied if doing so would 
advance the state's policy. If more than one state has an interest, there is a 
"true conflict." See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objectives 
in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 177, 
183-84 (1963);john H. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest In Protecting Its 
Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 173 (l98l);joseph Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 
B.U. L. REV. I (1989). 
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the compelling particularity of its needs and vulnerabilities. That 
court will want to make a new inquiry (and perhaps a new order) 
instead of blindly enforcing a foreign decree. Indeed, the inter­
state move itself may seem a "change of circumstances" sufficient 
to warrant at least a new hearing and perhaps a change of custody 
as well. 
Conversely, the need for certainty will seem most urgent to the 
court that lacks the power to enforce its own orders and that must 
rely on another state's court to do so. Such a court will not want 
to allow a litigant to evade an unfavorable ruling merely by cross­
ing a state border. In multistate, as in single-state, custody cases, 
the legal system's need for legitimacy in the face of apparent inde­
terminacy translates into a need for certainty. In the context of a 
request to modify a custody order, certainty would mean repose, 
that is, refusing even to consider the request. 
In a single-state case, a single tribunal must balance the interest 
in certainty with the interest in flexibility inherent in the best 
interests ideal.48 In a multistate case, however, no one court can 
comprehend the competing forces. "The legal system" becomes 
a term with uncertain meaning. Meeting the system's need for 
legitimacy in multistate cases would require cooperation of a kind 
that the situation itself undermines. 
Although motivated by concern for children, a court's willing­
ness to retry custody in multistate cases can be especially trouble­
some both to the litigants and to the system ofjustice. Most child 
custody disputes reach negotiated, not litigated, solutions.49 
Only the most recalcitrant disputes are fully litigated. The legal 
system's ability to impose a resolution on such disputes depends 
heavily on the litigants' perceptions of its legitimacy. A child cus­
tody decision will seem legitimate only to the extent that it seems 
to be the product of serious and thoughtful attention to the par­
ticular children's needs and to the parents' competing claims of 
ability to meet those needs. The best interests ideal's inherent 
flexibility presents some risk to the law's legitimacy even when a 
child custody dispute is conducted entirely in the courts of one 
48 See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the 
UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MicH. L. REv. 2215, 2288-97 (1991) 
(defending best interests ideal for enabling judicial discretion where it is 
needed). 
49 Cj Mnookin, supra note 18, at 288 ("Divorcing parents often negotiate 
and agree about child custody while simultaneously settling other issues 
such as visitation, child support, and marital property division."). 
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state, but the risk is greatly magnified in multistate cases. If a 
decision seems to reflect only the personal values of the new 
judge-or the parochial values of the new forum-it will not be 
respected. 
When a litigant doubts a custody decision's legitimacy and 
believes she can improve her position by taking the dispute to 
another forum, she may be strongly tempted to do just that. 50 If 
this tactic proves successful, and particularly if the mere change of 
forum seems to have contributed to the change in result, the 
other party will, in tum, be tempted to continue the cycle by tak­
ing the child somewhere else. Iflarge numbers oflitigants "seize 
and run,"51 the legal system as a whole will be perceived as pow­
erless to decide custody questions without the parties' consent; 
this, in tum, will likely encourage further self-help. 
That some custody litigants will respond to an unfavorable cus­
tody order not by complying but by moving away with the child 
and relitigating in a new forum should come as no surprise. 
Indeed, the wonder is that so many parents acquiesce in adverse 
custody decisions. Parents are likely to have deeply-held beliefs 
about their children's needs. An unsuccessful custody litigant 
may fervently believe that the trial court wrongly assessed the 
child's needs, the parents' respective fitness to meet those needs, 
or both. The litigant may conclude that the court's erroneous 
decision puts the child in grave danger, from which the original 
state's legal system provides no protection. If another jurisdic­
tion seems likely to take a fresh look at the custody question, the 
losing litigant will thus be strongly tempted to go there. Our cul­
ture's high valuation of a parent's willingness to make sacrifices 
and take risks for his or her child will, in such circumstances, sup­
port any parental inclination toward self-help. Even a parent who 
customarily is a Good Citizen (obeying the law because it is a 
source of moral guidance) may therefore become a Bad Man (or 
Woman) when he or she loses a custody dispute (merely asking 
what consequences will follow disobedience).52 
50 At one time, counsel may have even advised her to follow this course. 
See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 
VA. L. REV. 379, 393 (1959). 
51 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 542 (1953) (Jackson,J., dissenting). 
52 See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 
(1897) (stating that to know law, one must "look at it as a bad man, who 
cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enable him 
to predict"); William Twining, The Bad Man Revisited, 58 CoRNELL L. REv. 
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The radical indeterminacy of the best interests ideal, and the 
advantages that a local litigant has over a party who lives far from 
the tribunal, also combine to encourage such a step. Courts han­
dling custody matters are typically local courts. The judge may 
know local witnesses in person or by reputation; their lifestyles, 
values, and even their accents will be familiar. A local litigant 
seeking to evade a foreign custody order will likely be supported 
by such local witnesses: the opposing party will be trying to pre­
vent those witnesses from being heard in the local court. Under­
standably, courts are reluctant to close their doors to custody 
disputes in which their state has some interest, or to accept any 
other state's custody determination as final whenever a local peti­
tioner can make a colorable claim that custody should be reexam­
ined. 53 Courts appear particularly reluctant to defer to an out-of­
state tribunal when the dispute involves a local family or there is 
an abundance of local evidence. 
Moreover, a foreign decision may well reflect unfamiliar-per­
haps even actively disliked-cultural values. The evidence on 
which the foreign tribunal relied will probably be represented, at 
best, by a relatively unpersuasive cold transcript.54 The foreign 
expert witnesses were likely affiliated with unfamiliar institutions. 
The foreign fact witnesses may well have displayed unfamiliar val­
ues and life experiences. Such evidence is harder for a court to 
assess (and therefore perhaps inevitably less persuasive) than evi­
dence from local witnesses. 
The distant party relying on a foreign decree has additional dis­
advantages. She must somehow find and communicate with 
forum counsel. She must contend with regional chauvinism. If 
the forum orders a hearing, she must bear the costs of transport­
ing and housing witnesses or forgo their testimony. The party 
seeking a modification need only convince a court that a local 
275, 279 (1973) ("[W]hile the Good Citizen asks 'How should I behave?," 
the Bad Man inquires 'What will happen to me if I embark on this course of 
action?' "). 
53 Before the UCCJA, most courts disregarded other states' custody 
decisions, at least in reported cases. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra 
note 2, at 34 7; Stansbury, supra note 20, at 828-29. Although both the 
UCCJA and the PKPA were designed to alleviate the problem, it persists 
nonetheless. 
54 In Massachusetts, for example, there may be no transcript at all. See 
MASS. GEN. R. PRoB. CT. 18 (party wishing stenographic record must 
request it 48 hours before hearing). 
HeinOnline -- 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 863 1991-1992
 
864 University of California, Davis [Vol. 25:845 
child's welfare should be determined locally, and that the local 
parent is fit. Taken together, these factors account for the local 
party's "home court advantage." The prospect of enjoying such 
an advantage, in tum, furnishes yet another incentive for a disap­
pointed custody litigant to seize and run. 
In short, multistate custody cases have a structural tendency 
toward flexibility that permits them to be relitigated virtually 
indefinitely, until the parties' energies flag or the child reaches 
majority. This tendency made the problem of the interstate child 
notorious in the middle years of the century. It continues to 
undermine the legislative "solutions" of the UCCJA and the 
PKPA. 
B. The Traditional Understanding of the Problem 
The scholars who identified the problem of the interstate child 
analyzed it on a different level. They agreed generally on its 
causes. A given interstate custody dispute could be brought in 
the courts of more than one state. The states frequently ignored 
one another's custody decisions. Thus, custody litigants, by mov­
ing from state to state, could avoid unfavorable orders. The 
traditional understanding was that this problem resulted because 
there were too many interested forums and they granted too little 
interstate deference. 
1. Too Many Interested Forums 
Before the UCCJA, interstate custody disputes were clothed in 
judicially-developed doctrines of jurisdiction, comity, and full 
faith and credit. Courts and commentators used these traditional 
doctrines to express the interests at play in child custody disputes. 
Because many legitimate interests compete in such disputes, 
these traditional doctrines generated many potentially inconsis­
tent bases for jurisdiction. 
Litigation about child custody, like other family litigation, ordi­
narily takes place in state court because the underlying values are 
thought to be peculiarly suited to local determination and con­
trol.55 Children's welfare, if endangered, is of the same parens 
55 See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (dictum) (stating that 
domestic relations exception applies to custody); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 
(21 How.) 582 (1859) (creating domestic relations exception to federal 
jurisdiction). But cf. Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) 
(criticizing domestic relations exception); Sharon E. Rush, Domestic Relations 
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patriae interest to the state where the children are found, 56 as it is 
of urgent practical interest to their parents. Even if a child is not 
in danger, a state has at least the same interest in the family con­
nections of a child domiciled57 or resident58 there, perhaps mag­
nified by the child's youthful vulnerability, as it has in those of any 
citizen. Traditionally, these interests were described, by analogy 
to the state's interest in its citizens' marriages and divorces, as 
jurisdiction over the child's "status."59 
Unless the child is also physically present there, however, the 
state of the child's domicile or residence may be unable to 
enforce its custody decision because the child is not within its 
power. In contrast, no matter how tenuous its interest in the 
child, the state in which the child is physically present has the 
power to enforce its custody order. Thus, a court's jurisdiction 
might be premised on the child's mere presence within the state. 
Courts articulated this by saying that the child was the res in 
dispute.60 
Finally, a plurality of the Supreme Court gave jurisdictional rec­
ognition to the parents' strong interest in their child's custody in 
May v. Anderson.61 In May, the court that made the custody order 
had personal jurisdiction over one parent and in rem jurisdiction 
over the children.62 The Court held that the absent parent could 
relitigate custody in another state because the decree court lacked 
Law: Federaljurisdiction and State Sovereignty in Perspective, 60 NoTRE DAME L. 
REv. 1, 30 (1984) (arguing that federal courts should narrow domestic 
relations exception by entertaining domestic relations cases "unless 
abstention ... principles warrant judicial restraint"). 
56 See 43 CJ.S. Infants § 5 (1978 & Supp. 1991). 
57 Because a child cannot establish her own domicile, determining a 
child's domicile is even more difficult than determining an adult's. See 
Stansbury, supra note 20, at 821-22. 
58 The difficulties of determining a child's domicile, and practical 
concerns for the child's welfare, led many courts to substitute residence, 
overtly or covertly, for domicile. See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra 
note 2, at 351. 
59 See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536-42 (1953) Uackson, J., 
dissenting); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws§§ 144-155 (1934); 
Goodrich, supra note 23, at 2-3; Stansbury, supra note 20, at 820-24. 
60 See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2, at 347; Ratner, 
Federal System, supra note 2, at 797. 
61 345 u.s. 528 (1953). 
62 /d. at 530; see id. at 534 & n. 7. The court appeared to exercise in rem 
jurisdiction over the children based on their status as domiciliaries of the 
state, rather than based on their physical presence in the state. See id. 
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personal jurisdiction over her.63 
Unless both parents and all of the children were domiciled and 
physically present in the state of the children's birth, interests in 
the children and parents were likely to be scattered among several 
states. Believing that a search for the one state with the best 
claim to jurisdiction would be futile except when those interests 
coalesced in a single state, some authorities recognized concur­
rentjurisdiction in several states over the same custody dispute.64 
However, even if it had "concurrent jurisdiction" under this anal­
ysis, a state court with power over neither the child nor the losing 
party remained unable to enforce its custody decisions.65 In 
other civil matters, if the court deciding a case lacked direct con­
trol over both the losing party and the res, the winner could still 
enforce her judgment in some other appropriate state, provided 
that she could show that the first court had jurisdiction, because 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the states to respect and 
enforce one another's decisions.66 Unfortunately, in custody liti­
gation, a winning litigant was often unable to enforce ajudgment 
rendered by a court with power over neither the loser nor the 
child. 
63 !d. at 534. The plurality opinion seems to be based on the parent's 
due process interest in the custody of her child, a right "far more precious 
... than property rights." !d. at 533. Justice Frankfurter's concurring view 
was that although custody determinations are never entitled to full faith and 
credit because they are modifiable, the parents nevertheless have no due 
process rights that would prevent a state from enforcing a foreign custody 
decision through comity. See id. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
Frankfurter's rationale has been influential. See infra notes 165-72 and 
accompanying text (discussing UCCJA's drafters' reliance on Frankfurter's 
concurrence in May). 
64 See Sampsell v. Superior Court, 197 P.2d 739 (Cal. 1948) (Traynor,].); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 79 (1971); Ehrenzweig, 
Uniform Legislation, supra note 2, at 3; Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 
27, at 195; Stansbury, supra note 20, at 831-32. 
65 See Sampsell, 197 P.2d at 756 (Schauer,]., dissenting). 
66 See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires 
the states to enforce one another's judgments in most, but not all, cases. 
Full faith and credit is not required if the state rendering the decision lacked 
personal jurisdiction, see, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1957) 
(holding that Delaware had no obligation to grant full faith and credit to 
Florida judgment where Florida court lacked personal jurisdiction), or 
subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. I ( 1909) (holding 
direct order to transfer land located in another state not entitled to full faith 
and credit). 
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2. Too Little Interstate Deference 
Before the UCCJA and the PKPA, two special features of cus­
tody law made enforcing in one state a custody order that had 
been made in another an often insurmountable obstacle for a cus­
tody litigant. First, because of the unsettled and varying theories 
about custody jurisdiction, a second state's court could refuse to 
enforce a custody decree on the ground that the first court's juris­
diction was inadequate.67 Second, the Supreme Court had held 
that if the court that rendered a custody decision may modify it, 
other courts may also modify it because they need give the deci­
sion no greater deference.68 Therefore, a second state's court 
might refuse to enforce even a jurisdictionally unassailable deci­
sion because it could have been modified where made and, due to 
changed circumstances, it had become unwise on the merits.69 
Moreover, some states held custody decisions to be inherently 
modifiable, even if circumstances remained unchanged.70 Those 
states' custody decisions were never entitled to full faith and 
credit elsewhere. 
Because of these doctrines, jurisdiction to make a custody deci­
sion was often the subject of dispute, and no custody decision was 
clearly entitled to enforcement outside the state in which it was 
made. Hence, disappointed litigants sometimes perceived that 
they had nothing to lose by taking the child, and the dispute, to a 
new forum for further litigation.71 Because the states only 
deferred to one another's custody decisions as a matter of com­
ity-that is, after a hearing had convinced the local judge that she 
would have reached the same result anyway-before the UCCJA 
67 See, e.g., May, 345 U.S. at 534 (holding that Ohio need not give full 
faith and credit to custody order made by a Wisconsin court that lacked 
personal jurisdiction over one parent). 
68 See, e.g., Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); New York ex rei. Halvey 
v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947). 
69 Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2, at 352. 
70 See, e.g., In re Bort, 25 Kan. 215 (1881); see also Ehrenzweig, Interstate 
Recognition, supra note 2, at 352-55 (discussing Kansas rule); cf. Kovacs, 356 
U.S. at 609-16 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that child's welfare is 
paramount consideration and adherence to Full Faith and Credit Clause 
must yield if enforcing another state's order would adversely affect child's 
welfare); May, 345 U.S. at 535-36 (Frankfurter,]., concurring) (stating that a 
prior decree "reflecting another state's discharge of its responsibility at 
another time" did not affect forum state's responsibility for child's welfare). 
7l Justice Jackson named this third feature "a rule of seize-and-run." 
May, 345 U.S. at 542 Uackson, J., dissenting). 
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and the PKPA, only extrajudicial logistics would deter a Bad Man 
(or Woman) who had just lost a custody dispute from seizing the 
child and running to a new forum. 
This, then, was the traditional understanding of the problem of 
the interstate child. Parents, having many reasons to be dissatis­
fied with and disrespectful of adverse custody decisions, could 
move freely from state to state with their children; state courts 
were able, and usually willing, to consider custody anew regard­
less of the determination made by a different state's court. This 
way of understanding the problem was fairly generally established 
by mid-century. The next sections trace the development of the 
idea that reform was possible and desirable, and sketch the evolu­
tion of the reforming legislation, the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act. 
II. THE IDEA OF REFORM 
The scholars who studied the problem of the interstate child 
agreed generally on its characteristics. They disagreed, however, 
about whether reform was desirable. The most important schol­
ars studying the problem were Albert Ehrenzweig, Brainerd Cur­
rie, and Leonard Ratner. Of those three, only Professor Ratner 
found comprehensive reform attractive. 
When Professor Ehrenzweig studied interstate custody deci­
sions in the early 1950s, 72 he was primarily concerned with cor­
rectly describing what courts actually were doing. He identified 
two principles, which, he claimed, correctly predicted court 
behavior in such cases. 73 First, Ehrenzweig said that courts sel­
dom enforced foreign custody awards74 for three reasons: (1) they 
believed that the court making the award had lacked jurisdiction 
to do so; 75 (2) they found that there had been an intervening 
change of circumstances;76 or (3) they felt a duty to make an 
independent inquiry into the welfare and needs of any child 
brought before them. 77 Second, he said that when courts did 
respect foreign custody awards they usually did so because, after 
72 See generally Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2. 
73 See id. at 349-57. These differed from the result required by the 1934 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws. See REsTATEMENT OF CoNFLICT oF LAws 
§§ 144-47 (1934). 
74 See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2, at 348. 
75 /d. at 349-52. 
76 /d. at 352. 
77 /d. at 352-55. 
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inqumng into the facts, they found no material change of 
circumstances. 78 
Ehrenzweig found only one exception to the pattern of disre­
garding prior foreign custody decrees. 79 He found that courts 
usually did enforce foreign orders against a party who had 
brought a minor child into the jurisdiction either " 'in defiance of 
a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction of a sister state,' " 80 
or " 'wrongfully . . . for the purpose of avoiding and circum­
venting' " 81 a foreign order. He called this the "clean hands doc­
trine. " 82 According to Ehrenzweig, courts failed to apply the 
clean hands doctrine in only two situations: when the opposing 
party "had not claimed his rights for a period and had himself 
violated the prior decree,''83 and when the foreign decree seemed 
punitive because it deprived the now-local party of previously­
granted custody "on the mere ground of his disobedience."84 
Although Ehrenzweig was principally interested in description 
rather than prescription, he did suggest that a "fully satisfactory 
solution" might be possible if the states decided child custody 
"without regard to the cooperation or resistance of the feuding 
parties," that is, if a system of public regulation were substituted 
for private litigation over child custody.85 
In contrast, Professor Ratner deplored the existing law, and 
made the first systematic proposal for improving interstate child 
custody jurisdiction.86 After studying state decisions and the 
Supreme Court's evolving constitutional doctrines,87 Ratner 
selected four goals for reform: ( 1) to hold the trial at a place fair 
to the parties; (2) to have the decision made by a court with maxi­
mal access to the evidence; (3) to discourage multiple litigation; 
and (4) to discourage "abduction, removal, retention, or conceal-
78 See id. at 356-5 7. 
79 See id. at 357-60. 
80 !d. at 362 (quoting Ex parte Memmi, 181 P.2d 885, 888 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1947)). 
81 !d. (quoting Koebrich v. Simpson, 197 P.2d 820, 821 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1948)). 
82 /d. at 360. 
83 !d. at 369 (citing Cook v. Cook, 135 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1943)). 
84 /d. at 370. 
85 !d. at 372. 
86 See Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 815. 
8 7 See id. at 798 (discussing Supreme Court decisions involving full faith 
and credit in custody cases). 
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ment of a child in disregard of the reasonable claims of others. "88 
He found the existing law seriously deficient in meeting these 
goals because the "amorphous concepts of comity and concurrent 
jurisdiction" depended heavily on the state courts' "unpredict­
able discretion" and therefore promoted "continuing uncertainty 
in the resolution of custody disputes, continuing insecurity in the 
relationship of the child to its parents, and continuing expense to 
the individuals and the community."89 
Ratner proposed that the states adopt the goals he identified, 
and he suggested firstjudicial90 and then legislative91 methods by 
which they could do so. He believed the states could accomplish 
all four goals by abolishing concurrent jurisdiction over child cus­
tody disputes and instead reposing exclusive jurisdiction in a sin­
gle forum, the state of the child's "established home."92 If the 
child had no established home, the appropriate forum would be 
the "state of the last non-transient family abode,"93 or the "forum 
selected by one parent and accepted by the other without objec­
tion."94 After the initial decree had been made, Ratner would 
88 Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 183. Professor Ratner 
had initially identified eleven objectives. See Ratner, Federal System, supra 
note 2, at 808-10. He later boiled these down to four. See Ratner, Legislative 
Resolution, supra note 27, at 183. 
89 Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 815. 
90 See id. at 815-16. 
91 See Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 196-205. 
92 See Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 815-16; Ratner, Legislative 
Resolution, supra note 27, at 200 (§ 4(1) of Proposed Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act). Somewhat arbitrarily, Professor Ratner defined the child's 
established home as the community where a child had been living for at 
least six months. Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 818. He believed 
that the states could adopt this standard through uniform legislation or 
court decisions, or Congress could impose it by implementing the Due 
Process or Full Faith and Credit Clauses. /d. at 827 & n.l53. When 
Professor Ratner developed a proposed act implementing his ideas, 
however, he did not give the "established home" exclusive jurisdiction to 
decide custody. See generally Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27. 
93 Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 818; see Ratner, Legislative 
Resolution, supra note 27, at 200 (§ 4(l)(b) of proposed uniform act). 
94 Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 819; see Ratner, Legislative 
Resolution, supra note 27, at 200 (§ 4(l)(c) of proposed uniform act). 
Similarly, Ratner's proposed act permitted a state where the child was "a 
resident" to exercise jurisdiction if "the child resides with a defendant 
whose interest is substantially adverse to a parent petitioner." /d. (§ 4(2)(b) 
of proposed uniform act). 
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have limited other states to enforcing (rather than modifying) it,95 
so long as the state of initial decree remained the child's estab­
lished home.96 If the child acquired a new "established home,"97 
a court there would have jurisdiction to modify custody;98 if not, 
the proper forum would be the last established home if a contest­
ant continued to reside there,99 or otherwise the child's new 
residence. 100 
Underlying the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction had been a 
recognition that several states may have legitimate interests in a 
child's welfare. Ratner shared that recognition, but for him state 
interests derived from the parties' interests; he thought states 
permitted relitigation because a local party had not received a fair 
opportunity to be heard elsewhere. 101 This perspective led him 
to respond in a new way. 
Rather than permitting serial proceedings, each with a claim to 
legitimacy based on local interests, Ratner's statute attempted to 
involve all potentially interested persons in one action. To give 
everyone with a claim to the child's custody an opportunity to be 
heard, and to bind each one personally, 102 Ratner's statute 
95 See Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 832-33. Ratner codified this 
idea, with some difficulty, in §§ 5 and 9(2) of his proposed act. See Ratner, 
Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 201-03. 
96 See Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 822; Ratner, Legislative 
Resolution, supra note 27, at 203 (§ 9(2) of proposed uniform act). 
97 Although Ratner initially said this could only occur with court approval 
or by parental consent, see Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 820, his 
proposed act permitted either parent to create a new established home 
unilaterally simply by moving with the child and waiting, see Ratner, 
Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 199 (§ 2(20) of proposed uniform act). 
98 See Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 820-21. However, Ratner's 
proposed act permitted a state where the child had acquired a new 
established home to dismiss a petition to modify "without prejudice" if 
jurisdiction had been obtained in violation of another state's decree. See 
Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 202 (§ 7(2) of proposed 
uniform act). 
99 Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 820-22; Ratner, Legislative 
Resolution, supra note 27, at 201 (§ 5(2) of proposed uniform act). 
10o Ratner, Federal System, supra note 27, at 821; Ratner, Legislative 
Resolution, supra note 27, at 201 (§ 5(3) of proposed uniform act). 
101 See Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 184-88. 
102 Under the plurality opinion in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), 
the forum court could bind only those contestants within its personal 
jurisdiction to its child custody determination. See id. at 533-34. 
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required custody pleadings to identify all interested persons, 103 
made all interested persons necessary parties to the custody 
action, 104 and permitted long-arm notice. 105 To enhance the 
legitimacy and accuracy of this one action, the statute also tried to 
give the court access to reliable and current information about 
the child 106 by ordinarily making the child's "established home" 
the forum, 107 by permitting a court to dismiss custody proceed­
ings if it determined that another state would be a more appropri­
ate forum, 108 and by providing that all custody orders should be 
modifiable if circumstances changed. 109 Finally, Ratner tried to 
promote cooperation among courts by encouraging interstate 
investigations 110 and by permitting a court to take jurisdiction of 
a custody dispute solely to enforce another state's order. 111 
Ratner's act also codified Ehrenzweig's "clean hands doctrine" by 
prohibiting the forum from modifying another state's custody 
order if the forum's jurisdiction derived from an interstate move 
that violated the other state's order. 112 
Professor Ratner's proposed act rejected the doctrine of con­
current jurisdiction in order to achieve stability, which he envi­
sioned in terms of the twin goals of discouraging multiple 
litigation and deterring the abduction, removal, retention, or con­
cealment of a child in disregard of the reasonable claims of 
others. To achieve this stability, Ratner's act reposed initialjuris-
103 See Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 203-04 (§ 10 of 
proposed uniform act). 
104 See id. at 199-200 (§ 3 of proposed uniform act). 
105 See id. at 204-05 (§ 13 of proposed uniform act). 
106 Note Ratner's aspirational statement in§ 1(2) ofhis proposed act. See 
id. at 197 (setting forth objective to "[p]ermit the determination of a child's 
custody by the court most likely to decide correctly, that is, by the court 
having maximum access to the relevant evidence"). 
107 Ratner, Federal System, supra note 2, at 815-17. Although Ratner 
thought that where a child's established home was would ordinarily be 
obvious, he said that in doubtful cases it should be where the child had 
resided for at least six months, because "[m]ost American children are 
integrated into an American community after living there six months." !d. 
at 818. He implemented this in§§ 4 and 5 of his proposed uniform act. See 
Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 200-02. 
108 Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 202 (§ 7(1) of proposed 
uniform act). 
109 /d. at 202-03 (§§ 6, 8 of proposed uniform act). 
I 10 /d. at 204 ( § 12 of proposed uniform act). 
III /d. at 203 (§ 9(1) of proposed uniform act). 
112 !d. at 202 (§ 7(2) of proposed uniform act). 
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diction ·in a single forum and forbade simultaneous proceed­
ings.113 Moreover, Ratner's act gave the forum with initial 
jurisdiction-the "decree state"-continuing jurisdiction over 
any subsequent custody disputes, at least while the child 
remained in that state. 114 So long as the decree state had contin­
uing jurisdiction, other states were required to enforce, and for­
bidden to modify, its decrees. 11.5 
Brainerd Currie and Albert Ehrenzweig both wrote in response 
to Ratner's proposal. While agreeing with Ratner generally about 
how the existing law functioned, both scholars disagreed with him 
about the desirability of reform. Professor Currie rejected 
Ratner's suggestion that jurisdiction be limited to the child's 
"established home," because he considered the child's physical 
presence necessary both to a determination of thtj child's best 
interests 116 and to the enforcement of any custody order. 117 
Moreover, his own examination of four contemporary deci­
sions 118 led Currie to conclude that the Supreme Court would 
never hold that custody decrees were entitled to full faith and 
credit. 119 Consistent with these preferences and predictions, 
Currie proposed that Congress implement the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause in accord with the Court's apparent preference that 
"no judgment shall preclude the courts of a state having a legiti­
mate interest in the matter from making whatever custodial 
decree is required, in their judgment and discretion, for the wel­
fare of the child." 12° Currie proposed, in effect, to clarify and 
reinforce existing law. 
Like Currie, Ehrenzweig believed that the Full Faith and Credit 
113 /d. at 201-02 (§§ 4 and 5 of proposed uniform act) ("if ... no custody 
proceeding is pending in a court of another state having jurisdiction 
substantially in accordance with this Act"). 
114 /d. at 201 (§ 5(1) of proposed uniform act). Even afterwards, if the 
child had departed the decree state without express court authorization, the 
decree state retained continuing jurisdiction as long as another party 
continued to live there. /d. 
115 !d. at 203 (§ 9(2) of proposed uniform act). 
116 See Brainerd Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to judgments: A Role for 
Congress, 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 89, 117. 
117 !d. at 117-18. 
118 See id. at 109-18 (discussing Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); 
Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 
(1953); New York ex rel Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947)). 
119 /d. at 115. 
120 /d. 
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Clause did not, and should not, apply to custody decisions. 121 
However, he agreed with Ratner that Currie's proposed legisla­
tion would encourage unilateral removal of the child, resolution 
of custody by a forum unfairly inconvenient to one party, and 
relitigation. 122 To combat these tendencies, he proposed a uni­
form state act much simpler than Ratner's, providing for "perma­
nent jurisdiction" in a "guardianship court" situated in the state 
where the child "has his permanent abode and has been present 
for at least six months." 123 By itself, this proposal might have 
accomplished Ratner's third and fourth goals of discouraging 
multiple litigation and the abduction of children, if in draconian 
fashion, by reducing the plethora of possible forums to one. 
However, Ehrenzweig's act also responded to Ratner's other two 
goals, that the forum be fair to all parties and have maximal 
access to evidence, by providing for "temporary jurisdiction" in 
any state where the child was present, or where proceedings for 
her parents' divorce, annulment or separation had been com­
menced.124 Because Ehrenzweig's act permitted any court with 
either temporary or permanent jurisdiction to "rescind or mod­
ify"125 any previous custody order, his proposal, like Currie's, 
essentially codified existing law. Its main innovation was a 
requirement that no court modify a previous order until the court 
had "secured such records, transcripts and other information as 
may be available in the court which has made such decree or 
elsewhere.'' 126 
Thus, although these three scholars all agreed that existing law 
encouraged abductions by permitting relitigation, two of them 
also believed this to be the unfortunate but inevitable conse­
quence of the parties' due process right to a fair forum and the 
overridingly important goal of protecting children's welfare. 
Ehrenzweig's proposal would have permitted successive modifica­
tions in courts of different states while improving the information 
available to each court; Currie's proposal would have merely clar­
ified existing law. Only Ratner proposed comprehensive reform 
aimed at changing both parental and judicial behavior. 
121 See Ehrenzweig, Uniform Legislation, supra note 2, at 4. 
122 See id. at 3-4 (citing Ratner, Procedural Due Process, supra note 5, at 193). 
123 /d. at 10-11 (Article I of Counter-Proposal for a Uniform Interstate 
Custody Act). 
124 /d. at II (Article 2 of counter-proposal). 
125 /d. (Article 3 of counter-proposal). 
126 /d. (Article 3 of counter-proposal). 
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It was at this juncture, with three distinct and competing visions 
of law reform in recently-published law review articles, that the 
discussion shifted from scholarly to practical venues. The next 
section sketches the process of drafting and compromise that 
eventually produced the UCCJA, and examines interpretations of 
the statute that undermine the reformers' goals. 
III. THE UNIFORM CHILD CusTODY juRISDICTION AcT 
A. The Development of the UCCJA . 
The problem of the interstate child was of considerable con­
cern to practitioners as well as scholars in the mid-1960s. Ratner 
had drafted his statute at the request of the Committee on Child 
Custody of the American Bar Association's Family Law Sec­
tion. 127 At its midyear meeting in February, 1965, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) 
voted to appoint a Special Committee to draft a Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act. 128 Shortly thereafter, in March, 1965, Professor 
Henry Foster circulated a revision of the jurisdictional sections of 
Ratner's act. 129 During that summer's ABA meeting, the various 
proposals were discussed, and at least one other proposal was 
generated and shared with the Chairman of the NCCUSL Special 
Committee. Professor John Bradway proposed interstate cooper-
127 Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 196 n.5l. 
128 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAws AND PROCEEDINGS 80-81 (1965). 
129 See Memorandum from Henry H. Foster, Jr., Professor of Law, New 
York University, to American Bar Association Family Law Section, 
Committee on Child Custody (March 25, 1965) (on file with the U.C. Davis 
Law Review). Ratner's jurisdictional scheme had required a forum state to 
have at least six months' recent contact with the child and to be the 
residence of either the child or a parent, and required notice to all 
nonresident interested parties. See Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 
27, at 200-01 (§ 4 of proposed uniform act). Foster rejected this. Instead, 
for initial jurisdiction, Foster would have relied on personal jurisdiction 
over the child combined with what he hoped would be constitutionally 
adequate contacts with the parents. See Foster, supra, § 1. To bolster the 
adequacy of these contacts, Foster's draft provided that a court might order 
the petitioner to "pay necessary travel expenses for the respondent to 
appear and defend." /d. § 1 (5); see id. § 2(3). Foster would have permitted 
any court to modify a custody order, provided the petitioner was in 
substantial compliance with the original order and had either served the 
respondent in the forum state or paid his or her travel expenses; if the child 
was "found to be dependent or neglected," even these requirements were 
waived. /d. § 2. 
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ation among all interested states in both information-gathering 
and decision-making, culminating in a ''joint decree which can be 
entered on the record in both states." 130 All of these proposals 
shared Ratner's overall aspiration of requiring the states to 
enforce foreign custody decisions. 
A year later, the Special Committee presented a "First Tenta­
tive Draft of the Uniform Child Custody Act" to the NCCUSL. 131 
Although the Ehrenzweig and Foster proposals influenced this 
draft, 132 it differed significantly from them and indeed from all 
other previous proposals. Instead of focusing exclusively on the 
jurisdictional conundrum, it contained hortatory provisions relat­
ing to substantive custody law; 133 moreover, its jurisdictional 
scheme would have encouraged courts to issue custody decrees 
that other states would have been unlikely to enforce. 134 
130 Letter from John S. Bradway to WJ. Brockelbank, Chairman of 
NCCUSL Special Committee on Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 3 
(Aug. 18, 1965) (from the papers of John Wade, Vanderbilt University) 
(copy on file with the U.C. Davis Law Review). Professor Bodenheimer listed 
this memo as one of the UCCJA's sources. See Bodenheimer, Legislative 
Remedy, supra note 5, at 1217. 
131 Uniform Child Custody Act (Tentative Draft No. 1, July 1, 1966) 
(from the papers of John Wade, Vanderbilt University) (copy on file with the 
U.C. Davis Law Review) [hereafter First Tentative Draft]. 
132 Like Ehrenzweig's proposal, this draft suggested the compilation of a 
dossier to be used by all interested courts throughout a child's minority, id. 
§§ 4.3, 4.5-.7, and recommended that the same judge continue to handle 
the case if possible, id. § 4.12. The jurisdictional section, id. § 2.1, derives 
from Foster's § 1. See Foster, supra note 129, § 1. 
133 These provisions included a statement that "[c]ustody shall be 
awarded according to the best interests of the child," First Tentative Draft, 
supra note 131, § 4.8; a list of factors to be considered, id. § 4.9; and 
presumptions in favor of stability, id. § 4.11, and visitation, id. § 4.13. All of 
these substantive standards, however, were undercut by a provision stating 
that they were "meant to be guidelines to be adapted by the circumstances 
of the particular case. The failure of the trial court to observe them, may be 
ground for reversal on appeal only if there has been a substantial failure of 
justice." /d. § 4.15. 
134 The central provision permitted a court to make a custody decree if it 
has jurisdiction of the persons of the parties named in the suit, and the 
custody decree is effective only as to such persons, subject to limitations on 
simultaneous and geographically inconvenient proceedings. See id. 
§§ 2.2(a), 3.1, 7. However, the draft also permitted a court lacking personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant to make a custody decree ancillary to a 
decree of divorce, annulment, legal separation or termination of parental 
rights, id. § 6.1, although such a decree was to be "effective only as to the 
party over whom the court has jurisdiction of the person," id. § 6.2, and 
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The First Tentative Draft and the Ratner, Foster, and Bradbury 
proposals all took an activist stance to the problem of the inter­
state child. They attempted to solve the problem by changing the 
law in order to motivate or coerce courts to respect one another's 
custody decisions. An activist stance naturally appealed to practi­
tioners eager to respond to their clients' distress. In contrast, 
Ehrenzweig's and Currie's belief that the existing law should be 
accepted and codified must have seemed at best irrelevant, the 
product of ivory tower isolation from the pain and strife of actual 
practice. 
The activist proposals used four main strategies, each based on 
a different analysis of the problem's underlying dynamics. The 
first strategy was based on an assumption that courts permitted 
the parties to relitigate custody in a new forum because they were 
unsure that the first forum had reached a wise result. Two pro­
posals therefore attempted to assure courts that foreign decrees 
would be made carefully, in order to make enforcement of foreign 
decrees more acceptable. Ratner designed his jurisdictional 
scheme to give decision-making power to the single court with the 
best access to current information about the child. Similarly, the 
custody law reforms of the First Tentative Draft responded to a 
concern that decrees based solely on lay testimony might reason­
ably be denied recognition in states where courts habitually relied 
on professional home studies and other sorts of expert evidence. 
The First Tentative Draft therefore required courts to appoint a 
guardian ad litem for the child, and to compile, maintain and use 
a complete "dossier" 135 before rendering a decree that addressed 
the child's "physical, mental, spiritual, economic, social and 
familial welfare." 136 Ratner's act and the First Tentative Draft 
differed, however, on whether merely motivating courts to enforce 
foreign custody orders would be sufficient. Ratner's act required 
courts to enforce properly-made foreign custody decrees; the 
First Tentative Draft did not. 137 
"subordinate to any prior custody decree," id. § 6.3. These provisions 
invited courts to issue decrees of dubious extraterritorial validity or 
usefulness. 
135 The dossier would include investigative reports and stenographic 
transcripts of all hearings. !d. § 4.3. 
136 /d. § 4.9. 
137 See Brigitte Bodenheimer, Prefatory Note, Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act 2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, April 25, 1968). Professor 
Bodenheimer stated: 
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The second activist strategy was based on an assumption that 
the second forum permitted relitigation out of concern for a party 
whose due process rights had been violated in the first forum. 
That is, this strategy focused on the possibility that courts might 
be constitutionally precluded from respecting one another's deci­
sions, even if they would prefer to do so. Ratner's proposed act, 
according to this view, could not always produce enforceable 
orders. To preclude collateral challenges to a custody decree, 
Ratner's act gave the forum power to bind every person known to 
be likely to assert a custodial claim, whether or not that person 
had any contact with the forum. 138 Foster feared, however, that 
asserting jurisdiction over persons with no connection to the 
forum might be so unfair as to be unconstitutional. Foster's solu­
tion was to underwrite these litigants' access to the decision­
maker. He thought that any forum would be fair enough if local 
litigants could be ordered to pay their distant opponents' travel 
expenses, and he proposed that provisions to that effect be added 
to Ratner's act. 139 
The third activist strategy was based on an assumption that 
autonomous state courts that were presented with custody ques­
tions serially would each inevitably find it necessary to re-examine 
the evidence in order to fulfill a duty to protect the now-local 
child. Thus, two proposals attempted to transcend the problem 
of getting a local court to defer to a previously-made foreign child 
custody decision by radically restructuring the decision making 
process. Ehrenzweig's suggestion was utopian. He would have 
substituted a system of public regulation for the adversary system, 
!d. 
In view of these wide discrepancies in the caliber of custody 
decrees it is understandable that the draftsmen of the First 
Tentative Draft felt compelled to add provisions as to the 
standards for custody determinations, the preparation of social 
studies, and so forth, and that they ended up with a Child 
Custody Act rather than a Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. 
138 See Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 199-202, 204-05 
(§§ 3, 4, 5, and 13 of proposed uniform act). Professor Ratner based these 
provisions on his "effective litigation" conception of due process, which 
valued optimal access to evidence and avoidance of multiple trials over 
adherence to the traditional "territorial" requirements that a state have 
personal jurisdiction over each claimant (based upon residence, domicile, or 
personal service) in order to adjudicate his or her rights to custody of a 
child. See Ratner, Procedural Due Process, supra note 5, at 366-88. 
139 See Foster, supra note 129, at 2; supra note 129 (comparing Ratner's 
proposed uniform act with Foster's proposed revisions). 
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with one "guardianship court" maintaining jurisdiction over a 
custody dispute during the child's entire minority. This court 
would lose control of the case only when the court itself decided 
that transfer of jurisdiction to . another forum wouid serve the 
child's welfare. 140 Bradway's proposal shared a similar impulse, 
but relied on combining existing structures in new ways rather 
than on creating entirely new systems, with all interested states 
cooperating in reaching and enforcing a single decision. 141 
Finally, the fourth activist strategy was based on an assumption 
that if courts had the appropriate goals clearly stated for them 
and were reminded of their prudential power to refuse to provide 
a forum on the grounds of forum non conveniens or 
Ehrenzweig's "clean hands doctrine," they would do the right 
thing. 142 Ratner's proposed act thus contained a lengthy list of 
purposes, 143 and expressly permitted dismissal if "another state is 
the fairest place for the trial." 144 To emphasize a court's duty not 
to reward a party for flouting a foreign decree, Ratner's act also 
required dismissal of an otherwise proper modification if the peti­
tioner was holding the child in violation of a foreign decree, pro­
vided that the opposing party had exercised reasonable diligence 
and another fair forum was available. 145 
At their 1966 Annual Meeting, the NCCUSL Commissioners 
discussed several sections of the First Tentative Draft and sent the 
project back to committee. 146 When the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act next emerged, in 1968, it was in substantially final 
140 Ehrenzweig, Uniform Legislation, supra note 2, at 6. 
141 See Bradway, supra note 130, at 2-3 ("The facts in the case may be 
collected separately in [state] A and in [state] B as in interstate support 
cases; and then each jurisdiction will have a full story. Then the court in the 
state in which [the child] is present may draft a tentative decree and refer it 
to the corresponding court in A where [the wife] remains. The court in A in 
all probability will reach a conclusion similar to that reached by the B court. 
If so, then we have a joint decree which can be entered on the record in both 
states . . . . But suppose [the courts disagree. The solution] has already 
been worked out in Congress .... [A] conference committee resolves the 
dispute in many instances."). 
142 Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 202 (§ 7 of proposed 
uniform act). 
143 See id. at 196-97 (§ 1 of proposed uniform act). 
144 See id. at 202 (§ 7(l)(a) of proposed uniform act). 
145 See id. (§ 7(2) of proposed uniform act). 
146 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAws AND PRocEEDINGS 94 (1966). 
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form, and the NCCUSL approved it. 147 The intervening two 
years contained a great deal of hard work, much of it by the Spe­
cial Committee's Reporter, Professor Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, 
who was undoubtedly responsible both for the UCCJA's specific 
form and for its adoption by state after state. 148 Due to her draft­
ing and lobbying skills, the Uniform Act that emerged from this 
process was greeted with widespread support and enthusiasm. 
Bodenheimer used a method that has been called "interest 
group liberalism." Optimistic about the potential of law to do 
good and to solve any problem presented, she incorporated ideas 
from all of the existing proposals. 149 On the level of goals, the 
UCCJA, like the proposals on which it was based, sought to 
achieve both stability and flexibility. On the level of method, 
because the UCCJA adopted and elaborated on all four of the 
activist strategies that had been proposed for dealing with courts' 
reluctance to enforce foreign custody decisions, it approached 
every problem both with rules constraining court discretion and 
with principles inviting free exercise of discretion. This openness 
to all the previous drafters' principal ideas undoubtedly helped 
secure support for the Act. Unfortunately, some of these ideas 
are mutually incompatible. 
First, the UCCJA attempted to make custody decisions more 
acceptable to foreign courts by giving jurisdiction to the forum 
most likely to have access to current and complete information 
about the child and the family. 150 To further this project, the 
UCCJA sets out two main grounds for jurisdiction, "home state" 
147 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAws AND PROCEEDINGS 112, 198 (1968). 
148 See UCCJA: A Monument to Brigitte Bodenheimer, UNIFORM L. MEMO, 
Winter 1981-1982, at 8-9. 
149 See THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 51 (2d ed. 1979) 
(discussing "interest-group liberalism," which "defines the public interest 
as a result of the amalgamation of various claims"). For Bodenheimer's 
acknowledgment of her debt to these various sources, see Bodenheimer, 
Legislative Remedy, supra note 5, at 1217-18. 
150 Section 3 governs all assertions of "jurisdiction to make a custody 
determination by initial or modification decree." 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 143-44. 
Bodenheimer hoped that decisions "rendered in states in which as much as 
possible of the essential information about the child and his potential 
custodians is available will be considered trustworthy enough to command 
respect and recognition in other states." Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy, 
supra note 5, at 1221 (footnote omitted). 
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and "significant connection," 151 whereas Ratner's act had only 
one, "established home." 152 Under the UCCJA, a forum may 
exercise jurisdiction when it is the child's "home state" 153 at the 
time the custody proceeding is commenced. 154 Or, to protect the 
home state's jurisdiction when one parent has recently absconded 
with the child, 155 a forum may exercise jurisdiction when it has 
been the child's home state within six months of the proceedings' 
commencement and "the child is absent from this state because 
of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or 
for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent156 con­
tinues to live in this State." 157 In addition, a forum to which the 
child and at least one parent158 have a "significant connection" 
and where "substantial evidence concerning the child's present or 
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships" is 
located may also take jurisdiction provided that "it is in the best 
interests of the child" to do so. 159 The drafters added this "sig­
nificant connection" provision because of their concern that the 
151 UCCJA § 3, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143. 
152 See Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 199-201 (§§ 2(20), 4-
5 of proposed uniform act). 
153 This concept is defined in UCCJA § 2(5) as follows: 
"[H]ome state" means the state in which the child immediately 
preceding the time involved lived with his parents, a parent, or a 
person acting as a parent, for at least 6 consecutive months, and 
in the case of a child less than 6 months old the state in which the 
child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. 
Periods of temporary absence of any of the named persons are 
counted as part of the 6-month or other period. 
9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 133. This concept derives from Ratner's "established 
home" concept. See Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 199 
(§ 2(20) of proposed uniform act); supra notes 92-100 and accompanying 
text. 
154 UCCJA § 3(a)(1)(i), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143; cJ. Ratner, Legislative 
Resolution, supra note 27, at 200 (§ 4(l)(a) of proposed uniform act). 
155 See Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy, supra note 5, at 1225. 
156 This ungainly phrase identifies non-parents who either have or seek 
custody of a child. UCCJA § 2(9), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 134. 
157 UCCJA § 3(a)(1)(ii), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143 (footnote added); cf. 
Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 200 (§ 4(a)(b) of proposed 
uniform act). 
158 The statute also applies when the child and one "contestant" have a 
significant connection with the jurisdiction. UCCJA § 3(a)(2)(i), 9 U.L.A. pt. 
1, at 143. A "contestant" is a person, including a parent, who claims a right 
to custody or visitation of a child. UCCJA § 2(1), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 133. 
159 UCCJA § 3(a)(2), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143. 
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home state might not always have the best access to relevant 
information. 160 Like Ratner's act, the UCCJA requires enforce­
ment, 161 and limits modification, 162 of properly-made foreign cus­
tody decrees. Further, the UCCJA also has two minor 
jurisdictional provisions with roots in Ratner's proposed act: 
emergency jurisdiction, 163 and vacuum jurisdiction. 164 
Second, the UCCJA implemented Ratner's strategy of protect­
ing the parties' due process interests. It did so by borrowing 
Ratner's broad assertion of power to bind every interested person 
whether or not she has had any connection with the forum. 165 As 
160 See Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy, supra note 5, at 1227. In that 
article, written shortly after the UCCJA was promulgated, she hypothesized 
a case in which a married couple who had lived in state A for some years left 
their children with friends in state B while they obtained a divorce, and then 
moved separately to different cities in state C. See id. at 1221. There, 
although state A might arguably be the home state, or have been the home 
state within six months, state C would seem to be a more appropriate forum. 
She also referred to the notorious case Painter v. Bannister, implying that 
under the UCCJA, the father would have had an easier time getting his son 
back because the child had significant connections with the father's home 
state. /d. at 1227 (citing Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa) 
(awarding custody to deceased mother's parents after father had asked them 
to care for child), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966)). 
161 UCCJA §§ 13, 15, 9 U.L.A. pt. l, at 276, 311. 
162 UCCJA § 14, 9 U.L.A. pt. l, at 292. 
163 Emergency jurisdiction is available to a state exercising parens patriae 
jurisdiction to protect a child if she is present in the state and either 
abandoned or in need of emergency protection because she "has been 
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise 
neglected." UCCJA § 3(a)(3)(ii) & cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt. l, at 144-45. This 
provision was consistent with Ratner's proposal. See Ratner, Legislative 
Resolution, supra note 27, at 203 (§ 9(3) of proposed uniform act). 
164 Vacuumjurisdiction is available when "it appears that no other state 
would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with 
[the UCCJA]," or when another state has declined jurisdiction because it 
viewed the present forum as more appropriate. UCCJA § 3(a)(4), 9 U.L.A. 
pt. l, at 144. The suggestion that another state might decline jurisdiction in 
favor of the forum derives from Ratner's § 4(3). See Ratner, Legi_slative 
Resolution, supra note 27, at 200. 
165 Notice and an opportunity to be heard must be given to "the 
contestants, any person whose parental rights have not been previously 
terminated, and any person who has physical custody of the child." UCCJA 
§ 4, 9 U.L.A. pt. l, at 208. In addition, any other person who "claims to 
have custody or visitation rights with respect to the child" must be made a 
party. UCCJA § 10, 9 U.L.A. pt. l, at 269-70. 
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Bodenheimer explicitly acknowledged, 166 this choice was based 
on the assumption that Frankfurter's concurrence, rather than the 
plurality opinion, states the rule of May v. Anderson. 167 Frank­
furter thought no litigant-not even a parent-has a due process 
right to insist that the forum deciding a child's custody have per­
sonal jurisdiction over the adult litigants. 168 Under this reading 
of May, properly notified parties may be bound even if they have 
no contact with the forum. 169 Nevertheless, the UCCJA also 
adopted a version of Foster's solution to any resulting constitu­
tional defect. Under the UCCJA, a decision binds "all parties who 
have been served in this state or notified in accordance with section 5 
or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who 
have been given an opportunity to be heard." 170 Section 5 per­
mits notice by "any form of mail ... requesting a receipt." 171 
166 See Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy, supra note 5, at 1232; accord 
UCCJA § 13 cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 277. 
167 345 U.S. 528 (1953); see supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text 
(discussing May). 
168 See 345 U.S. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice 
Frankfurter stated that a court may recognize a custody decree made by a 
sister state lacking personal jurisdiction over a parent without offending the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but no prior custody 
decree is entitled to full faith and credit because "the child's welfare ... has 
such a claim upon the State that its responsibility is obviously not to be 
foreclosed by a prior adjudication." /d. 
169 State courts interpreting the UCCJA are split on whether they really 
possess this statutorily-asserted power to bind a party with no connection to 
the forum. Compare In re Leonard, 17 5 Cal. Rptr. 903 (Ct. App. 1981) 
(relying on May and distinguishing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 
( 1978) (holding presence of children insufficient to give state power to 
order non-resident parent to pay child support)) and Hudson v. Hudson, 
670 P.2d 287 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (relying on Frankfurter's concurrence 
in May) with Ex parte Dean, 447 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1984) (relying on May 
plurality and holding that Florida custody judgment was not entitled to full 
faith and credit although it complied with the UCCJA and the PKPA, 
because, in the absence of long-arm statute, Florida lacked personal 
jurisdiction over defendant mother) and Mitchell v. Mitchell, 458 N.Y.S.2d 
807 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (holding that state with minimal contact with one party 
defers to parties' former home state). 
Professor Coombs has suggested that some "extreme applications" of the 
UCCJA would unconstitutionally deprive defendants of due process. See 
Coombs, supra note 5, at 762-65. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the 
scope of this article. 
170 UCCJA § 12, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 274 (emphasis added). 
171 UCCJA § 5, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 212-13. According to the Comment, 
the mail need not reach the addressee for service to be accomplished: "If at 
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Persons who have physical custody of the child outside the forum 
state may be ordered to appear, and, whether they appear volun­
tarily or not, their expenses may be shifted to another party or 
otherwise provided for. 172 
Third, although the UCCJA neither created federal guardian­
ship courts nor permitted two states to enter joint orders, it 
adopted a number of provisions inspired by Ehrenzweig's pro­
posed act and Bradway's letter that require or encourage inter­
state cooperation. 173 The UCCJA requires each state to preserve 
its child custody records until the child's majority and to certify 
the records, upon request, to another state's court. 174 Each state 
can request court records from other states, 175 and must have a 
place to file certified copies of decrees and other materials relat­
ing to foreign custody proceedings. 176 The UCCJA also permits 
courts to authorize out-of-state depositions, 177 to request assist­
ance from another state's courts, 178 and to conduct hearings and 
studies to assist another state's court, 179 and it encourages local 
judges to speak with judges in other possible forums before 
deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction. 180 
Finally, the UCCJA adopted the hortatory strategy: like 
Ratner's act, the UCCJA contains a long list of purposes embody­
ing both stability and flexibility goals 181 and codifies both forum 
all possible, actual notice should be received by the affected persons; but 
efforts to impart notice in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual 
notice are sufficient when a person who may perhaps conceal his 
whereabouts, cannot be reached." UCCJA § 5 cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 213 
(citations omitted). 
172 UCCJA §§ 19(b), 20(c), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 319, 322. 
173 UCCJA §§ 18-20,9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 318-22, seem closest to Bradway's 
suggestions, but all probably derive from his vision of interstate 
cooperation. See Bradway, supra note 130, at 3 (proposing that courts 
cooperate in issuing custody decrees-even to the point of issuing joint 
decrees). Article 3 of Ehrenzweig's proposed act, providing that before a 
court could modify a foreign custody order it should be required to obtain 
information from the foreign court, was probably also influential. See 
Ehrenzweig, Uniform Legislation, supra note 2, at 11. 
174 UCCJA § 21, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 324. 
175 UCCJA § 22, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 325-26. 
176 UCCJA § 16, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 316. 
177 UCCJA § 18, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 318. 
178 UCCJA § 19, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 319. 
179 UCCJA § 20, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 322. 
180 UCCJA § 7(d), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 233. 
181 See UCCJA § 1, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 123-24. 
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non conveniens 182 and Ehrenzweig's "clean hands doctrine." 183 
The latter two provisions rely heavily on the local judge's discre­
tion. The UCCJA mandates dismissal of an otherwise proper cus­
tody proceeding in only one circumstance: if the modification 
petitioner "has improperly removed the child from the physical 
custody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly 
retained the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment 
of physical custody." 184 Even then, a court may still exercise 
jurisdiction ifto do so is "required in the interest of the child." 185 
In addition, the UCCJA permits dismissal of a custody proceeding 
in three circumstances: first, if the forum is "inconvenient ... and 
... a court of another state is a more appropriate forum"; 186 sec­
ond, if a modification petitioner "has violated any ... provision of 
a custody decree of another state"; 187 and third, if a petitioner in 
an initial proceeding "has wrongfully taken the child from 
another state or has engaged m similar reprehensible 
conduct." 188 
The UCCJA thus employs some version of all four of the 
activist strategies that had been proposed, without attempting to 
reconcile their inconsistencies. Faced with an incoherent statute, 
the courts have had predictable difficulty with the cases coming 
before them. Often, although the UCCJA seems to have dictated 
a case's rationale, its result seems better explained by 
Ehrenzweig's two principles. 189 The next section illustrates this 
observation by examining state courts' interpretations of the 
UCCJA's most crucial provisions, showing how they expose the 
Act's incoherence and its consequent failure to resolve the prob­
lem of the interstate child. 
B. The Crucial Indeterminacies of the UCCJA 
Beginning in the late 1940s, some courts and commentators 
embraced the doctrine of "concurrent jurisdiction" in response 
to the jurisdictional tangle enmeshing interstate custody cases. 
Under this doctrine, several states' courts might legitimately 
182 See UCCJA § 7, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 233-34. 
183 See UCCJA § 8, 9 U .L.A. pt. 1, at 251. 
184 UCCJA § 8(b), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 251. 
185 Id. 
186 UCCJA § 7(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 233. 
187 UCCJA § 8(b), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 251. 
188 UCCJA § 8(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 251. 
189 See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text. 
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assert jurisdiction over the same custody dispute at approximately 
the same time, and none of their decisions was entitled to 
enforcement in another forum. 190 To achieve Ratner's goals of 
discouraging multiple litigation and deterring the abduction, 
retention, or concealment of a child in disregard of the reason­
able claims of others, Ratner's proposed act had sharply limited 
concurrent jurisdiction. 191 The drafters of the UCCJA embraced 
Ratner's stability goals, 192 but, apparently disagreeing amongst 
themselves over whether to authorize continuing and concurrent 
jurisdiction, employed ambiguous language to implement 
them. 193 This drafting strategy reified the disagreement: it has 
consequently been reenacted in case after case as the courts 
struggle to understand and apply the UCCJA's compromise 
language. 
The central question for interpreting the UCCJA is, "When 
may a court make a custody order?" The Act's concurrent juris­
diction compromises frequently deny this question either a single 
or a certain answer. For expository purposes, the central ques­
tion may usefully be broken down into four subsidiary questions: 
(1) When may a court make an initial custody order?; (2) When 
must a court enforce a foreign custody order instead of making an 
independent inquiry into the situation?; (3) When may a court, 
after an independent inquiry, modify a foreign custody order?; 
and (4) When should a court refuse to inquire into the merits of a 
custody matter because its order would not be respected by a for­
eign court, or for other reasons? This section examines the state 
courts' interpretations of the UCCJA's answers to these four 
questions. As the courts' interpretations reveal, the UCCJA's 
answers do not advance the reformers' stability goals. 
Courts interpreting the UCCJA have often permitted a litigant 
to evade an adverse decision in one state by recourse to the courts 
of another state. They have done so, in most instances, because 
of their concern for justice in the particular case-a concern 
Ratner shared, and one embodied in the UCCJA both as principle 
190 See Sampsell v. Superior Court, 197 P.2d 739 (Cal. 1948); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 79 (1971); Ehrenzweig, 
Uniform Litigation, supra note 2, at 3, Ratner, Legislative Resolution, supra note 
27, at 195; Stansbury, supra note 20, at 831-32. 
191 See supra notes 86-115 and accompanying text. 
192 See UCCJA § 1(a)(1), (4)-(7), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 123-24. 
193 See Foster, supra note 12, at 303-04, 307-08. 
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and as rule. 194 As will become clear, whatever their doctrinal 
rhetoric, state courts have not abandoned the practice of concur­
rent jurisdiction. 
1. When May a Court Make an Initial Custody Order? 
(Sections 3 and 6) 
The UCCJA provides an apparently straightforward standard 
for determining when a court may make an initial custody order. 
Section 3 establishes four alternate grounds for taking jurisdic­
tion: (1) the forum is the child's "home state" (or has been within 
the last six months); (2) the child and at least one contestant have 
a "significant connection" to the forum; (3) the child is physically 
present in the jurisdiction and an emergency necessitates resolv­
ing the child's custody; and (4) no other state- has jurisdiction 
under the Act. 195 Courts most often use the first two of these 
grounds to resolve jurisdiction between competing parents; the 
other two grounds are not much used in this context. 196 
The existence of four alternate jurisdictional grounds suggests 
that the UCCJA did adopt the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction, 
and that therefore two or even more states might potentially have 
jurisdiction over the same matter at the same time-one as the 
"home state" and others as "significant connection" states. The 
UCCJA does, however, have a mechanism explicitly designed to 
194 See UCCJA §§ 1(a)(2)-(3), 3(a)(2), 7(c)(2)-(3), 8, 14(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, 
at 123, 143, 233, 251, 292. 
195 UCCJA § 3, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143-44; see supra notes 150-64 and 
accompanying text (discussing UCCJA's jurisdictional provisions in greater 
detail). 
196 With the exception of child protection actions filed by a public entity 
and alleging abuse and neglect, emergency jurisdiction is primarily used in 
actions for modification rather than for initial custody. See, e.g., Stuart v. 
Stuart, 516 So. 2d 1277 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming emergency transfer 
of custody of child in Louisiana for visit on basis of allegations that custodial 
mother became intoxicated daily and was unable to care for child, although 
Washington had become home state); Marcrum v. Marcrum, 437 A.2d 725 
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (ordering hearing where abducting father 
alleged that custodial mother was an alcoholic). Even in this context, courts 
are reluctant to exercise emergency jurisdiction if the emergency can 
adequately be dealt with in the child's home state. See, e.g., Nelson v. 
Nelson, 433 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (refusing to exercise 
emergency jurisdiction when emergency was not in Florida); cJ. Dillon v. 
Medellin, 409 So. 2d 570 (La. 1982) (refusing to enforce another state's 
emergency modification because to do so would encourage an abduction). 
Vacuum jurisdiction is rarely used in any context. 
HeinOnline -- 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 887 1991-1992
 
888 University of California, Davis [Vol. 25:845 
prevent this. Like Ratner's act, and adopting its exact lan­
guage, 197 the UCCJA forbids simultaneous proceedings. Section 
6 prohibits courts from exercising jurisdiction while another pro­
ceeding concerning the same child is "pending" in a forum that is 
"exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this 
Act."l98 
In practice, however, although courts sometimes defer to other 
states' pending proceedings, 199 when they consider it appropriate 
they have easily been able to find statutory grounds for asserting 
jurisdiction and resolving a custody matter that another court is 
currently considering.200 The courts do this in two main ways: by 
197 Compare VCCJA § 6(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 219-20 with Ratner, 
Legislative Resolution, supra note 27, at 200-01 (§§ 4-5 of proposed uniform 
act). 
198 UCCJA § 6, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 219-20. Section 9 requires the parties, 
in their first pleadings, to disclose all interested persons and all other 
litigation concerning the child. 9 U .L.A. pt. 1, at 266. Some courts have 
treated this requirement as jurisdictional, see, e.g., Brewington v. Serrato, 
336 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); others have held that any defect is 
curable by amendment, see, e.g., Gambrell v. Gambrell, 272 S.E.2d 70 (Ga. 
1980). 
199 See, e.g., Rector v. Rector, 565 P.2d 950 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977) 
(holding court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because another 
proceeding was pending in Kansas); Mainster v. Mainster, 466 So. 2d 1228, 
1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding Florida should have declined to 
exercise jurisdiction "because the Virginia proceeding was pending at the 
time the mother filed her Florida action"); Steele v. Steele, 296 S.E.2d 570 
(Ga. 1982) (reversing trial court to require deference to former home state's 
pending proceeding); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 719 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1986) (requiring enforcement of North Carolina custody decree 
rendered in case pending when Texas began proceedings). 
200 In so doing, courts are sometimes aided by the statute's amorphous 
policy pronouncements. For example, the statute's general purposes, set 
out in § 1, include "discourag[ing] continuing controversies," "deter[ring] 
abductions" and "avoid[ing] re-litigation of custody decisions," but also 
ensuring that "a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best 
decide the case in the interest of the child," and that "litigation concerning 
the custody of a child take place ordinarily in the state with which the child 
and his family have the closest connection and where significant evidence 
concerning his care, protection, training and personal relationships is most 
readily available." UCCJA § 1, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 124. The official Comment 
to § 3 emphasizes the act's purpose "to limit jurisdiction rather than 
proliferate it .... UJurisdiction exists only if it is in the child's interest, not 
merely the interest or convenience of the feuding parties .... There must 
be maximum rather than minimum contact with the state." UCCJA § 3 cmt., 
9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 145 (emphasis in original). 
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determining that the case is not "pending" in the other state, and 
by determining that the other state did not exercise jurisdiction in 
·~substantial conformity" with the UCCJA. 
The Rhode Island case Houtchens v. Houtchens 201 is a good 
example of the first interpretive strategy for evading section 6.202 
The parties married in Rhode Island and then moved to Texas. 
Their two children were born in Texas, and the family lived 
together there for some years. Then, one day, the father moved 
back to Rhode Island with the children. The mother immediately 
commenced a proceeding in Texas seeking divorce and cus­
tody. 203 Two weeks after arriving in Rhode Island, the father also 
sought custody of the children, in a Rhode Island court. 
In response, the mother objected that UCCJA section 6 pre­
cluded Rhode Island from taking jurisdiction of the case because 
Texas custody proceedings were already pending when the father 
filed his action in Rhode Island. Nevertheless, the Rhode Island 
trial court held a hearing and granted the father temporary cus­
tody of the children. Meanwhile, the earlier-begun Texas action 
continued, and, about two months after the Rhode Island tempo­
rary order was entered, the Texas court granted the mother a 
divorce and custody of the children. She accordingly removed 
the children from Rhode Island and returned with them to Texas. 
The Rhode Island court decided that, by taking her children to 
Texas, the mother had acted in contempt of its temporary custody 
order; it ordered her to return the children to their father. On 
the strength of this Rhode Island order, the father went to Texas, 
got the children, and brought them back to Rhode Island. 
201 488 A.2d 726 (R.I. 1985). 
202 See id.; see also Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 542 So. 2d 726, 728-29 (La. Ct. App. 
1989) (holding that rule for contempt, filed in Florida to enforce Florida 
custody order, is not a pending "proceeding to determine custody" and 
therefore § 6 does not require Louisiana to defer to it); In re Brandon L.E., 
551 N.E.2d 506, 510 (Mass. 1990) (holding that although Mississippi is 
attempting to enforce its prior custody order by finding the mother in 
contempt, this does not mean that a custody proceeding is still "pending" in 
Mississippi, and therefore does not preclude Massachusetts from assuming 
jurisdiction). 
203 Under UCCJA § 3(a)(1)(ii), Texas would seem to have had 
jurisdiction: the children had lived with their parents in Texas "within 6 
months before the commencement of the proceeding," the children were 
only absent from Texas because of their "removal or retention by a person 
claiming [their] custody," and their mother continued to live in Texas. See 9 
U.L.A. pt. I, at 143. 
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The mother followed her children back to Rhode Island and 
appealed the temporary custody order and the judgment of con­
tempt to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, renewing her argu­
ment that section 6 required Rhode Island to defer to Texas. The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's exercise of 
jurisdiction. Although acknowledging that Texas had been the 
children's home state within six months of the time the mother 
initiated her claim for custody there, and thus that Texas had 
jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 204 the supreme court held that sec­
tion 6 did not require the trial court to defer to the pending 
Texas custody proceeding. 
The court reasoned that because the father had not received 
actual notice of the Texas proceeding at the time he filed his 
Rhode Island action, the Texas proceeding was not yet really 
"pending," and therefore Rhode Island should not be precluded 
from exercising its "significant connection" jurisdiction.205 The 
Rhode Island court made no inquiry as to when a custody pro­
ceeding is "pending" under Texas law. The question was instead 
seen as one of Rhode Island law, to be decided with reference to 
the children's best interests. The children's best interests, in 
turn, were seen through the lens of the Rhode Island trial court's 
factual determinations: that exercising jurisdiction206 and award­
ing custody to their father207 would be in their best interests. 
The North Carolina case Davis v. Davis 208 is a good example of 
the second interpretive strategy for evading section 6, that is, 
determining that the foreign state did not exercise jurisdiction in 
"substantial conformity" with the UCCJA.209 In Davis, the par-
204 488 A.2d at 730. 
205 !d. at 731-32; cJ. Lopez v. District Court, 606 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1980) 
(en bane) (holding that under California law, a custody action is "pending" 
as soon as filed). 
206 Assumption of jurisdiction under UCCJA § 3(a)(2) requires a 
determination that this is in the child's best interests. 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 143. 
207 The determination that awarding custody to the father was in the 
children's best interests is implicit in the award. 
208 281 S.E.2d 411 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981). 
209 At least four other states' courts have used this mechanism to avoid 
deferring to an ongoing, earlier-begun, custody proceeding in another state. 
See Norsworthy v. Norsworthy, 713 S.W.2d 451 (Ark. 1986) (holding that 
Arkansas need not defer to Texas custody proceeding begun two weeks 
earlier because Texas's exercise of jurisdiction seems to conflict with 
purposes ofUCCJA as set out in§ 1); Bull v. Bull, 311 N.W.2d 768 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1981) (holding that Michigan need not defer to pending Georgia 
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ties' North Carolina marriage was punctuated by several separa­
tions during which the mother took the children to California. 
Eventually, the father filed an action in North Carolina seeking 
"permanent and exclusive" custody of the children.210 In 
response, the mother pled that a custody proceeding that ante­
dated the father's North Carolina action was pending in Califor­
nia, and that a California court had granted her temporary 
custody of the children. Both California and North Carolina had 
adopted the UCCJA.211 Following the procedure mandated by 
UCCJA section 6(c),212 the North Carolina trialjudge telephoned 
the Californiajudge, was told that California would not relinquish 
its jurisdiction, and accordingly dismissed the father's action.213 
On the father's appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
reversed. It is clear from the opinion that the Court of Appeals 
thought the mother should not have custody.214 (The court's 
recital of the facts paints the mother as impulsive and unreliable, 
repeatedly leaving the father for no apparent reason and then 
begging him to take her and the children back. The court also 
proceeding because Georgia did not consider best interests of child in 
changing custody and thus did not act in conformity with the UCCJA); Swire 
v. Swire, 494 A.2d 1035 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (holding that New 
Jersey need not defer to proceeding pending in former home state where 
father still resided because the "vast preponderance" of evidence was in 
New Jersey, where children had been living for six years); In re Fenn, 664 
P.2d 1143 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that Oregon was not required to 
defer to Texas proceeding begun two weeks earlier because Oregon had 
better access to evidence about children and family); see also Mainster v. 
Mainster, 466 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (interpreting section 6 
to permit or require an inquiry into correctness of other state's 
determination of its own jurisdiction, but agreeing that other state had 
jurisdiction); Bowden v. Bowden, 440 A.2d 1160 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1982) (remanding for factual hearing to decide if Nebraska's pending 
proceedings were "substantially in conformity" with UCCJA). 
21o 281 S.E.2d at 412. 
211 !d. at 413,416. 
212 Section 6(c) reads: 
If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that 
a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in 
another state before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay 
the proceeding and communicate with the court in which the 
other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be 
litigated in the more appropriate forum .... 
9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 220. 
213 281 S.E.2d at 412. 
214 /d. at 411-12. 
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recounts several occasions when the mother allegedly deceived 
the father so she could leave North Carolina with the children.215) 
It accordingly read UCCJA section 6 as permitting North Carolina 
to determine for itself whether California was "exercising juris­
diction substantially in conformity with this Act."216 
The children appear to have been in California from approxi­
mately March, 1978, to January, 1979, and again from February, 
1979 to June, 1979, both times probably living with their mother 
and maternal grandmother.217 While in California, the mother 
and children received public assistance.218 Although the Califor­
nia court might well have determined, therefore, that during their 
visits to California the mother and children established "signifi­
cant connections" with the state, supporting California jurisdic­
tion under UCCJA section 3(a)(2), the North Carolina court 
redetermined the facts and disagreed. That court focused on the 
brevity of the mother's most recent stay in California before she 
filed her custody action: "We do not believe that, by this brief 
interlude (one month) in California, California obtained jurisdic­
tion in conformity with [N.C. Gen. Stat. section] 50A-3."219 
These two strategies for interpreting section 6, that is, deter­
mining that a case is not "pending" or that an exercise of jurisdic­
tion is not in "substantial conformity with this Act," have a 
common thread. In both, the second forum, motivated by con­
cerns for a child's welfare to disregard an earlier-begun foreign 
proceeding, exploits the statutory direction to evaluate foreign 
jurisdiction under forum law in order to justify taking jurisdiction 
over the case. Section 6 directs the second court to test both pen­
dency and substantial conformity with respect to "this Act,"220 
that is, the law of the state making the inquiry, rather than the law 
of the state where the other proceeding was begun. Even when 
both states have adopted the UCCJA without change, so that the 
language of the two state laws is identical, directing a court to 
look at its own, rather than foreign, law seems to increase the lati­
tude of its interpretations. The UCCJA does not direct the sec­
ond court to consider the decisional law that guided the first court 
215 See id. at 411-12, 417. 
216 /d. at 416. 
217 See id. 
218 See id. at 412. 
219 /d. at 416. 
22o 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 219 (emphasis added). 
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in its own interpretation of the UCCJA.221 As a result, even when 
the first court's proceeding is both pending and proper under its 
own interpretation of the UCCJA, the present forum is able to 
construe the foreign proceeding as not "pending" under local 
law, or as not in "substantial conformity" with the requirements 
of local law, and to take jurisdiction. 
State courts do not always exploit these opportunities; in many 
cases they instead dismiss in deference to a pending foreign pro­
ceeding. But whenever the now-local child seems to have needs 
that the forum fears a foreign proceeding will disregard, section 6 
provides the means for a concerned court to take jurisdiction over 
the dispute. In such cases, however, the forum's eventual child 
custody order will be particularly vulnerable to attack in other 
states, and especially so in the state whose pending proceeding 
was disregarded. 222 
2. When Must a Court Enforce a Foreign Order Instead of 
Making an Independent Inquiry Into the Situation? 
(Sections 12, 13, and 15) 
Section 6 requires courts to defer only to pending cases, not to 
final decisions. Similarly, the provisions requiring deference to 
foreign decrees are couched in terms that make it possible to 
interpret the UCCJA as requiring the forum to defer to a foreign 
proceeding only as long as the case is actually pending in a for­
eign court.223 Under this interpretation, once the foreign custody 
221 This was a deliberate drafting choice, the result of Bodenheimer's 
decision to make the act "uniform" but not "reciprocal." Bodenheimer 
wanted every state that adopted the UCCJA to be bound by its provisions 
whether or not other interested states had also adopted it. See UCCJA 
Prefatory Note, 9 U:L.A. pt. I, at 118. 
222 See infra notes 233-38 and accompanying text (discussing In re 
Hopson, 168 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Ct. App. 1980)). 
223 See UCCJA §§ 12, 13, 15, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 274, 276, 311. Several 
years after the UCCJA was promulgated, when it became apparent that 
courts were sometimes interpreting the act in this way, Professor 
Bodenheimer wrote that the UCCJA both forbade concurrent jurisdiction 
and implicitly required other states to defer to the decree state's jurisdiction 
even after the child has left the decree state: 
When a child stays in a state for six months or more as a visitor 
or a victim of abduction, the question arises whether the new 
state has power to modify the custody decree. The answer is that 
the Act does not permit the second state to take jurisdiction 
because the paramount jurisdiction of the prior state continues. 
Section 3 of the Act, the basic provision on subject matter 
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case reaches final judgment, another forum may immediately 
exercise its own jurisdiction by re-determining custody.224 
The UCCJA does contain two provisions that seemingly require 
courts to enforce foreign decrees. Both of them, however, direct 
the forum to inquire into the foreign court's jurisdiction before 
enforcing its order. Because the foreign court's jurisdiction is to 
be tested according to the law of the forum rather than the law of 
the court rendering the decision, both provisions permit the same 
sorts of interpretive strategies as are sometimes used under sec­
tion 6. 
One of the two provisions requiring deference to foreign 
decrees is in UCCJA section 13. Section 13 requires the forum to 
"recognize and enforce" foreign custody decrees made by a court 
that had "assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions sub­
stantially in accordance with this Act or [if the decree] was made 
under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards 
of the Act."225 The most common way for a court to honor sec­
tion 13's strictures without enforcing the foreign decision is to 
jurisdiction, must be read in corUunction with section 14, which 
does not permit modifications by another state as long as the 
prior state's exclusive jurisdiction continues. This is true 
whether or not another state has technically become the child's 
home state. 
Bodenheimer, Progress Under the UCCJA, supra note 5, at 988 (footnotes omit­
ted). As authority for this assertion, Bodenheimer relied on the Commis­
sioner's Note to Section 14 rather than on the text of the statute itself. See 
id. at 988 n.67; see also Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, supra note 5, at 204-
05. 
In response, Professor Foster made a textual analysis of the UCCJA that 
supports his conclusion that the decree state does not retain continuing 
jurisdiction for more than six months after the child has left it. See Foster, 
supra note 12, at 303-10. 
224 See, e.g., Gordon v. Gordon, 363 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) 
(reversing trial court's order because entered while custody proceeding was 
pending in another state, but remanding for a hearing on whether the other 
state has jurisdiction "now," and for possible modification of the order if it 
does not). 
225 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 276. Section 13 also conditions its requirement of 
enforcement on the foreign decree not having been modified "in 
accordance with jurisdictional standards substantially similar to those of this 
Act." So far as I am aware, no court has based a decision on a distinction 
between the slightly different standards applied to the foreign state's 
assumption of jurisdiction ("substantially in accordance with this Act") and 
its exercise of jurisdiction by modification ("substantially similar to those of 
this Act"). 
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determine that the foreign court did not assume jurisdiction 
"substantially in accordance with this Act."226 
Courts have applied fairly technical local rules to foreign deci­
sions under this rubric, as in Brewington v. Serrato.227 In Brewington, 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a Texas court's 
jurisdiction was defective because its (final and unappealed) deci­
sion had not complied with North Carolina's requirement that 
custody decisions contain explicit and specific findings of jurisdic­
tional facts.228 Both Texas and North Carolina had adopted the 
UCCJA. Although the North Carolina court did not acknowledge 
it, Texas certainly had "significant contacts" jurisdiction, and may 
have been the "home state" as well.229 When the Texas court 
gave the mother custody, the father neither appealed nor obeyed 
the order; instea<i, he filed for custody in North Carolina. The 
North Carolina court's determination that Texas lacked jurisdic­
tion seems to have been driven by its view of the merits, based at 
least in part on evidence of post-abduction father-son fishing 
trips.230 
The other provision governing deference to foreign decrees is 
found in UCCJA section 15 when it is read together with section 
226 The other possibility, a determination that the factual circumstances 
do not meet the Act's jurisdictional standards, seems mostly to have been 
used in reviewing the work of courts not subject to the UCCJA. See, e.g., 
Mace v. Mace, 341 N.W.2d 307 (Neb. 1983) (determining that Mississippi, 
which had not yet adopted UCCJA, lacked significant contacts with child 
who had regularly visited father there). 
227 336 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); see also Dillon v. Medelin, 409 
So. 2d 570 (La. 1982) (refusing to defer to Texas's § 3(a)(4) "emergency" 
jurisdiction, which was based on allegations that custodial mother and 
stepfather sexually abused child and used drugs, because alleged actions 
occurred in Louisiana rather than in Texas). 
228 See 336 S.E.2d at 447; cf. Walt v. Walt, 574 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1991) (reversing trial court's enforcement of Mississippi custody 
decree because of Mississippi's procedural lapses, as assessed under 
Florida's verbatim enactment of UCCJA § 9). 
229 See UCCJA § 3(a)(1)(i), (2), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143. The child was born 
in Texas and lived there with his parents for a year, until the family moved 
to North Carolina. About six months after the move, however, the mother 
returned to Texas with the child, first saying that she was visiting a sick 
relative and then that she did not want to go on living with her husband. 
Approximately six months after the mother and child returned to Texas, the 
father fetched the child back to North Carolina over the mother's protest. 
She immediately filed a custody action in Texas; the father was served, and 
he filed responsive pleadings. 336 S.E.2d at 446. 
230 See 336 S.E.2d at 448. 
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12. Section 15 permits a party to file a foreign custody decree 
with a forum court, and requires the forum to enforce such a 
decree "in like manner as a custody decree rendered by a court of 
this State."231 By itself, this provision seems simple and auto­
matic; it apparently gives the forum no opportunity to inquire 
into the bona fides of a facially-valid foreign custody order. Such 
an opportunity, however, is latent in the direction to treat the for­
eign decree "in like manner" to a local decree. Section 12 defines 
a local custody decree's effect. According to section 12, a local 
decree is binding as to "all issues of law and fact decided and as 
to the custody determination made unless and until that determi­
nation is modified pursuant to law," provided that the court that 
rendered it has "jurisdiction under section 3," that is, under 
forum law. 232 
The California case In re Hopson 233 provides a striking example 
of the sort of interpretation a court that does not wish to enforce 
a recent foreign decree can give section 15. In Hopson, both par­
ties presented the California court with facially-valid foreign cus­
tody decrees. The Arizona decree gave custody to the mother. 
She asked the California court to enforce the Arizona decree 
under California's enactment of UCCJA section 15. Arizona had 
been the children's home state at the time the action was origi­
nally filed there. The later Tennessee decree transferred custody 
to the father. Arguably, Tennessee had jurisdiction at the time it 
made its decision. 234 Rather than enforcing either foreign 
231 9 U .L.A. pt. 1, at 311. 
232 UCCJA § 12, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 274. Section 12 also specifies that the 
decree is binding only on all properly-served parties "who have been given 
an opportunity to be heard." 
233 168 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Ct. App. 1980). 
234 The parties had lived in Arizona for two years when they divorced; an 
Arizona decree gave the mother custody. Although the Arizona decree 
prohibited both parents from removing the children from the state without 
court permission, the mother moved with them to California shortly after 
the father moved, alone, to Tennessee. Thereafter, the father sought a 
change of custody in the Arizona court; while his request was pending, he 
took the children from California to his home in Tennessee and filed for 
custody there. After a hearing, Arizona continued the mother's custody and 
gave her permission to take the children to California or anywhere else. !d. 
at 349-50. 
Shortly thereafter, a Tennessee court took jurisdiction of the father's 
action for custody, over the mother's objection. After a contested hearing, 
the Tennessee court gave the father custody because it considered the 
children's best interests more important than punishing the father for child-
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decree, the California court assumedjurisdiction over the dispute 
itself, reasoning that California had jurisdiction because it had 
been the children's home state at the time the father abducted 
them to Tennessee, more than two years previously.235 The Cali­
fornia Court of Appeal reviewed the Tennessee decision as if an 
inferior local court had made it, and found it to be in "error."236 
According to the California court, Tennessee should have 
deferred to the then-pending Arizona proceeding, should have 
weighed the father's misconduct more heavily, and should have 
applied a different substantive standard to the question of modifi­
cation.237 Had the case been in fact appealed from Tennessee to 
California, a remand to the Tennessee courts would have been 
proper; under the circumstances, committing the question to a 
California trial court approximated this result as closely as possi­
ble. Of course, since Tennessee is in fact an independent sover­
eign state, California's determination of the custody issue in 
Hopson was not respected in the one place it could have been 
enforced-Tennessee, where the children stayed during the Cali­
fornia litigation, and where they remained afterwards.238 
3. When May a Court, After an Independent Inquiry, 
Modify a Foreign Custody Order? (Sections 3 and 
14) 
Under the UCCJA, deciding that a foreign child custody decree 
is not entitled to be "recognized and enforced" is only one way 
for a court to avoid enforcing it. Even a concededly valid decree 
may onen be modified. Sections 3 and 14 govern such 
modifications. 
By prohibiting simultaneous proceedings, section 6 implicitly 
prohibits a forum from modifying foreign orders in pending 
cases. However, the UCCJA treats final decrees differently; sec­
tions 12, 13, and 15 all contemplate modification of final foreign 
snatching. /d. at 350. The children had been living in Tennessee for 
seventeen months at the time of this decision. !d. at 353. 
235 /d. at 359. 
236 /d. at 356. 
237 /d. at 353-56. 
238 The mother was unable to enforce Califomia's decision in Tennessee. 
Interestingly, about four years after the Hopson decision, when the children 
were approximately 14 and 1 7, both ran away from their father to live with 
their mother. The parties were then able to agree on visitation. Telephone 
Interview with William Hinton (Aug. 21, 1991) (attomey for mother). 
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custody decrees under certain circumstances. Section 14 specifies 
these circumstances. The forum may modify a foreign decree if 
"(1) it appears to the court of this State that the court which ren­
dered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdic­
tional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this Act or 
has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (2) 
the court of this State has jurisdiction. " 239 There are three 
important points to note about this language. 
First, while sections 12, 13 and 15 tested foreignjurisdiction at 
the time the decree court assumed it, section 14 tests it "now." 
Second, even if the forum concludes that the decree court both 
assumedjurisdiction legitimately and still has jurisdiction "now," 
the forum may nevertheless modify the decree if it determines 
that the decree court has "declined to assume" its jurisdiction. 
Third, these assessments, like the forum's evaluation of its own 
jurisdiction, are to be made on the basis of the forum's view of 
both facts240 and law.241 The first two of these points merit 
extended discussion. 
a. Does the Decree Court Have jurisdiction "Now"? 
Even the decree of a court that, under section 13, concededly 
"assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in 
accordance with this Act"-a decree that the forum court must 
therefore "recognize and enforce"242-may nevertheless be mod­
ified by a forum that decides that the decree state does not have 
jurisdiction "now," if the forum also believes that it itself does 
have jurisdiction. The new state's assessment of the situation may 
well differ from the decree state's assessment. Indeed, decree 
states often think they may retain "significant contact" jurisdic­
tion long after the child has left the state.243 The statute can, with 
239 UCCJA § 14, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 292. 
240 /d. ("it appears to the court of this State"). 
241 /d. ("under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance 
with this Act" (emphasis added)). 
242 UCCJA § 13, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 276. 
243 See, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1977) 
(holding it proper to exercise "significant contacts" jurisdiction nine years 
after child's departure); Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986) (en 
bane) (remanding to determine whether, seven years after leaving state, the 
children still have "significant contacts" that would support Colorado 
jurisdiction); Kioukis v. Kioukis, 440 A.2d 894 (Conn. 1981) (remanding to 
determine if Connecticut has "significant contacts" jurisdiction three years 
after child's departure from state); Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 
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some difficulty, be read to support this position.244 Usually it is 
1990) (holding that Florida retains jurisdiction four years after children 
moved away); Harris v. Melnick, 552 A.2d 38 (Md. 1989) (holding it proper 
to exercise "significant contacts" jurisdiction seven years after children 
moved away); Range v. Range, 440 N.W.2d 691 (Neb. 1989) (holding it 
proper to exercise "significant contacts" jurisdiction three years after 
children moved away); People ex ret. Throneberg v. Butcher, 479 N.Y.S.2d 
762 (App. Div. 1984) (holding that New York has "significant contacts" 
jurisdiction seventeen months after child left state because child was 
wrongfully retained in Oklahoma after a visit there); G.S. v. Ewing, 786 P.2d 
65 (Okla. 1990) (holding it proper to exercise "significant contacts" 
jurisdiction four years after children's departure); see also Dennis v. Dennis, 
387 N.W.2d 234 (N.D. 1986) (holding that trial court did not abuse 
discretion by dismissing for forum non conveniens reasons a case that had 
been remanded for determination of whether, three years after child left 
North Dakota, there was still "significant contacts" jurisdiction); cf. 
Schlumpf v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 190 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding 
that although California retained "significant contacts" jurisdiction nine 
years after child's departure, UCCJA § 7, forum non conveniens, required 
court to stay proceedings in favor of those in child's present home state). 
244 UCCJA § 3(c) makes it clear that the "[p]hysical presence of the child, 
while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his 
custody." 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 144. That being the case, it is possible to 
interpret§ 3(a)(2)'s requirement that "the child and his parents, or the child 
and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this State," id. 
at 143, as being satisfied long after the child has departed with one parent 
for a new home, so long as the child visits the local parent occasionally. 
Section 3(a)(2)'s other requirement, that "there [be] available in this State 
substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, 
protection, training, and personal relationships," id. at 143, is either 
ignored, e.g., Kendall v. Whalen, 526 A.2d 588, 590 (Me. 1987) (relying 
entirely on Bodenheimer's writings and "the purpose of the UCCJA" to 
affirm decree state's continuing jurisdiction to modify custody twenty-one 
months after child left Maine with custodial parent), or considered to be 
satisfied by regular visitation, e.g., Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So. 2d 1327, 1331 
(Fla. 1990) (finding that children's annual visits establish significant 
contacts; holding that UCCJA does not divest decree court of continuing 
jurisdiction "unless virtually all contacts [with decree state] have been 
lost"), or even by the possibility that a change in custody would make 
evidence about the decree state relevant to the child's future care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships, e.g., Biggers v. Biggers, 650 P.2d 692, 
696 (Idaho 1982) (permitting decree state to modify custody although 
children live in new state with custodial parent because evidence of 
children's pre-move contacts in Idaho bears on their "present and future 
care"). 
In some states, courts may also rely on a statutory preference for 
continuing jurisdiction. See, e.g., Levy v. Levy, 434 N.E.2d 400, 404 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1982) (relying, in part, on Illinois amendment to UCCJA § 3 
specifying that "a court, once having obtained jurisdiction over a child, shall 
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only when an appellate court in the decree state wishes to punish 
parental wrongdoing that it concludes that time must have viti­
ated the child's connections with the decree state.245 In contrast, 
when the question of "significant contact" jurisdiction arises in 
the new (or "asylum") state, the forum often concludes that the 
decree state lost jurisdiction almost as soon as the new state 
became the "home state"-potentially little more than six months 
after the move. 246 
retain such jurisdiction"); Larsen v. Larsen, 615 P.2d 806 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1980) (relying, in part, on KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a) (1979) (amended 
repeatedly through 1988) to find continuing jurisdiction to modify custody 
five years after child and custodial parent moved away from Kansas). 
245 See, e.g., Hafer v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. Rptr. 132 (Ct. App. 1981) 
(finding error to assert continuing jurisdiction over custody matter three 
years after child left California for Idaho; mother's abduction of children 
influenced court); Hegler v. Hegler, 383 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980) (holding that Florida lacked "significant contacts" jurisdiction over 
children who left state four years before, although one was abducted back to 
Florida two years later and thus had been in Florida for two years, and 
remanding to determine if emergency jurisdiction existed); State ex rei. 
Murphy v. Boudreau, 653 P.2d 531 (Okla. 1982) (affirming trial court's 
finding that Oklahoma lost jurisdiction over children five years after their 
move, in part because father abducted child); cf. In re Lance, 690 P.2d 979 
(Mont. 1984) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of modification filed seven 
months after child left state with custodial mother because petitioning father 
was prose, incarcerated, and had attempted to bribe Wyoming trial judge). 
But see L.F. v. G.W.F., 443 A.2d 751 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 1982) (finding 
New Jersey's jurisdiction vitiated 4 112 years after child's departure). 
246 See, e.g., In re Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903 (Ct. App. 1981) (fourteen 
months; held-over visit); Fuge v. Uiterwyk, 542 So. 2d 726 (La. Ct. App. 
1989) (twelve months); Olson v. Olson, 494 A.2d 737 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1985) (five years); Mace v. Mace, 341 N.W.2d 307 (Neb. 1983) (eighteen 
months); In re Reynolds, 441 N.E.2d 1141 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (two years); 
Ellis v. Nickerson, 604 P.2d 518 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (five years). 
Even when doing so permits an abduction to mature into the basis for 
home state jurisdiction in six months, many asylum courts test the decree 
state's jurisdiction not at the time the proceeding was commenced or even 
at the time the decision was rendered, but at the time the modification 
proceeding was filed in the new state, or even later. See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 
287 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa 1980) (testing decree state's jurisdiction at time of 
filing in Iowa); Bull v. Bull, 3ll N.W.2d 768 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (testing 
Georgia's jurisdiction at time abducting mother filed pleadings in Michigan 
in response to father's attempt to enforce Georgia decree there); Ellis v. 
Nickerson, 604 P.2d 518 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (refusing to enforce 
Missouri decree issued in 1977, two years after mother left state, because by 
1979 Missouri lacked "significant contacts" with the children; forum, 
children's home since 1977, asserts jurisdiction); In re Brandon L.E., 394 
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When the decree and asylum states' assessments ofjurisdiction 
differ in this way, each forum usually follows its own determina­
tion.247 It is important to understand that, because any given 
forum may be an asylum state in one case and a decree state in 
another, jurisdiction is typically analyzed as a question "of fact" 
that may be resolved differently in superficially similar cases on 
the basis of assertedly important factual distinctions.248 
Occasionally a court will address the underlying policy ques­
tions rather than the technical details of a modification issue. The 
Oregon Supreme Court's epic struggles with the proper interpre­
tation of section 14 are particularly illuminating. The court con­
fronted the problem in two cases, each of which arose when a 
party took a child into Oregon from the state ofinitialjurisdiction 
before an initial order had been made. As the court recognized, 
the policy question was whether an abduction should ever mature 
into such settled residency as would support an exercise of child 
S.E.2d 515 (W. Va. 1990) (testing Florida's jurisdiction at time of appeal 
from West Virginia's custody decision); Rosics v. Heath, 746 P.2d 1284 
(Wyo. 1987) (testing Texas's jurisdiction at time of initial modification 
hearing in Wyoming). 
Slidell v. Valentine, 298 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1980), is a similar case. There, 
the Iowa Supreme Court refused to enforce a Florida custody order in favor 
of the father by applying its own law to the question of when a Florida 
custody proceeding had been commenced. The Iowa court held that 
custody proceedings the father had commenced in Florida shortly before 
the mother left the state (in defiance of an order to produce the child in 
court) were abandoned by him because he did not search for her vigorously 
enough, although Florida itself later consolidated the earlier proceedings 
with those the father brought when he finally located the mother in Iowa, 
three years later. !d. at 602. 
247 See, e.g., McCarron v. District Court, 671 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1983) (en 
bane) (issuing mandamus to require Colorado court to exercise jurisdiction 
over custody dispute although decree state had asserted its continuing 
jurisdiction). 
248 Compare Harris v. Melnick, 552 A.2d 38 (Md. 1989) (Maryland, as 
decree state, asserts exclusive continuing jurisdiction although child has 
lived in Colorado for seven years) with Olson v. Olson, 494 A.2d 737 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (Maryland, as asylum state, asserts home state 
jurisdiction five years after child's arrival from Rhode Island) and Howard v. 
Gish, 373 A.2d 1280 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (Maryland, as asylum state, 
asserts jurisdiction after eleven months); also compare Mace v. Mace, 341 
N.W.2d 307 (Neb. 1983) (Nebraska, as asylum state, decides that decree 
state lost jurisdiction after children were absent for eighteen months) with 
Range v. Range, 440 N.W.2d 691 (Neb. 1989) (Nebraska, as decree state, 
asserts jurisdiction over children absent for three years and distinguishes 
Mace on basis of children's ages). 
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custody jurisdiction by the asylum state. Answering this question 
"no" subordinates the UCCJA's goals of flexibility and of having 
the custody decision made by a court with maximum access to 
current information; answering it "yes" subordinates the 
UCCJA's goals of preventing and deterring abductions. The 
question therefore exposes the heart of the UCCJA's 
indeterminacy. 
The first such case to command the Oregon Supreme Court's 
attention was In re Settle. 249 In Settle, the mother fled with the chil­
dren to Oregon in order to evade the father's custodial claims 
while the case was pending in an Indiana court with personal 
jurisdiction over both parents and the children. 250 In the 
mother's absence, Indiana granted the father custody. When the 
father located the children in Oregon and attempted to enforce 
the Indiana custody order, however, the Oregon trial court con­
solidated the father's habeas corpus action with the mother's peti­
tion for modification, heard testimony on the merits, and granted 
custody to the mother.251 The Oregon Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that the mother was not entitled to an Oregon 
forum because she had violated an Indiana court order by leaving 
the state with the children, 252 but on further appeal the Oregon 
Supreme Court vindicated both the trial court's assertion ofjuris­
diction and its award of custody. By the time of the Oregon hear­
ing, the children had been away from both Indiana and their 
father for twenty months.253 The supreme court reasoned that 
UCCJA section 14 permitted Oregon to modify the Indiana 
decree because Indiana was neither the home state nor a state 
with "significant connection" to the children at the time the Ore­
gon action was filed, 254 and because Oregon had by then become 
the children's "home state."255 
From the first, the Oregon Supreme Court recognized that the 
249 556 P.2d 962 (Or. 1976) (in bane), overruled by In re Ross, 630 P.2d 
353 (Or. 1981) (in bane). 
250 The Oregon Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the mother's 
scofflaw motivations. See id. at 963-64. 
251 The court thought the children's welfare would be best served by 
stability-continued custody with the mother-in the absence of 
"affirmative reasons to award custody to either parent." !d. at 965. 
252 In re Settle, 550 P.2d 445 (Or. Ct. App.), rev 'd, 556 P.2d 962 (Or. 
1976) (in bane), overruled by In re Ross, 630 P.2d 353 (Or. 1981) (in bane). 
253 556 P.2d at 964. 
254 !d. at 966. 
255 !d. at 965. 
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UCCJA attempts to achieve both of two incompatible goals, flexi­
bility and repose. In Settle, after carefully considering the 
UCCJA's language and official Comments, the Oregon Supreme 
Court chose flexibility. It read the statute itself as choosing flexi­
bility over repose, in order to achieve the best interests of the 
child, whenever the two "schizophrenic" goals presented "an 
irreconcilable conflict. " 256 
A few years later, in In re Ross,257 the Oregon Supreme Court 
overruled Settle. The facts of Ross were similar to those of Settle. 
Two days after parents who had married and lived together in 
Montana separated, the father took their child to Oregon. In his 
absence, and on the basis of service by publication, the Montana 
court awarded the mother both a divorce and custody of the child. 
It took the mother twenty months to locate the father and child in 
Oregon. Relying on Settle, the lower Oregon courts tookjurisdic­
tion over the father's modification petition, held a hearing, and 
awarded him custody.258 On further appeal, the Supreme Court 
of Oregon reversed, holding that because the child retained "sig­
nificant connections" with Montana, Oregon could not take 
jurisdiction. 259 
The factual basis for this holding was not strong. The trial 
court had found that the only "'significant connection' the child 
now has with [Montana] is the October, 1977, decree."260 To 
conclude that the child still had a significant connection with 
Montana at the time the father sought modification in Oregon, 
the Oregon Supreme Court had to transform the mother's con­
nections with Montana into the child's: 
The mother still lived [in Montana], and the relationship 
between mother and child is itself a significant one. Beyond that, 
although the child was forcibly removed at [age nineteen 
months], the child had other significant connections with the 
state. Her older sister continued to reside in the family home 
with the mother, and other friends and neighbors, who had also 
been involved in the child's upbringing also continued to live 
256 !d. at 968 ("A close reading of the Act discloses a schizophrenic 
attempt to bring about an orderly system of decision and at the same time to 
protect the best interests of the children who may be immediately before the 
court. . ") 
257 630 P.2d 353 (Or. 1981) (in bane). 
258 In re Ross, 614 P.2d 1225 (Or. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 630 P.2d 353 
(Or. 1981) (in bane). 
259 630 P.2d at 360-61. 
260 /d. at 359 (quoting trial court). 
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nearby.261 
As the court forthrightly acknowledged, its decision in Ross was 
based on a deliberate change in policy, in an attempt to deter 
"abductions. " 262 The court abandoned the policy it had chosen 
in Settle, although it still thought that "the purpose which per­
vades the Act is to provide that child custody determinations will 
be made in the state where there is optimum access to evi­
dence,"263 and it still read sections 3 and 14 as giving a new state 
jurisdiction after "successful long-term concealment following an 
abduction. "264 Contrary to its own careful analysis of the specifi­
cally-applicable sections, 265 the Oregon Supreme Court in Ross 
relied on the UCCJA's stated general purpose of "deterring 
abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken 
to obtain custody awards."266 
Why? The most influential factor seems to have been Professor 
Bodenheimer's published criticism of the Settle decision.267 
Bodenheimer had left no doubt that she viewed Settle as based on 
"an interpretation [of the UCCJA] which would encourage the 
very evils the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws intended to 
eradicate."268 In response, the Oregon court held that, at least 
on Ross's facts, "[a]n abduction and concealment of but 21 
months does not divest the decree state of jurisdiction. " 269 
A close reading of the two cases could support the conclusion 
that the Oregon Supreme Court was wrong in both Settle and Ross. 
To shift custody to a parent who had deliberately flouted the 
authority of a foreign court, in Settle the supreme court ignored 
261 /d. at 361. In evaluating this recital, it must be remembered that the 
child had been taken from the mother, and remained concealed from her, 
from August 28, 1977, when the child was nineteen months old, until at 
least May 15, 1979, when the child was three years and four months old. /d. 
at 354-55. 
262 /d. at 361. One problem with this policy is distinguishing 
"abductions," or wrongful interstate moves with a child, from their non­
wrongful cousins. 
263 /d. at 357. 
264 /d. at 358. 
265 See In re Settle, 556 P.2d 962 (Or. 1976) (in bane), overruled by In re 
Ross, 630 P.2d 353 (Or. 1981) (in bane). 
266 UCCJA § 1(5), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 124; see Ross, 630 P.2d at 357, 361. 
267 See 630 P.2d at 362-63 (quoting Bodenheimer, Progress Under the 
UCCJA, supra note 5, at 988-89). 
268 Bodenheimer, Progress Under the UCCJA, supra note 5, at 988. 
269 630 P.2d at 363. 
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strong arguments for deferring to the decree state: both language 
in section 8 that would have supported dismissing the modifica­
tion,270 and Oregon's own pre-UCCJA cases, which, ironically, 
had helped Ehrenzweig to formulate the "clean hands doc­
trine."271 In Ross, however, the Oregon court took his child from 
a father who had never violated any order of which he had actual 
notice. His departure with the child in the company of his eight­
een-year-old girlfriend may well have startled and enraged the 
mother, but it was not legally "wrongful," because prior to a cus­
tody order both parents are the natural guardians of their 
child. 272 But such criticism would entirely miss a much more 
important point. Oregon's high court twice grappled with the 
problem sections 3 and 14 pose, both times taking serious and 
careful note of the statute's language and the scholarly commen­
tary. It reached two contradictory, but equally well-documented 
and well-thought-out conclusions, because the UCCJA supports 
them both. Tellingly, other jurisdictions continued to cite Settle 
approvingly even after Oregon overruled it. 273 
270 Section 8(b) permits dismissal of a modification "[i]f the petitioner 
has violated any ... provision of a custody decree of another state" and 
dismissal is 'just and proper under the circumstances." 9 U .L.A. pt. 1, at 
251. The mother had violated a court order by leaving Indiana. 
Dismissal was not mandated in Settle, however, because the UCCJA only 
requires a court to dismiss a modification when the modification petitioner 
"has improperly removed the child from the physical custody of the person 
entitled to custody or has improperly retained the child after a visit or other 
temporary relinquishment of physical custody." UCCJA § 8(b), 9 U.L.A. pt. 
1, at 251. At the time she removed the children from Indiana, the mother 
had temporary custody of the children by court order and agreement of the 
parties. See In reSettle, 556 P.2d 962, 963 (Or. 1976) (in bane), overruled by 
In re Ross, 630 P.2d 353 (Or. 1981) (in bane). 
271 See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2, at 367 n.142 (citing 
In re Lorenz, 241 P.2d 142, 146 (Or. 1952); Ex parte Quinn, 233 P.2d 767, 
772 (Or. 1951) (dictum); Lingel v. Maudlin, 212 P.2d 751 (Or. 1949)). 
272 The Oregon Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged this awkward 
fact when it said that "[e]ven though father removed the child prior to the 
time mother filed her suit, there is no dispute that the child was improperly 
retained." Ross, 630 P.2d at 360. If there was no dispute, there should have 
been: the father apparently had no notice of the Montana decree giving 
custody to his ex-wife until he was arrested nearly two years later and 
charged with "custodial interference" for violating it. See id. at 354-55. 
273 See, e.g. Speights v. Rockwood, 451 So. 2d 1275 (La. Ct. App. 1984) 
(refusing to enforce Texas custody order and exercising home state 
jurisdiction although custodial mother entered Louisiana with child in 
violation of a Texas restraining order); Pierce v. Pierce, 640 P.2d 899, 905 
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b. Has the Foreign Court "Declined to Exercise jurisdiction"? 
Even if the decree court both assumed jurisdiction legitimately 
and still has jurisdiction "now," under UCCJA section 14 the 
forum may nevertheless modify the decree if it determines that 
the decree court "declined to exercise" its jurisdiction. Although 
perhaps intended to apply to cases that remain "open" while not 
under active consideration, this phrase can be interpreted to 
allow a forum to modify any foreign decision of which it disap­
proves. It need only see the foreign method of decision (perhaps 
as revealed by its result) as a declination of jurisdiction. 
E. E. B. v. D.A. 274 is a particularly egregious example of this 
interpretive strategy. Although E.E.B. is a New Jersey case, the 
story begins in Ohio, where twenty-one-year-old Doris Angle 
gave birth to her daughter out of wedlock, in October, 1978. 
Three days after the child's birth, Doris and the child's father sur­
rendered the child for adoption to the county welfare depart­
ment, and three days after that the child was placed with "pre­
adoptive parents," Edwin E. Bowen and his wife.275 Four days 
later-one week after signing the surrender form, ten days after 
the child's birth-Doris went to the county welfare department 
with her mother and asked for her baby back. 276 The welfare 
worker refused, and, on the next day, someone in the department 
asked the Juvenile Court to approve the surrender. That court, 
unaware that Doris had changed her mind, did so. 277 
The subsequent Ohio proceedings went as swiftly as these 
things ever do. Only two months elapsed before Doris Angle 
found a lawyer and filed a habeas corpus petition, seeking custody 
of her daughter. The Juvenile Court took three more months to 
deny the writ. 278 Doris Angle's unsuccessful appeal to the Ohio 
(Mont. 1982) (ordering hearing on home state of child retained in Montana 
after end of visit; citation shows court's awareness that Settle was overruled 
"in part"); L.F. v. G.W.F., 443 A.2d 751, 756 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1982) (declining to exercise continuing jurisdiction, citing Settle, and stating, 
"We think that each case must be decided on its own facts."); Gooch v. 
Gooch, 321 N.W.2d 354 (Wis. 1982) (exercising home state jurisdiction 
fourteen months after custodial parent left decree state in violation of court 
order). 
274 446 A.2d 871 (NJ. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210, reh 'g denied, 460 
u.s. 1104 (1983). 
275 !d. at 873. 
276 Angle v. Children's Servs. Div., 407 N.E.2d 524, 525 (Ohio 1980). 
277 !d. at 525. 
278 See id. 
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Court of Appeals took another four months.279 Her further 
appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court was decided about a year later, 
in July, 1980. Although the court treated the question as solely 
one of statutory interpretation, it was perhaps motivated also by a 
desire to curb the lawlessness of Ohio county welfare offices. The 
Ohio Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding that 
Doris was "entitled to custody of her child."280 It remanded the 
case to the Juvenile Court for "proceedings consistent with this 
opinion."281 Although the Bowens urged the Ohio Supreme 
Court to order, and the Juvenile Court to schedule, a best inter­
ests hearing, both refused. The Juvenile Court issued the writ of 
habeas corpus.282 
Had the prospective adoptive parents still been in Ohio, that 
would have been the end of the matter: her daughter, then aged 
twenty-one months, would have been returned to Doris Angle. 
However, in October, 1979, the Bowens moved to New Jersey 
with the child so that Edwin could become pastor of a church 
there.283 Rather than complying with the writ of habeas corpus, 
the Bowens filed an action for custody in New Jersey six days after 
the Ohio Juvenile Court had issued the writ.284 
Doris Angle's challenge to New Jersey's jurisdiction reached 
the New Jersey Supreme Court in January, 1981. That court 
simultaneously sent the jurisdictional question to New Jersey's 
intermediate appellate court while remanding for an expedited 
best interests hearing in the Court of Chancery.285 This unusual 
procedure ensured that the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
give plenary consideration to the jurisdiction question only after a 
New Jersey trial court had decided the merits of the case. 
Not surprisingly, the Court of Chancery found it in the child's 
best interests to remain with the Bowens, the only parents she 
had ever known. Doris Angle neither participated in the hearing 
nor challenged the finding. 286 She did, however, vigorously chal-
279 See E. E. B., 446 A.2d at 873. 
280 Angle, 407 N.E.2d at 527. 
281 Jd. 
282 E. E. B., 446 A.2d at 874. 
283 The New Jersey decision mentions that the Bowens notified the 
welfare department, raising the inference that they may not have notified 
the Ohio courts. See id. 
284 Jd. 
285 Bowen v. Angle, 427 A.2d 589 (NJ. 1981). 
286 E.E.B., 446 A.2d at 872. 
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lenge New Jersey's right to reach the merits of the case rather 
than merely enforce the Ohio decision. 
Ohio was clearly the child's home state when Doris Angle filed 
her habeas corpus petition.287 The case proceeded expeditiously. 
Nevertheless, driven by its concern for the child's best interests as 
the Court of Chancery determined them, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court affirmed the modification of Ohio's decree. It reasoned 
that by refusing to hold a best interests hearing, the Juvenile 
Court had "declined to exercise" its jurisdiction.288 The New 
Jersey decision relied on Ohio precedents-which it asserted the 
Ohio courts had misapplied-allegedly entitling the Bowens to 
such a hearing.289 It ignored the clear meaning of the Ohio 
Supreme Court's mandate and of its denial of the Bowens' 
request for a hearing: that the juvenile court was required to issue 
the writ forthwith. Although couched in politer terms, in effect 
the New Jersey court reviewed the decision of another state's 
highest court and found it in error, just as the California Court of 
Appeal had done in Hopson.290 
E.E.B. is a striking case because the New Jersey Supreme Court 
used the UCCJA to disregard a very recent, unquestionably valid, 
judgment of a sister state. Section 14's best justification is the 
need to respond to changed circumstances, yet New Jersey used it 
instead to review, and reverse, another state's determination of 
the best way to respond to unchanged, if tragic, facts. Once the 
welfare worker sent Doris Angle away without her baby, once the 
Juvenile Court denied her the speedy relief of habeas corpus, this 
case could only end sadly. No court could do better than choose 
between bad outcomes. The child was growing up with the 
Bowens although her mother had neither surrendered her for 
adoption nor been found to be unfit.291 Neither Doris Angle nor 
the Bowens had done anything wrong; the child was even more 
287 At that time, her child had lived from birth with a "person acting as a 
parent" in Ohio; since the child was under six months of age, this sufficed to 
make Ohio the child's home state. See UCCJA § 2(5), (8)-(9), 9 U.L.A. pt. I, 
at 133-34. 
288 E.E.B., 446 A.2d at 877. 
289 /d. 
290 See In re Hopson, 168 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Ct. App. 1980); supra notes 233-
38 and accompanying text (discussing Hapson). 
291 Indeed, the Bowens apparently never contended that Doris Angle was 
unfit; they relied instead on establishing the more lenient "best interests of 
the child" standard. See E.E.B., 446 A.2d at 873-74. 
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blameless. Certainly returning the child to her mother, as the 
Ohio Supreme Court ordered, would have been painful for the 
Bowens and devastating to the child, but perhaps the court saw 
no other way to bring Ohio's county welfare offices in line, to pro­
tect other mothers and their babies from what amounts to little 
more than kidnaping. 
Whether or not one agrees with the Ohio court's balancing of 
the harms, the choice was clearly committed to it. Yet the Bowens 
were able to evade this choice by moving to another jurisdiction. 
In New Jersey, Ohio's institutional concerns were, necessarily, 
attenuated: only the child was in New Jersey; her mother and the 
rogue welfare bureaucrats were not. Because of the Bowens' 
move and the delays of litigation, the child had spent most of her 
short life in New Jersey.292 Principles of comity, naturally 
enough, seemed much less important to the New Jersey courts 
than the compelling needs of this particular New Jersey child. 
4. When Should This Court Refuse to Inquire Into a 
Custody Matter? (Sections 7 and 8) 
The UCCJA contains no guidance for a forum seeking to ascer­
tain whether its order is likely to be respected by a foreign court. 
To the extent it assumes that another state's interpretations ofthe 
Act are likely to conform to its own, the forum may be deluded. 
In practice, as we have seen, states often interpret the statute as 
authorizing decisions that other states then judge to be improper 
and disregard.293 The difficulty is deep within the marrow of the 
UCCJA: because its drafters did not recognize the inevitable 
inconsistency of pursuing both flexibility and repose, the UCCJA 
embraces both Ratner's stability and his flexibility goals, and so 
provides no single answer in hard cases. 
The UCCJA does contain, in sections 7 and 8, two provisions 
that seek to guide the forum in deciding whether to decline to 
exercise jurisdiction that seems otherwise proper. Section 7 
reminds a court that it may dismiss a proceeding at any time upon 
finding that it is an "inconvenient" forum and that another forum 
is "more appropriate."294 Although courts use this provision, in 
practice dismissal on these grounds is entirely discretionary; 
292 The child was 3 112 years old (and had been in New jersey for two 
years and eight months) by the time Supreme Court made its decision. 
293 See supra notes 195-292 and accompanying text. 
294 UCCJA § 7, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 233-34. 
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appellate courts seldom reverse trial courts that conclude the 
forum is not "inconvenient. "295 
Section 8 attempts to codify Ehrenzweig's "clean hands doc­
trine." Although Ehrenzweig found that courts usually refused to 
modify foreign orders when the petitioning party had brought the 
child into the jurisdiction either " 'in defiance of a decree of a 
court of competent jurisdiction of a sister state,' " 296 or " 'wrong­
fully ... for the purpose of avoiding and circumventing' " a for­
eign order,297 section 8 is much narrower. It requires dismissal 
only if "the petitioner, without consent of the person entitled to 
custody, has improperly removed the child from the physical cus­
tody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly retained 
the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physi­
cal custody."298 Further, it permits dismissal in only two other cir­
cumstances: "[if] the petitioner for an initial decree has 
wrongfully taken the child from another state or has engaged in 
similar reprehensible conduct,"299 and "[i]f the petitioner has 
violated any other provision of a custody decree of another 
state."300 
Section 8's codification of the "clean hands doctrine" has given 
rise to a very interesting phenomenon. Section 8 is almost never 
cited, except by courts that are either explaining why the provi­
sion does not apply to the forum, or suggesting that it does apply 
to a foreign court. 301 Nevertheless, the doctrine itself is alive and 
295 See, e.g., Harris v. Melnick, 552 A.2d 38 (Md. 1989) (finding no abuse 
of discretion in trial court's refusal to dismiss in favor of Colorado, where 
children had lived for seven years). But see Schlumpfv. Superior Court, 145 
Cal. Rptr. 190 (Ct. App. 1978) (reversing trial court's exercise of 
jurisdiction over child who moved away nine years before, and requiring it 
to decline jurisdiction in favor of child's new home, Wyoming). 
296 Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2, at 362 (quoting Ex parte 
Memmi, 181 P.2d 885, 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947)). 
297 /d. at 362 (quoting Koebrich v. Simpson, 197 P.2d 820, 821 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1948)). 
298 UCCJA § 8(b), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 251. Even then, the forum may 
exercise jurisdiction if it considers that to do so would be "required in the 
interest of the child." !d. 
299 Jd. § 8(a). 
300 /d. § 8(b). 
301 See, e.g., Flannery v. Stephenson, 416 So. 2d 1034, 1039 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1982) (stating that § 8 did not apply because father abducted child 
from custodial mother's relatives rather than from mother herself); In re 
Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. 903,917 (Ct. App. 1981) (stating that§ 8(b) did not 
apply, apparently because both parents engaged in wrongful conduct); 
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well. Courts often refuse jurisdiction to a party who has acted 
badly; they just fail to cite section 8 when they do so.302 Instead, 
they cite section 7, 303 section 14,304 scholarly articles, 305 or the 
Baird v. Baird, 374 So. 2d 60, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that§ 8 
did not prohibit Florida from considering mother's request for modification, 
although Arizona decree court found her in contempt when she refused to 
return there with the child, because her original Arizona decree did not 
explicitly prohibit departure from Arizona); Bullard v. Bullard, 647 P.2d 
294, 301 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that § 8(b) did not apply although 
mother wrongfully retained child after end of visit because Hawaii was 
decree state and § 8(b) prohibited modification of decree "of another 
state"); Dobyns v. Dobyns, 650 S.W.2d 701, 707 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) 
(stating that § 8(a) did not apply because the wronged parent brought a 
cross-petition for custody); People ex rei. Throneberg v. Butcher, 479 
. N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (App. Div. 1984) (suggesting that Oklahoma, where child 
had been for seventeen months, "might well" decline jurisdiction under 
§ 8); cf. Schoeberlein v. Rohlfing, 383 N.W.2d 386, 390-91 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986) (refusing, on other grounds, to modify Florida's decree on petition of 
parent who held child in Minnesota after visit was to have ended; citing 
§ 8(b) as additional support for this discretionary refusal to exercise 
jurisdiction); Winkelman v. Moses, 279 N.W.2d 897, 901 (S.D. 1979) 
(refusing to modify court's own decree on petition of parent who removed 
child from her home in California without prior notice to her mother or her 
school on grounds that California has a closer connection to the evidence, 
mentioning but not relying on § 8(b)). 
302 See, e.g., Kumar v. Superior Court, 652 P.2d 1003, 1011-12 (Cal. 
1982) (refusing to modify New York decree in asylum state, in part because 
petitioning mother moved to California without prior notice to father; 
explicitly "does not reach" § 8 issue); Hafer v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. 
Rptr. 132, 139 (Ct. App. 1981) (reversing assumption of "significant 
contact" jurisdiction three years after child's departure, in part, to deter 
abductions); Zuccaro v. Zuccaro, 407 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1981) (affirming trial court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction when father 
took child from mother in New York, without prior notice to her, solely to 
prevent New York from becoming the "home state"); State ex rei. Laws v. 
Higgins, 734 S.W.2d 274, 279 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (prohibiting trial court 
from modifying Wyoming custody order because children's presence in 
Missouri resulted from father's keeping them after their visit should have 
ended); State ex rei. Murphy v. Boudreau, 653 P.2d 531, 533 (Okla. 1982) 
(declining to exercise decree state's own continuing jurisdiction in part 
because Oklahoma parent "abducted" the child from New Mexico and was 
holding the child in violation of custody orders in both states); Ryan v. 
Ryan, 301 N.W.2d 675, 678 (S.D. 1981) (reversing trial court's refusal to 
exercise jurisdiction because father forcibly took child from mother to 
Arizona before mother filed custody action in South Dakota). 
303 See, e.g., Zuccaro v. Zuccaro, 407 So. 2d 389, 391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1981). 
3°4 See, e.g., Kumar v. Superior Court, 652 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Cal. 1982). 
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"general principles" behind the Act. 306 In addition, many states 
refuse to consider periods of time during which a child was 
"wrongfully" in a party's actual custody when they assess their 
own jurisdiction under sections 3 and 14.307 
According to Ehrenzweig, courts appeared to ignore the "clean 
hands doctrine" in two situations: when the opposing party "had 
not claimed his rights for a period and had himself violated the 
prior decree,"308 and when the foreign decree deprived a now­
local party of previously-granted custody "on mere ground of his 
disobedience."309 Courts interpreting the UCCJA appear to have 
305 See, e.g., id. at 1007 (citing Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, supra note 
5); State ex ret. Laws v. Higgins, 734 S.W.2d 274 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (citing 
Joan M. Krauskopf, Child Custody jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 34 J. Mo. B. 
383 (1978)). 
306 See, e.g., Hafer v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. Rptr. 132, 138 (Ct. App. 
1981); Ryan v. Ryan, 301 N.W.2d 675, 677 (S.D. 1981). 
307 See, e.g., Freeman v. Freeman, 547 S.W.2d 437, 441 (Ky. 1977) 
(stating that time during which child is wrongfully hidden in a state does not 
count towards satisfying home state time-in-residence requirement); Curtis 
v. Curtis, 574 So. 2d 24 (Miss. 1990) (ignoring twenty months' residence in 
Mississippi under color of invalid temporary order); In re Nehra, 372 N.E.2d 
4, 8 (N.Y. 1977) (ignoring four and one-half years); Winkelman v. Moses, 
279 N.W.2d 897, 899 (S.D. 1989) (dictum) (stating that abducting parent 
may not acquire home state status even after six months in state); Sams v. 
Boston, 384 S.E.2d 151, 157-58 (W.Va. 1989) (ignoring three and one-half 
years); cf. In re B.B.R., 566 A.2d 1032, 1042 (D.C. 1989) (Schwelb, J., 
concurring) (stating that parents should not be allowed to create 
jurisdictional facts by wrongful conduct); In re Ross, 630 P.2d 353, 361 (Or. 
1981) (in bane) ("It could not have been intended that unilateral removal of 
the child results in the deprivation of decree state jurisdiction upon the 
expiration of six months .... "). 
Contra Pierce v. Pierce, 640 P.2d 899,905 (Mont. 1982) (wrongful conduct 
does not affect threshold issue of whether court has jurisdiction); Nehra v. 
Uhlar, 402 A.2d 264, 267-69 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (six years adequate 
to divest decree state of jurisdiction), cert. denied, 408 A.2d 807 (NJ. 1979). 
308 Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2, at 369. Ehrenzweig 
noted that 
/d. 
there are a number of cases in which courts have refused to 
recognize or did recognize custody decrees of sister states 
without apparent regard to the "clean hands" of the benefiting 
parent. Close analysis, disregarding inconclusive reasoning in 
the traditional terms of jurisdiction and changes of 
circumstances, permits, however, classification of a large 
majority of such cases under other, more realistic, equitable 
considerations. 
309 /d. at 370. 
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re-created these two exceptions, exercising jurisdiction when 
both parties have acted badly,310 and when the foreign decree 
seems "punitive."311 Neither of these elaborations on the clean 
hands doctrine has any basis in the text of section 8.312 
It appears that the courts are continuing to follow the spirit of 
310 See, e.g., In re Leonard, 17 5 Cal. Rptr. 903, 917 (Ct. App. 1981) 
(exercising jurisdiction although California parent had snatched child, 
apparently because Georgia parent "had committed the identical act three 
days before"); Houtchens v. Houtchens, 488 A.2d 726, 731 (R.I. 1985) 
(exercising jurisdiction although father had twice unilaterally removed 
children from Texas, apparently because mother had also abducted them 
and father's "conduct stemmed from the sincere belief that [it was] 
necessary to protect ... the children). 
311 See, e.g., In re Lemond, 395 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) 
(dicta) (stating that a foreign decree designed to punish should not be given 
total deference); Slidell v. Valentine, 298 N.W.2d 599, 605 (Iowa 1980) 
(noting that punitive decrees are disfavored unless "just and proper under 
the circumstances"); Spaulding v. Spaulding, 460 A.2d 1360, 1366-67 (Me. 
1983) (defining punitive decrees as those of "a sister state [that] changes or 
awards custody, without regard to the best interest of the child, solely to 
punish one parent for disregarding its authority"); Holt v. District Court, 
626 P.2d 1336, 1343-44 (Okla. 1981) (noting that punitive foreign orders 
need not be enforced but finding order before it not punitive); Brooks v. 
Brooks, 530 P.2d 547, 551 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (deeming order granting 
custody to father due to mother's interference with father's visitation rights 
punitive and therefore subject to modification). 
Although the text of the UCCJA contains no provision regarding punitive 
decrees, the concept is discussed in the official Comment to § 13, 9 U.L.A. 
pt. 1, at 277, and in two of Professor Bodenheimer's articles. See 
Bodenheimer, Progress Under the UCC]A, supra note 5, at 1003-04; 
Bodenheimer, Rights of Children, supra note 5, at 503-04. 
312 Section 8(b) allows courts to ignore unclean hands when a child's best 
interests require it, although many courts have recognized this exception 
without referring to § 8. See, e.g., Kudler v. Smith, 643 P.2d 783, 785-86 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (modifying New York order requiring grand parental 
visitation, on ground of children's best interests, although New York order 
authorizing custodial father to depart with children contemplated six-week 
visit rather than permanent move), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 837 (1982); 
Marcrum v. Marcrum, 437 A.2d 725, 727 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) 
(exercising "emergency" jurisdiction and ordering a hearing on abducting 
father's allegations although Texas had given mother custody and earlier 
asylum state, Indiana, had ordered Texas order enforced), appeal dismissed, 
460 A.2d 645 (NJ. 1982); Nehra v. Uhlar, 402 A.2d 264, 268-69 (NJ. Super. 
Ct. App. Div.) (requiring best interests hearing because children had been 
with mother for most of their lives, although she abducted the children in 
1973 from custodial father in Michigan, and father was seeking enforcement 
of Michigan and New York custody decrees in his favor), cert. denied, 408 
A.2d 807 (NJ. 1979). 
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the "clean hands doctrine" while ignoring the letter of section 8. 
Perhaps they prefer the freedom of an equitable principle to the 
confines of precedent-bound statutory interpretation. Perhaps 
section 8 feels to courts like a forfeiture provision. The section is 
complicated and technical, and its terms often seem to conflict 
with the courts' own sense of when they should, or should not, 
exercise jurisdiction. When they do not ignore it entirely, courts 
read section 8 narrowly, just as they tend to interpret statutes of 
limitation narrowly. At the same time, they are developing flexi­
ble, discretionary methods for punishing those "abductions" that 
either seem unjustifiable or have become too permanent to undo. 
As this review of the courts' interpretations of the UCCJA's key 
provisions, sections 3, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, and 15, has demon­
strated, the practice of concurrent jurisdiction continues to flour­
ish. Thus, even after the UCCJA was widely adopted, in every 
contested custody case the possibility that a new forum would 
both take jurisdiction and reach a more favorable result remained 
clearly present. This possibility continued to encourage parents 
to "seize and run." Early studies of the Act's operation recog­
nized this, although they tended to attribute the problem to 
errors in interpretation caused by unfamiliarity with the Act.313 
Professor Bodenheimer's published exegeses of the UCCJA,314 
which have been influential with courts, exemplify rather than 
remedy the statute's indeterminacy. In reviewing early cases 
under the statute, she decried two errors that she claimed the 
courts were making: taking jurisdiction after an "abduction," and 
enforcing "punitive decrees." She completely failed to recognize 
that these are two ways of looking at the same situation. 
Bodenheimer's first concern was to deter unauthorized exten­
sions of visits and "abductions," a term she used loosely to 
include removals before any custody decree had been made,315 
and, sometimes, extended even to moves by a custodial parent 
that were merely unauthorized by the decree court. In aid of that 
goal, she said that the UCCJA gave the child's old home exclusive 
continuing jurisdiction that persists so long as one of the parents 
lives in the old state-even after a child "stays in a [new] state for 
313 See, e.g., Bates & Holmes, supra note 5, at 77; Bodenheimer, Progress 
Under the UCCJA, supra note 5, at 985. · 
314 See Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, supra note 5; Bodenheimer, 
Progress Under the UCCJA, supra note 5. 
315 See Bodenheimer, Progress Under the UCCJA, supra note 5, at 989-90. 
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six months or more as a visitor or victim of abduction," and even 
if the new state has "technically" become the home state.316 
However, she was also, and equally, concerned that no other state 
enforce a "punitive" decree. She defined a "punitive" decree as 
one made to punish a parent for leaving the decree state with the 
child, or to redress a wrongful removal.317 Taken together, 
Bodenheimer's interpretations of the UCCJA encourage the 
decree state to vindicate its "continuing jurisdiction" by entering 
a custody order that the asylum state is then encouraged to disre­
gard as "punitive." 
While the UCCJA's sponsors continued to press for more states 
to adopt it,318 and while Professor Bodenheimer continued to 
explain her ideas about its proper interpretation, Congress began 
to study the problem. The next section describes the process that 
led Congress to enact federal law covering approximately the 
same ground as the UCCJA-the Parental Kidnaping Prevention 
Act (PKPA}.319 
IV. THE PARENTAL KIDNAPING PREVENTION AcT 
A. The Development of the PKPA 
In the late 1970s, in connection with its study of comprehensive 
federal criminal code reform, 32° Congress began to consider leg-
316 See id. at 988. This was the pronouncement that influenced the 
Oregon court in Ross. See supra notes 257-73 and accompanying text 
(discussing Ross). In a later article, Bodenheimer attributed this rule of 
exclusive continuing jurisdiction to "state law" that, she said, both pre­
existed and survived the UCCJA's enactment. See Bodenheimer, Interstate 
Custody, supra note 5, at 213. 
317 Bodenheimer, Progress Under the UCCJA, supra note 5, at 1003-04. 
318 See, e.g., Parental Kidnaping: Hearing on H.R. 1290 Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1980) 
[hereafter Hearing on H. R. 1290] (American Bar Association House of 
Delegates, Resolution I, App. A (Aug. 1978)) (encouraging state legislatures 
to adopt the UCCJA "at the earliest opportunity"). 
319 Pub. L. No. 96-611 § 6-10, 94 Stat. 3568 (codified in scattered 
sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
320 See Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Nixon: Reflections on 
Constitutional Liberties and the Rule of Law, 1981 DuKE LJ. 1, 59 (discussing 
Nixon administration bills that would have criminalized disclosure of certain 
classified government information); Louis B. Schwartz, Reform of the Federal 
Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics, and Prospects, LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoss., Winter 
1977, at 1, 2 (describing "awesome scope and complexity" of controversial 
federal criminal law reform proposal). The original criminal code reform 
bill was S. 1400, 93d Cong., lst Sess. (1973). Succeeding bills included S. 1, 
HeinOnline -- 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 915 1991-1992
 
916 University of California, Davis [Vol. 25:845 
islation to deter a parent from taking her children across state 
lines in defiance of a court's order or the other parent's wishes.321 
In early 1977, Senator Moss introduced a bill that would have 
required states to accord full faith and credit to custody 
decrees.322 In 1978, at Senator Wallop's suggestion, similar lan­
guage was added to S. 1437, the criminal code reform bill passed 
by the Senate (but not the House) in 1978.323 For the next two 
years, Congress studied many bills that dealt with the "parental 
kidnaping" problem. The provisions of these bills fell generally 
into four categories. 
One category of proposals would have made "parental kidnap­
ing" a federal crime.324 Professor Bodenheimer,325 the American 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 6869, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 
1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 1722, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979); S. 
1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
321 H.R. 762, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (would make parental 
kidnaping a crime). A number of similar legislative proposals were 
introduced in that same legislative session and studied in connection with 
omnibus criminal code reform. See, e.g. , Legislation to Revise and Recodify 
Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on H.R. 6869 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal 
justice of the House Comm. on the judiciary (pts. 1-3), 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 
720, 727 (1977-1978) [hereafter Hearings on H.R. 6869] (statement of 
Children's Rights, Inc.). 
322 H.R. 988, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
323 See Russell M. Coombs, The "Snatched" Child is Halfway Home in 
Congress, 11 FAM. L.Q 407 (1978), reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 6869, supra 
note 321, at 1002-18. 
324 The proper definition of "parental kidnaping" was hotly contested. 
Parents and their advocates wanted Congress to treat any taking that 
surprised or angered the other parent as a federal crime. See, e.g., Parental 
Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1979, S. 105: joint Hearing on S. 105 Before the 
Subcomm. on Criminal justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. 
on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human 
Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 70, 71 (1980) [hereafter joint Hearing on S. 
105] (statement of Arnold I. Miller, President, Children's Rights, Inc.) 
(defining "child-snatching" as "a concealment of a child from another 
person" and estimating that 70% take place before any custody order is 
issued). In contrast, the Justice Department wanted to limit federal 
involvement to cases in which a parent both violated a court's custody 
decree and posed a serious risk of physical harm to the child. See Hearing on 
H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 81-84 (statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division). 
325 See Parental Kidnaping, 1979: Hearing on Examination of the Problem of 
"Child Snatching" Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the 
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 47, 47, 53-
55 ( 1979) [hereafter Hearing on Child Snatching] (statement of Brigitte M. 
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Bar Association,326 a non-profit organization called Children's 
Rights, Inc.,327 and individual parents328 supported these pro­
posals. Strongly opposed by Professor Russell Coombs,329 the 
Justice Department,330 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(F.B.I.)331 as unduly harsh and a misuse of scarce resources, how­
ever, they never became law. Nonetheless, they left their mark on 
the PKPA. The PKPA "interprets" the federal crime of Interstate 
Flight to Avoid Prosecution to apply to parents subject to state 
felony prosecution for kidnaping their children. 332 Congress 
Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis); Hearings on 
H. R. 6869, supra note 321, at 2561, 2563 (statement of Brigitte M. 
Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis). 
326 See Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 99-107 (statement of 
Doris J. Freed, Chairperson, Comm. on Custody, and Council Member, 
Family Law Section, American Bar Association, on Behalf of American Bar 
Association);joint Hearing on S. 105, supra note 324, at 52-68 (statement of 
Doris ]. Freed, Chairperson, Comm. on Custody, American Bar 
Association). 
327 See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 39-80 (testimony of 
Children's Rights, Inc.); Hearings on H.R. 6869, supra note 321, at 720-31 
(statement of Children's Rights, Inc.). 
328 See, e.g., Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1979, S. 105: Addendum to 
Joint Hearing on S. 105 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal justice of the Senate Comm. 
on the judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate 
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 309-12, 319, 323-
25 ( 1980) [hereafter Addendum to joint Hearing on S. 105] (letter to Elizabeth 
Nichols; letters from Gerald F. Klejnot, Sr., Margaret & David Strickland); 
Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 35-38 (prepared statement of 
Marilyn W. Armstrong). 
329 See joint Hearing on S. 105, supra note 324, at 143, 154 (prepared 
statement of Russell M. Coombs); Coombs, supra note 323, at 415-17. 
330 See Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 81-84 (statement of Mark 
M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division); joint 
Hearing on S. 105, supra note 324, at 21-24, 47-50 (statements of Paul R. 
Michel, Acting Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice); see also 
Addendum to joint Hearing on S. 105, supra note 328, at 101 (additional 
submission of Russell M. Coombs: letter from Assistant Attorney General 
Patricia M. Wald to Representative Peter W. Rodino and attachments 
(n.d.)). 
331 See Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 84-86 (statement of 
Executive Assistant Director Francis M. Mullen,Jr.);joint Hearing on S. 105, 
supra note 324, at 24-27 (statement of Lee Colwell, Executive Assistant 
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation). 
332 See supra note 10. This approach was suggested by Children's Rights, 
Inc. See joint Hearing on S. 105, supra note 324, at 77, 79 (prepared statement 
of Children's Rights, Inc., presented by Arnold I. Miller, President, and Rae 
Gummell, Vice President). 
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intended to enlist the F.B.I.'s assistance in locating abducting par­
ents, contrary to pre-PKPA practice, but to stop short of federally 
prosecuting the parents.333 The provision therefore met many of 
the objections of the opponents of criminal sanctions while giving 
the proponents some of what they had hoped to gain. 
The second category of proposals would have required the Par­
ent Locator Service to assist both official and private searches for 
abducting parents.334 The Service, ajoint federal-state effort, was 
originally established to assist state welfare departments in forc­
ing absent parents to support their children. The Department of 
Health and Human Services opposed its use to locate abducting 
parents because to do so would be expensive and make parents' 
tax records, the primary source of location information, too 
widely available.335 Nevertheless, the PKPA made the Service 
available for official searches. 336 
The third category consisted of bills that would have amended 
the diversity jurisdiction statute337 to give United States District 
333 See Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 86, 95-99 (testimony of 
Francis Mullen, Jr., Executive Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice). 
334 See, e.g., S. 105, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), quoted in Hearing on Child 
Snatching, supra note 325, at 3, 12-13. Senate Bill 105 would have required 
assistance to "an agent or attorney of any state," "any court having 
jurisdiction to make or enforce a child custody determination, or any agent 
of such court," "any parent, legal guardian, attorney, or agent of a child 
sought to be located," and "any agent or attorney of the United States," for 
the purpose of enforcing federal criminal provisions or of "making or 
enforcing a child custody determination." S. 105, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 
(1979). 
These proposals were pressed by Children's Rights, Inc. See, e.g., joint 
Hearing on S. 105, supra note 324, at 77, 79 (prepared statement of 
Children's Rights, Inc., presented by Professor Arnold I. Miller, President, 
and Rae Gummell, Vice President); Hearings on H. R. 6869, supra note 321, at 
720, 725 (statement Children's Rights, Inc.). Professor Bodenheimer also 
supported these proposals. See Hearings on H. R. 6869, supra note 321, at 
2561, 2563 (statement of Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, 
University of California, Davis). 
335 See Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 86, 89-91 (testimony of 
Louis B. Hays, Deputy Director, Office of Child Support Enforcement, 
Department of Health and Human Resources) (expressing concerns about 
added cost of additional searches and about privacy implications of giving 
searchers access to federal tax returns, the primary source of location 
information). 
336 See supra note 10. 
337 28 U.S.C. § l332(a). 
HeinOnline -- 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 918 1991-1992
 
1992] Tragedy of the Interstate Child 919 
Courts the power to enforce valid state custody orders.338 It was 
opposed by the Justice Department because it would have 
"increase[d] the workload of the federal courts" and for other, 
technical, reasons,339 and it did not become law. 
The final category consisted ofseveral bills developing the pro­
posals of Senators Moss and Wallop to implement the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause by requiring states to enforce one another's 
custody decrees. This approach was endorsed by the American 
Bar Association340 and Children's Rights, Inc.,341 and it had many 
academic supporters. Professor Bodenheimer thought it would 
ensure that other states would enforce the properly-made decrees 
of every state that had adopted the UCCJA.342 In addition, with­
out recognizing the inherent inconsistency, she thought a federal 
statute could be used to close "loopholes" in the UCCJA that per­
mitted parents to evade its strictures, 343 although the PKPA could 
only close those loopholes by commanding courts to refuse full 
faith and credit to some custody decrees authorized by the 
UCCJA. Professor Coombs thought that placing the UCCJA's 
provisions on jurisdiction and interstate recognition of custody 
338 See H.R. 9913, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 11273, 95th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 11722, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 325, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); see alw Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 9-16 
(testimony of Hon. Hamilton Fish, Jr., Representative in Congress from the 
25th Congressional District of the State of New York) (advocating Senate 
adoption of H.R. 325). 
339 See Refonn of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1722 and S. 1723 
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (pt. XIV), 96th Con g., 1st Sess. 10628, 
10629-30 (1979) [hereafter Hearings on S. 1722 and 1723] (letter from 
Assistant Attorney General Patricia M. Wald to Hon. Peter W. Rodino, 
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 20, 1978); submitted by 
Professor Russell Coombs). 
340 See Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 101 (American Bar 
Association House of Delegates, Resolution II, app. A (Aug. 1978)). 
341 Children's Rights, Inc. believed that requiring courts to give full faith 
and credit to custody decrees would produce "consistency and uniformity in 
the enforcement of custody decrees." Hearings on H. R. 6869, supra note 321, 
at 720, 725 (statement of Children's Rights, Inc.). 
342 See Hearing on Child Snatching, supra note 325, at 50-51 (statement of 
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis). 
Similarly, it was argued that such federal legislation would oblige all the 
states to follow the provisions of the UCCJA, whether or not they had 
actually adopted it. See, e.g.,joint Hearing on S. 105, supra note 324, at 55-56 
(prepared statement of Doris J. Freed). 
343 See Hearing on Child Snatching, supra note 325, at 51-52 (statement of 
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis). 
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decrees within federal law would "ensure that they are inter­
preted and applied by the states with ... uniformity."344 In addi­
tion, Professor Coombs, Professor Bodenheimer, and Dr. Doris 
Jonas Freed all thought that the Moss/Wallop approach would 
empower the victims of pre-decree abductions. If a parent took a 
child away before any custody order had been made, they 
believed that the remaining parent could completely protect her 
custody rights by immediately obtaining a custody order; they 
thought full faith and credit would require all other states to 
enforce such an order.345 Congress enacted the Moss/Wallop 
approach as the main part of the PKP A. 346 
Early versions of the Moss/Wallop proposals contained two 
interesting variations, both ultimately rejected because they 
seemed to invite relitigation rather than enforcement. The first 
variation relieved states of the duty to enforce those custody 
decrees found to be "inconsistent with [the enforcing state's] 
strong public policy." This language was strongly opposed by 
both the Justice Department347 and Professor Bodenheimer;348 
344 Hearings on S. 1722 and 1723, supra note 339, at 10669, 10670 
(statement of Associate Professor Russell M. Coombs, School of Law, 
Rutgers University, Camden, New Jersey); see also joint Hearing on S. 105, 
supra note 318, at 143, 145 (prepared statement of Russell M. Coombs). 
345 See Addendum to joint Hearing on S. 105, supra note 328, at 267, 272 
(questions of Senator Mathias and Responses of Russell M. Coombs); 
Hearing on H.R. 1290, supra note 318, at 102, 103-04 (testimony of Doris]. 
Freed, Chairperson, Comm. on Custody and Council Member, Family Law 
Section, American Bar Association, on behalf of American Bar Association); 
Hearing on Child Snatching, supra note 325, at 60, 63-64 (answers by Brigitte 
M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis to 
questions by Senator Cranston following hearing in Los Angeles). The 
UCCJA by itself could not always ensure such a result. See, e.g., Houtchens 
v. Houtchens, 488 A.2d 726 (R.I. 1985) (awarding custody to parent who 
took children without consent, prior to any custody decree, even though 
UCCJA governed in both states); supra notes 201-07 and accompanying text 
(discussing Houtchens). 
346 See supra note 10. The PKPA was attached as a rider to a bill 
providing for Medicaid coverage of pneumococcal vaccine. See Pub. L. No. 
96-611, 94 Stat. 3568. 
347 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1722 and 1723, supra note 339, at 10628-35 
(letter from Assistant Attorney General Patricia M. Wald to Hon. Peter W. 
Rodino, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 20, 1978)) (stating 
that provision might be unconstitutional, would extend federal control into 
state law of child custody, and would make criminal enforcement turn on a 
subjective civil standard). 
348 See Hearings on H. R. 6869, supra note 321, at 2561, 2562 (statement of 
HeinOnline -- 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 920 1991-1992
 
1992] Tragedy of the Interstate Child 921 
they successfully argued that the exception would swallow the 
rule. The second rejected variation relieved states of the duty to 
enforce "punitive" custody decrees. Professor Bodenheimer ini­
tially supported a narrow formulation of this rule,349 but reluc­
tantly withdrew her support in the face of the Justice 
Department's strenuous objections.350 Professor Coombs also 
opposed this exception. 351 
The PKPA was developed from the same set of beliefs and 
understandings that produced the UCCJA, and by means of a 
similar process of "interest group liberalism. " 352 Intended to 
supplement rather than supersede the UCCJA, its provisions are 
similar although not identical. It became effective on July 1, 
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis) 
(noting that public policy "exception" would "annihilate the principle offull 
faith and credit"). 
349 H.R. 6869, 95th Con g., l st Sess. ( 1977) would have relieved a state 
from enforcing a foreign custody decision when "the primary basis for the 
child custody determination was punishment of a contestant and not the 
best interests of the child." Professor Bodenheimer thought that inviting 
the second court to reexamine the best interests of the child "would open a 
large loophole that could undermine the rule of full faith and credit to a 
considerable extent." She suggested the following language as a safe 
substitute: "the primary basis for a court's modification of its own prior 
custody determination was the imposition of a disciplinary measure upon a 
contestant." Hearings on H.R. 6869, supra note 321, at 2561, 2562-63 
(statement of Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of 
California, Davis); see also Hearing on Child Snatching, supra note 325, at 47, 48 
(statement of Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of 
California, Davis) (suggesting that definition of "custody determination" 
specify "modifications other than punitive modifications" (emphasis added)). 
350 See Hearings on S. 1722 and 1723, supra note 339, at 10628, 10630, 
10632 n.1 (letter from Assistant Attorney General Patricia M. Wald to Hon. 
Peter W. Rodino, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 20, 1978)) 
(stating that provision would encourage second state to re-determine child's 
best interests, would create substantive federal standard in area of 
traditionally exclusive state concern, and would make criminal enforcement 
turn on subjective civil standard); Hearing on Child Snatching, supra note 325, 
at 60, 61 (answers of Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, University of California, 
Davis to questions by Senator Cranston following hearing in Los Angeles). 
351 See Hearings on S. 1722 and S. 1723, supra note 339, at 10669, 10671 
(statement of Professor Russell M. Coombs, School of Law, Rutgers 
University, Camden, New Jersey) (stating that exception would be a "federal 
encroachment on the right of each state to determine what specific factors 
would be given what weight in awarding or changing custody"). 
352 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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1981.353 Although many courts considering interstate custody 
problems since the PKPA's enactment have simply ignored the 
Act,354 many others have struggled to reconcile its commands 
with those of the UCCJA. The next section examines these 
courts' interpretations of the PKPA, illustrating the Act's crucial 
indeterminacies. 
B. The Crucial Indeterminacies of the PKPA 
If the central question for understanding the UCCJA was, 
"When may a court make a custody order?," the analogous ques­
tion for understanding the PKPA is, "When must a court give full 
faith and credit to a custody order?" For expository purposes, 
this question may usefully be broken down into two subsidiary 
questions: (1) When must a court enforce a foreign custody 
order?; and (2) When may a court, after an independent inquiry, 
modify a foreign custody order? This section examines the state 
courts' interpretations of the PKPA's answers to these two ques­
tions, and the PKPA's consequent failure to "close loopholes" 
and achieve the reformers' stability goals. 
1. When Must a Court Enforce a Foreign Custody Order? 
Like the UCCJA, the PKPA applies to both custody and visita-
353 Pub. L. No. 96-611 § 2, 94 Stat. 3567. 
354 See, e.g., Waller v. Richardson, 757 P.2d 1036 (Alaska 1988); Szmyd v. 
Szmyd, 641 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1982); Bell v. Bell, 705 S.W.2d 891 (Ark. 1986); 
Davis v. Davis, 687 S.W.2d 843 (Ark. 1985); Bakke v. District Court, 719 
P.2d 313 (Colo. 1986) (en bane); E.P. v. District Court, 696 P.2d 254 (Colo. 
1985) (en bane); McCarron v. District Court, 671 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1983) (en 
bane); Mondy v. Mondy, 428 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1983); Biggers v. Biggers, 650 
P.2d 692 (Idaho 1982); In re Hubbard, 315 N.W.2d 75 (Iowa 1982); Bills v. 
Murdock, 654 P.2d 406 (Kan. 1982); Perry v. Perry, 639 S.W.2d 780 (Ky. 
1982); Wood v. Graham, 633 S.W.2d 404 (Ky. 1982); Harris v. Melnick, 552 
A.2d 38 (Md. 1989); Stowers v. Humphrey, 576 So. 2d 138 (Miss. 1991); 
Castleberry v. Castleberry, 541 So. 2d 457 (Miss. 1989); Roberts v. Fuhr, 
523 So. 2d 20 (Miss. 1987); Walker v. Luckey, 474 So. 2d 608 (Miss. 1985); 
Clarke v. Clarke, 496 A.2d 361 (N.H. 1985); Mattleman v. Bandler, 461 A.2d 
561 (N.H. 1983); State ex rei. Aycock v. Mowrey, 544 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio 
1989); Walling v. Walling 727 P.2d 586 (Okla. 1986); Kretzer v. Kretzer, 
506 A.2d 81 (R.I. 1986); Knoth v. Knoth, 377 S.E.2d 340 (S.C. 1989); 
Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1985); Angell v. Sixth judicial 
Dist., 656 P.2d 405 (Utah 1982); Duval v. Duval, 546 A.2d 1357 (Vt. 1988); 
Carr v. Carr, 375 S.E.2d 190 (W. Va. 1988); Brockman v. Hegner, 317 
S.E.2d 516 (W.Va. 1984); Rosics v. Heath, 746 P.2d 1284 (Wyo. 1987). 
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tion orders.355 Unlike the UCCJA, the PKPA does not distinguish 
between final decrees and orders in pending cases. Because it 
defines a "custody determination" to include "permanent and 
temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications,"356 the 
PKPA requires courts to enforce both temporary and final orders, 
provided only that they are "made consistently with the provi­
sions of [the PKPA] by a court of another State."357 
To be consistent with the PKPA, a custody determination must 
have been made by a court with jurisdiction under its own law. 358 
In this, the PKPA differs from the UCCJA, which assesses the 
decree state's jurisdiction under the forum's law.359 In actual 
practice, however, the difference may be more formal than real. 
Although an asylum court interpreting the PKPA may sometimes 
defer to the decree state's own jurisdictional assessment,360 more 
often it will make an independent evaluation.361 Indeed, under 
the PKPA the asylum court may well decide that the decree 
court's assessment of its own jurisdiction was erroneous.362 
Thus, even under the PKPA, asylum courts remain able to avoid 
enforcing foreign decisions when they so choose. 
To be consistent with the PKPA, a foreign decree must also be 
made in one of five sets of factual situations.363 These are based 
355 Compare PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738A(b)(2)) with UCCJA § 2(1), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 133. 
356 PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(3)). 
357 PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a)). 
358 See PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1)) 
("has jurisdiction under the law of such State"). 
359 See supra notes 220-.21 and accompanying text. 
360 See, e.g., Bahr v. Bahr, 439 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Fam. Ct. 1981) (deferring to 
Connecticut's assessment of its own jurisdiction), aff'd, 458 N.Y.S.2d 247 
(App. Div.), appeal denied, 454 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1983). 
361 See, e.g., Murphy v .. Woerner, 748 P.2d 749 (Alaska 1988) (assessing 
Kansas's jurisdiction under Kansas statute and cases); Barndt v. Barndt, 580 
A.2d 320 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (assessing North Dakota's jurisdiction under 
North Dakota law); Arbogast v. Arbogast, 327 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1984) 
(assessing Kansas's jurisdiction under Kansas statute and cases). 
362 See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 640 P.2d 899, 904-05 (Mont. 1982) (holding 
trial court erred in telephoning Kentucky court to find out if it asserted 
jurisdiction, and remanding for full hearing on whether Kentucky court has 
jurisdiction under Kentucky law); Serna v. Salazar, 651 P.2d 1292, 1295 
(N.M. 1982) (determining that California did not have jurisdiction under its 
own law); Debra S. v. Roger S., 455 N.Y.S.2d 723, 725 (Fam. Ct. 1982) 
(same). 
363 See PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)); 
infra note 366. 
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on UCCJA section 3 but differ from it in two ways. First, the 
PKPA requires the forum to enforce custody determinations 
made by courts with "significant contacts" jurisdiction only if the 
child had no home state. Second, the PKPA adopted 
Bodenheimer's concept of "continuing jurisdiction." These 
deserve separate discussion. 
a. The PKPA Favors Home State jurisdiction 
In early versions of the Moss/Wallop proposal, the problem of 
identifying those decrees that deserved enforcement had been 
solved by adopting the language of UCCJA section 3. A custody 
decree was entitled to full faith and credit if it had been made by a 
court with "jurisdiction under the law of such state," and if one of 
the jurisdictional requirements of UCCJA section 3 were met. 364 
At Professor Bodenheimer's suggestion, however, this language 
was altered to close a "loophole" used by "persons who remove a 
child from the home state prior to custody litigation."365 As 
enacted, the PKPA favors home state jurisdiction by requiring 
courts to grant full faith and credit to custody decrees that were 
made pursuant to "significant contact" jurisdiction, only if the 
child had no home state.366 
364 See, e.g., S. 105, 96th Con g., 1st Sess. § 3(a) ( 1979). 
365 Hearing on Child Snatching, supra note 325, at 50, 51-2 (statement of 
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis). 
Professor Coombs agreed with Professor Bodenheimer's suggestion and 
proposed the language that was eventually enacted into law. See Addendum to 
joint Hearing on S. 105, supra note 328, at 267, 270 (questions of Senator 
Mathias and responses of Russell M. Coombs);joint Hearing on S. 105, supra 
note 324, at 143, 145 n.16 (prepared statement of Russell M. Coombs). 
366 The PKPA requires that "[t]he appropriate authorities of every State 
... enforce according to its terms, and ... not modify except as provided in 
subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determination made 
consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State." 
PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a)). It defines as 
"consistent with the provisions of this section" only those determinations 
made by a court with jurisdiction "under the law of such state," PKPA 
§ 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1)), and where 
(2) one of the following conditions is met: 
(B)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under 
subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child 
that a court of such State assume jurisdiction because (I) the 
child and his parents, or the child and at least one 
contestant, have a significant connection with such State other 
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This provision is often explained by saying that the PKPA gives 
the home state exclusive jurisdiction. While that is a much sim­
pler and clearer explanation than the one I have just given, it is 
also inaccurate. The PKPA is federal law and therefore can 
neither grant nor withhold state jurisdiction; that is a matter for 
state law. All the PKPA can do, and all that it does, is specify 
which state decrees are entitled to enforcement under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause. The PKPA neither requires a state to 
exercize jurisdiction only when its orders would be entitled to full 
faith and credit367 nor prohibits a state from enforcing (as a mat­
ter of comity) a custody decree not entitled to full faith and credit. 
It is in this limited sense alone that the PKPA prefers home state 
over significant contacts jurisdiction. 
Although courts routinely enforce initial decrees made by 
courts with home state jurisdiction,368 they occasionally refuse to 
do so. The most commonly cited statutory ground is failure to 
give proper notice. The PKPA requires that "reasonable notice 
and opportunity to be heard" be afforded any parent, contestant, 
or person with actual physical custody of a child, before a custody 
order is entered. 369 If one parent disappears with the child 
before any custody action has been filed, the remaining parent is 
often advised to seek custody immediately.37° Frequently, how­
ever, he or she finds it difficult to serve process on, or even give 
actual notice to, the absent parent. Although courts sometimes 
than mere physical presence in such State, and (II) there is 
available in such State substantial evidence concerning the 
child's present or future care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships 
PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)) (emphasis 
added). 
367 See, e.g., Pazder v. Pazder, 556 N.Y.2d 427 (App. Div. 1990) (mem.) 
(permitting father to institute action for, inter alia, custody of children who 
have been living in Florida with their mother for eleven months over 
mother's objection that PKPA prohibits this). 
368 See, e.g., Michell v. Michell, 437 So. 2d 122 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982) 
(enforcing Texas custody order because Texas had been child's home state 
within six months of commencement of action although father had taken 
him to Alabama eleven days before mother filed Texas proceeding). 
369 PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § l738A(c)); cJ. 
UCCJA § 5, 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 212-13 ("Notice required for the exercise of 
jurisdiction over a person outside this State shall be given m a manner 
reasonably calculated to give actual notice .... "). 
370 See supra note 345 and accompanying text. 
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enforce foreign custody orders entered ex parte in such circum­
stances on the ground that the absent parent was not reasonably 
entitled to any notice,371 some courts balk, especially when the 
remaining parent did not act quickly.372 
b. The PKPA Recognizes "Continuing jurisdiction" 
The UCCJA requires that a court wishing to modify its own 
decree apply the same jurisdictional tests it needed to apply to 
enter an initial decree.373 In contrast, the PKPA explicitly 
adopted Bodenheimer's concept of "continuing jurisdiction."374 
Once a state court has made an initial custody decree that is "con­
sistent" with the PKPA's standards, only that court's orders are 
entitled to full faith and credit-provided that the decree court 
continues to have jurisdiction under its own law and remains the 
residence of either the child or any contestant. 375 
Decree courts have not been reluctant to interpret the PKPA's 
371 See, e.g., Siler v. Storey, 677 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. I984) (requiring 
enforcement of Pennsylvania custody decree made without service on father 
because he had abducted child and was hiding from process server; no 
explicit PKPA analysis); cf. Elder v. Park, 7I7 P.2d II32 (N.M. I986) 
(deferring to New Hampshire's jurisdiction because mother filed post­
abduction action there, even though New Hampshire's ex parte temporary 
order was unenforceable and New Mexico court could properly modify it to 
give father summer visit with child). 
372 See, e.g., Sherry Ann F. v. Bennett S., 502 N.Y.S.2d 383 (Fam. Ct. 
I986) (refusing to enforce order entered without notice to father; mother 
filed California action II months after father's departure with child); 
Virginia E.E. v. Alberto S.P., 440 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Fam. Ct. I98I) (refusing to 
enforce ex parte California custody decree dated August 8, 1977; father 
disappeared with child in I975). 
373 UCCJA § 3(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at I43. 
374 Professor Bodenheimer's articles had urged a similar interpretation 
of the UCCJA. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, Progress Under the UCC}A, supra note 5, 
at 984. According to Professor Foster, she was influential in persuading 
Congress to enact the concept into federal law. See Foster, supra note I2, at 
303 n.33. 
375 Subsection (c)(2)(E) refers to "continuing jurisdiction," which 
subsection (d) defines as follows: "The jurisdiction of a court of a State 
which has made a child custody determination consistently with the 
provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection 
(c)(l) of this section continues to be met and such State remains the 
residence of the child or of any contestant." PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570-7I 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § I738A(d)). Subsection (c)(l) merely requires that 
the state have jurisdiction "under the law of such State," i.e., under its own 
law. PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § I738A(c)(I)). 
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language as authorizing them, long after the child has moved 
away, to make custody orders that they expect to be exclusively 
entitled to full faith and credit. 376 After all, many courts asserted 
continuing jurisdiction on the strength of the UCCJA alone.377 
Under the UCCJA, however, asylum courts were much less likely 
to recognize a decree court's continuing jurisdiction than a 
decree court was to assert it. 378 The PKPA seems at first glance to 
have made a difference here. Asylum courts using the PKPA to 
analyze the continuing jurisdiction issue usually recognize the 
decree state's contin.uing jurisdiction.379 However, asylum courts 
376 See, e.g., Russo v. Myers, 588 So. 2d 887 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (decree 
state exercising jurisdiction to modify nearly two years after custodial 
mother and child moved to Florida, and enforcing modification by contempt 
three years after); Robertson v. Robertson, 532 So. 2d 1014 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1988) (decree state asserting continuing jurisdiction four years after 
children left state); O'Daniel v. Walker, 686 S.W.2d 805 (Ark. Ct. App. 
1985) (decree state exercising jurisdiction to modify three years after 
custodial mother and children left state, and punishing noncompliance with 
contempt four years after); Jesus A. v. Lizette A., 546 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Fam. 
Ct. 1989) (asserting jurisdiction to modify its custody order seven months 
after custodial mother and children moved to Puerto Rico); Hall v. Hall, No. 
1401, 1991 WL 46676 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 1991) (decree state asserting 
jurisdiction to modify 2 1/2 years after custodial mother and child moved to 
Georgia); Escudero v. Henry, 395 S.E.2d 793 (W.Va. 1990) (denying writ of 
prohibition to custodial mother to prevent exercise of modification 
jurisdiction nearly two years after she and the children moved to Kentucky). 
But see, e.g., Ziegler v. Ziegler, 691 P.2d 773 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) 
(holding that decree state may decline to exercise continuing jurisdiction 
when remaining parent has voluntarily litigated custody in child's new 
home); Nielsen v. Nielsen, 4 72 So. 2d 133 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that 
decree state may decline to exercise continuing jurisdiction when child, who 
has been living in Texas for two years, has closer connections there); 
Patricia R. v. Andrew W., 467 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Fam. Ct. 1983) (holding that 
decree state may decline to exercise continuing jurisdiction when children 
spend the greater portion of their time in New Jersey). 
377 See supra note 243 and accompanying text. Decree courts continue to 
decline to exercise continuing jurisdiction to punish the remaining parent's 
wrongdoing. See supra note 245. In Hafer v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. Rptr. 
132 (Ct. App. 1981), for example, the mother abducted the child to Florida 
in violation of a California court order. The father obtained a California 
order awarding him custody, which the mother subsequently petitioned the 
California court to modify. !d. at 133. The California Court of Appeal 
viewed the mother's wrongful abduction as an "adequate basis to deny [her] 
the California forum for unclean hands .... " !d. at 136. 
378 See supra note 243-46 and accompanying text. 
379 See, e.g., Murphy v. Woerner, 748 P.2d 749 (Alaska 1988) (holding 
that asylum state may not modify Kansas decree three years after custodial 
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sometimes deferred to decree courts under the UCCJA; perhaps 
courts already inclined to defer now also cite the PKPA. 
Certainly, asylum courts continue to take jurisdiction when they 
deem it appropriate to do so, even if the case is still under active 
consideration in the decree court. Some of the opinions in such 
cases simply do not address the PKPA,380 deal with it cursorily,381 
or conclude that it does not apply.382 However, some of these 
mother and children moved there); Via v. Johnston, 521 So. 2d 1324 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1987) (holding that asylum state must enforce Indiana 
modification made over a year after custodial parent and child left state); 
Souza v. Superior Court, 238 Cal. Rptr. 892 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that 
asylum state must enforce Hawaii modification made more than three years 
after custodial parent and child left state); Bahr v. Bahr, 439 N.Y.S.2d 265 
(Fam. Ct. 1981) (holding that asylum state must defer to Connecticut 
exercise of continuing jurisdiction although child and custodial parent had 
been living in New York for more than six months); State ex rei. Cooper v. 
Hamilton, 688 S.W.2d 821 (Tenn. 1985) (holding that asylum state must 
enforce 1980 Indiana modification made after custodial parent and child 
moved to Tennessee); Rush v. Stansbury, 668 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1984) 
(holding that asylum state must enforce Tennessee modification made seven 
months after custodial father brought children to live with him in Texas); In 
re S.A.V., 798 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that asylum state 
may not modify decree six months after custodial parent left decree state); 
Lundell v. Clawson, 697 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that 
asylum state must enforce Minnesota modification made after custodial 
mother and child had moved to Texas with Minnesota court's permission); 
Arbogast v. Arbogast, 327 S.E.2d 675 (W.Va. 1984) (holding that asylum 
state must enforce Kansas modification made eight months after custodial 
parent and child left state). 
380 See, e.g., Mace v. Mace, 341 N.W.2d 307 (Neb. 1983) (asylum state 
refusing to enforce decree state's modification without analyzing effect of 
PKPA); Rosics v. Heath, 746 P.2d 1284 (Wyo. 1987) (same). 
381 See, e.g., Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907, 9ll & n.6 (Conn. 1989) 
(relying principally on UCCJA and noting that PKPA was modeled on 
UCCJA and contains similar language); Quenzer v. Quenzer, 653 P.2d 295, 
30 l (Wyo. 1982) (concluding, without analysis, that continuing jurisdiction 
was "not applicable" to a Texas custodial modification entered three years 
after custodial mother left Texas with child, although father had 
continuously remained a Texas resident), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983). 
382 See, e.g., State ex rei. Department of Human Services v. Avinger, 720 
P.2d 290, 292 (N.M. 1986) (holding that New Mexico may conduct abuse 
and neglect hearing although custodial mother still resides in Texas because 
PKPA does not apply to such proceedings); Williams v. Knott, 690 S.W.2d 
605, 608-09 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that Texas may consider 
mother's petition to terminate father's parental rights although custody 
dispute between them is pending in Oklahoma because PKPA and UCCJA 
do not apply). But see State ex rei. Kasper v. Kasper, 792 P.2d 118, 118 (Utah 
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cases do rely on interpretations of the PKPA's language.383 The 
PKPA sets forth three prerequisites for continuing jurisdiction: 
(1) the initial decree must have been made "consistently with the 
provisions of this section"; (2) the decree state's own jurisdic­
tional requirements must "continue[] to be met"; and (3) the 
decree state must "remain the residence of the child or of any 
contestant."384 Courts using the PKPA to repudiate another 
state's continuing jurisdiction usually employ interpretive strate­
gies that find defects in the first two of these. 
In re Thorensen 385 is a good example of the first interpretive 
strategy, that is, deciding that the foreign decree was not made 
"consistently with the provisions of this section." The Thorsen­
sens lived in Florida and their child was born there. About two 
years later, the mother filed for a divorce in Florida; in December, 
1979, a Florida court gave her permanent custody of the child. 
The parents later filed countercharges against one another in the 
Florida court; while that matter was pending, the mother moved 
out of state in violation of an order requiring her to obtain court 
permission. In response, the Florida court transferred the child's 
custody to a state agency. Nearly five years later, in 1985, the 
father located the mother and child in Washington. To assist him 
in bringing the child back to Florida, die Florida court gave the 
father custody. This order was entered without prior notice to 
the mother, although her whereabouts were known. 
The Washington court not only refused to enforce the change 
of custody, it decided that any subsequent Florida orders, even if 
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that PKPA applies to neglect hearings and that 
Utah must defer to decree state's continuing jurisdiction). 
383 See, e.g., Ex parte Blanton, 463 So. 2d 162 (Ala. 1985) (refusing to 
enforce Louisiana modification entered after custodial mother left state with 
children); Snow v. Snow, 369 N.W.2d 581 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing 
to enforce South Dakota modification entered on father's petition filed after 
custodial mother left state with children); Serna v. Salazar, 651 P.2d 1292 
(N.M. 1982) (refusing to enforce California modification entered on father's 
motion filed two years after custodial mother moved to New Mexico with 
children); Debra S. v. RogerS., 455 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Fam. Ct. 1982) (refusing 
to enforce California modification entered on mother's default, three years 
after custodial mother moved to New York with child); In re Thorensen, 730 
P.2d 1380 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (refusing to enforce Florida modification 
entered after custodial mother left state with children). 
384 PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d)). 
385 730 P.2d 1380 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). 
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properly-noticed, would not be entitled to full faith and credit.386 
Although Florida had continuously been the father's residence, 
the Washington court concluded that Florida's continuing juris­
diction had ended because its latest order was not "consistent" 
with the PKPA.387 The court was apparently motivated to reach 
this result by its fear that Florida might not give proper weight to 
the mother's allegations of abuse, which the Washington court 
had found to be substantiated.388 
Serna v. Salazar 389 is a good example of the second interpretive 
strategy, that is, determining that the decree state's jurisdictional 
requirements have not "continue[d] to be met."390 Shortly after 
the couple's 1977 California divorce gave the mother custody, she 
moved with the child to New Mexico. In October, 1980, the 
father asked the California court to give him a month's summer 
visit with the child, which it did. In May, 1981, however, before 
the first such visit could take place, the mother asked a New Mex­
ico court to modify the California order. She alleged that the 
father was a drug addict and an alcoholic. The New Mexico trial 
court dismissed the action in deference to California's continuing 
jurisdiction, but the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed. Rely­
ing on a California case, it held that California no longer had 
jurisdiction under its own law. Therefore, the supreme court rea­
soned, New Mexico could exercise jurisdiction as the child's new 
home state. 391 The fact that a California court had, seven months 
before, entered an order intended to take effect in the summer of 
1981 was deemed of "no relevance. " 392 
386 See id. at 1385; if. supra notes 3 71-72 and accompanying text (noting 
courts' tendency to refuse to enforce ex parte orders of which absent parent 
had inadequate notice). 
387 See 730 P.2d at 1383-84. 
388 See id. at 1382; if. Snow v. Snow, 369 N.W.2d 581 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1985) (deciding that decree state 1ostjurisdiction because its entry of ex parte 
change of custody violated both UCCJA and PKPA). 
389 651 P.2d 1292 (N.M. 1982). 
390 See id. at 1295 (quoting PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 357 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1738A(d))); see also Pierce v. Pierce, 640 P.2d 899 (Mont. 1982) 
(remanding for factual inquiry into Kentucky's continuing jurisdiction 
although Kentucky had asserted, and was exercising, jurisdiction to modify); 
Debra S. v. RogerS., 455 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Fam. Ct. 1982) (refusing to enforce 
modification very recently entered in decree state). 
391 651 P.2d at 1294-95. 
392 /d. at 1295. 
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2. When May a Court, After an Independent Inquiry, 
Modify a Foreign Custody Order? 
931 
Like the UCCJA, the PKPA permits courts to modify even con­
cededly valid foreign custody orders in two situations: (1) if "the 
other state no longer has jurisdiction,"393 and (2) if the decree 
court has "declined to exercise" itsjurisdiction.394 The first pro­
vision, which has already been discussed, 395 gives rise to contin­
ual uncertainty over whether a decree court's modification will be 
enforced elsewhere. Moreover, even when a litigant persuades an 
asylum state to recognize the decree state's order, her victory may 
be pyrrhic. 
Gordon v. Gordon 396 is a good example of this. After the Ohio 
divorce court gave custody to the mother, she moved with the 
child to Georgia. Later, when the Ohio court modified its order 
to give the father custody, he tried to enforce the modification in 
Georgia. He was successful on appeal-but the case was 
remanded for a hearing to determine whether Ohio still had juris­
diction. 397 If it did not, the appellate court indicated that Georgia 
might properly exercise jurisdiction over the case to restore cus­
tody to the mother.398 
E. E. B. v. D.A. 399 is a good example of one strategy for inter­
preting away the "declined to exercise its jurisdiction" provision. 
In E. E. B., the PKPA was no barrier to New Jersey's modification 
of a very recent Ohio decision. The court's conclusion that Ohio 
had declined to exercise its jurisdiction when it failed to hold a 
best interests hearing served to authorize modification under the 
PKPA precisely as it did under the UCCJA.400 
This tendency of asylum courts to exercise jurisdiction when 
393 PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3571 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2)); cf. 
UCCJA § 14(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 292 ("it appears to a court of this State 
that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction"). 
394 PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3571 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2)); cf. 
UCCJA § 14(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 292. 
395 See supra notes 373-92 and accompanying text (discussing "continuing 
jurisdiction" under PKPA). 
396 363 S.E.2d 353 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). 
397 /d. at 355. 
398 The Georgia court was critical of the Ohio modification, calling it 
"home cooking." See id. 
399 446 A.2d 871 (NJ. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210, reh'g denied, 460 
u.s. 1104 (1983). 
400 See supra notes 274-92 and accompanying text (discussing holdings 
that decree court declined to exercise jurisdiction under UCCJA). 
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they fear the decree court may reach the wrong result seems not 
to have gone unnoticed by the state courts. Anticipating such 
intervention, decree courts have experimented with ways to retain 
power over departing or absent litigants. They sometimes issue 
orders explicitly "retaining jurisdiction" over a party who is or 
may be moving to another state. Asylum courts routinely disre­
gard these orders,401 as they do agreements between the parties 
providing for continuing jurisdiction in the decree court.402 
Decree courts also sometimes craft orders intended to coerce an 
out-of-state party into obeying their custody orders, with mixed 
results.403 
Because the PKPA has not significantly reduced the UCCJA's 
indeterminacy, parents and their lawyers have searched for other 
ways to settle the jurisdictional question. Two relatively recent 
Supreme Court opinions arose in that context. They concern two 
strategies for coping with the inadequacies of the statutory 
401 See, e.g., Snow v. Snow, 369 N.W.2d 581 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) 
(disregarding South Dakota retention of jurisdiction by refusing to enforce 
its modification); cf. Rumbolo v. Phelps, 759 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1988) (holding that if trial court order claiming "continuing jurisdiction" 
was meant to retainjurisdiction regardless of future events, it was error, but 
if it was meant only to assert a determination to exercise jurisdiction to 
extent allowed by law, order's correctness is notjusticiable because it turns 
on future facts). 
402 See, e.g. Olson v. Olson, 494 A.2d 737 (Md. Ct. App. 1985) (asylum 
court refusing to abide by parties' settlement agreement stipulation that 
custody would be determined by Rhode Island courts). Of course, a decree 
court's decision to decline to exercise continuing jurisdiction is always 
accepted. See, e.g., Berry v. Berry, 466 So. 2d 138, 140 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) 
(accepting decree state of North Carolina's determination that it lacked 
continuing jurisdiction). So, too, may be a party's admission that continuing 
jurisdiction has been lost. See Quenzer v. Quenzer, 653 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 
1982) (asylum court relying in part on party's concession, in earlier Oregon 
custody action, that decree state of Texas had lost jurisdiction to modify 
when custodial mother and child moved away), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 
(1983). 
403 See, e.g., Kioukis v. Kioukis, 440 A.2d 894, 895, 899 (Conn. 1981) 
(error to require escrow of all further child support payments until mother 
complied with modified visitation order); Bullard v. Bullard, 64 7 P.2d 294 
(Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (requiring father who had frustrated mother's 
visitation when he had custody to post $2,500 bond before being permitted 
visitation); Roberts v. Fuhr, 523 So. 2d 20,23-24 (Miss. 1987) (neexeat bond 
used to secure compliance with custody and visitation orders; bond forfeited 
when father retained child in Illinois instead of returning him to Mississippi 
for visit). 
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schemes-self-help and invoking the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. The next section examines those cases. 
V. THE SUPREME COURT CASES 
Two recent Supreme Court cases poignantly typify many other 
casualties of the PKPA's and UCCJA's indeterminacies.404 Taken 
together, these cases also cut off any reasonable hope that the 
federal courts will try to impose uniform interpretations on either 
the UCCJA or the PKPA.405 
A. Automatic Interstate Rendition for Parental "Kidnaping": 
California v. Superior Court (Smolin) 
For the Supreme Court, California v. Superior Court (Smolin) 406 
was an extradition case, plain and simple. Richard Smolin and his 
father, Gerard Smolin, had done something in Louisiana that 
Louisiana claimed was a crime. Let them, therefore, be tried in 
Louisiana. The Smolins argued that they had merely been 
enforcing a valid California custody judgment when they took 
Richard's children from a school bus stop in Louisiana and 
brought them back to California; as legal custodians, they argued, 
they could not be guilty of kidnaping. Fine, responded the 
Supreme Court: tell that story in Louisiana. Whether or not the 
Smolins' arguments were correct-and the Court was willing to 
grant that they were-"under the Extradition Act, it [was] for the 
Louisiana courts to do justice in this case, not the California 
courts."407 
The Smolins had argued in the Supreme Court that there was 
only one way to resolve whether Richard had legal custody of his 
children when he took them back to California: their way. Rich­
ard's 1981 California custody order was valid because California 
clearly had "continuing jurisdiction" under the UCCJA and the 
404 See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988); California v. 
Superior Court (Smolin), 482 U.S. 400 (1987); infra text accompanying 
notes 405-29. 
405 Certiorari remains a theoretical possibility for litigants claiming that 
either the PKPA or the UCCJA is "repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, 
or laws of the United States .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The Court has shown 
no disposition to get into such matters, however. 
406 482 U.S. 400 (1987). 
407 /d. at 412 (citing Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3182). 
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PKPA.408 The prosecution's contention that the 1981 Texas 
judgment giving the children's mother custody was valid was 
"quite simply, dead wrong."409 The Smolins had wanted to con­
vince the Supreme Court, as they had convinced the California 
court,410 that their custody claim was so strong that, in effect, 
Louisiana had not charged them "substantially" with a crime at 
all. 
The Smolins' strategy thus required them to obscure what was, 
perhaps, their most compelling ground for relief. In truth, their 
California judgment was plainly valid-in California. Elsewhere, 
it was open to question. There is some evidence that the Smolins 
themselves understood this: they used self-help, after all, instead 
of attempting to litigate the issues in Louisiana. But on another 
level, they seem to have been lured by the UCCJA's and the 
PKPA's appearance of uniformity into assuming that a validly ren­
dered California judgment would be enforced elsewhere if only 
the statutes were "properly applied." This assumption plainly 
underlay their claim, in the Supreme Court, that the father was 
"really" the legal custodian of his children. 
As we have seen, however, under the PKPA and the UCCJA, 
each state has the opportunity, perhaps even the duty, to reassess 
the decree state's jurisdiction before enforcing a foreign decree. 
Louisiana might well prefer the mother's 1981 Texas custody 
decree over the father's 1981 California decree. To see how this 
might happen, we must examine the facts carefully. 
When Richard and Judith Smolin were divorced in 1978, Cali­
fornia was indisputably the children's home state.411 The Califor­
nia court gave Judith custody of their two small children subject 
to Richard's rights of "reasonable visitation." Judith married 
James Pope in August, 1979. In November, 1979, the Popes 
moved to Oregon, taking the children with them, and neglecting 
408 Brief of Real Parties in Interest at 34-35, California v. Superior Court 
(Smolin), 482 U.S. 400 (1987) (No. 86-381). 
409 /d. at 34 n.16. 
410 See People v. Superior Court (Smolin), 716 P.2d 991 (Cal. 1986) (en 
bane), rev 'd sub nom. California v. Superior Court (Smolin), 482 U.S. 400 
(1987). 
411 They had married, lived together, and had their children, in 
California. Joint Appendix at 61, California v. Superior Court (Smolin), 482 
U.S. 400 (1987) (No. 86-381) (Smolin v. Smolin, No. E 001135 
(unpublished) (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1986)) [hereafter Joint Appendix]; see 
UCCJA § 3(a)(l), 9 U.L.A. pt. I, at 143. 
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first to tell Richard that they were going. Two months later, in 
January, 1980, the Popes moved with the children to Texas.412 
In September, 1980, after she and the children had been in 
Texas for eight months, Judith began a proceeding in Texas seek­
ing recognition and enforcement of the California judgment 
granting her sole custody. Richard was served, but did not 
appear. Instead, in October, 1980, he filed an action in California 
seeking joint custody by modification of the 1978 order. Judith 
was served, but she did not appear. Apparently, neither Judith 
nor Richard informed either the California or the Texas court 
about the proceedings pending in the other state.413 
The California case proceeded more expeditiously: Richard was 
made the children's joint custodian on October 27, 1980. Judith 
did nothing to comply with the new California order, apparently 
on the advice of counsel.414 In January, 1981, Richard therefore 
asked the California court to find her in contempt and grant him 
sole custody. On February 27, 1981, to punish Judith for dis­
obeying its earlier visitation orders, the California court gave 
Richard sole custody of his children, and terminated his duty to 
pay child support. 415 
Meanwhile, on February 13, 1981, the Texas court issued a 
decree recognizing and enforcing the 1978 California decree that 
had given Judith sole custody of the children. Relying on the 
Texas decree, Judith did not comply with the most recent Califor­
nia decree. Nor did Richard seek to enforce it; instead, he merely 
stopped paying child support.416 · 
In March, 1981, the Popes moved to Louisiana with the chil­
dren, again without telling Richard. He did not learn their exact 
whereabouts until October, 1982. After that, Richard spoke with 
his children by telephone and sent them gifts, but he did not 
make any serious effort to enforce the 1981 California decree giv­
ing him sole custody until after February, 1984. That February, 
the Popes served Richard with notice of their Louisiana proceed­
ing to have the children adopted by James Pope. In response, 
Richard and his father went to Louisiana, took the children from a 
412 Joint Appendix, supra note 411, at 62. 
413 /d. at 63-64. 
414 Her Texas attorney told Richard's attorney that, in his opinion, the 
1980 California joint custody order was not enforceable in Texas because 
California lacked jurisdiction to make such an order. /d. 
415 /d. at 64-65, 96-98. 
416 /d. at 64-65. 
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school bus stop, and brought them back to California.417 
Richard Smolin's claim to be the legal custodian of his children 
when he removed them from Louisiana depended on the validity 
of the October, 1980, California order giving him joint cus­
tody.418 From the California courts' perspective, California could 
change custody because it still had "continuing jurisdiction." A 
Louisiana court, however, might well have taken a different view. 
It could have determined that California should have dismissed 
Richard's October, 1980, petition for modification under UCCJA 
section 6 because Judith's request to enforce the original Califor­
nia custody decree was already pending in Texas.419 If Califor­
nia's exercise of modification jurisdiction was therefore not 
"substantially in accordance with this Act," under UCCJA section 
13, no state need recognize and enforce the modified order.420 
Nor would the modification be entitled to full faith and credit 
under the PKPA, because California had lacked jurisdiction under 
its own law.421 Thus, the Smolins' guilt or innocence might well 
turn on whether California's view of its own order would be 
accepted or not. 
As we have seen, decree states often assert continuing jurisdic­
tion although the children are living in an asylum state that 
believes it has thereby gained home state jurisdiction. The 
Supreme Court's decision in Smolin means that self-help is never 
safe, even for a parent armed with a facially valid custody decree. 
Whether or not any state's assertion of child custody jurisdiction 
is likely to be respected elsewhere, this case makes it determina­
tive of rights within that state, and a possible basis for criminal 
charges. 
417 /d. at 65-66. 
418 After Richard brought his children back to California, the February, 
1981, order giving him sole custody was held to have been punitive and 
unenforceable, because the court had entered it solely to punish Judith 
Pope and without hearing any evidence about the children's needs. !d. at 
64-65, 96-98. 
419 See VCCJA § 6, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 219-20. Arguably, a proceeding for 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign order under § 13 is a "proceeding 
concerning the custody of the child[ren]" under § 6. See VCCJA § 13, 9 
U.L.A. pt. 1, at 276. 
420 9 U.L.A. pl. 1, at 276; see supra text accompanying notes 223-30. 
421 See PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570-71 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738A(c)(l), (d)); supra text accompanying notes 389-92. 
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B. Federal Courts' Lack of jurisdiction to Enforce the PKPA: 
Thompson v. Thompson 
The facts of Thompson v. Thompson 422 were relatively uncompli­
cated. In December, 1980, a California divorce court awarded 
Susan Thompson custody of her son pending a full investigation 
and hearing, to facilitate her move to Louisiana. Three months 
after the move, she asked the Louisiana court to enforce this 
order, and it did so in April, 1981. Susan had alleged that David 
Thompson had frightened and endangered their child with his 
hostile and erratic behavior; the Louisiana court was apparently 
exercising emergency jurisdiction.423 Meanwhile, in California 
the investigation continued. In June, 1981, the California court 
awarded David full custody of the child. According to David, the 
California investigation covered the same allegations made in 
Louisiana and found them "meritless."424 
Faced with two recent, and conflicting, custody decisions, David 
could have asked the Louisiana court either to enforce Califor­
nia's decision or to reassess its own jurisdiction and dismiss its 
case. But he thought this would waste time and money, because 
the California judge had already, unsuccessfully, made the same 
arguments and requests by telephone.425 He therefore promptly 
asked the local federal district court to enjoin enforcement of the 
Louisiana decree.426 The district court's refusal was affirmed on 
appeal.427 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and closed the 
doors of the federal courts to these cases. 
In Thompson, the Supreme Court held that the PKPA does not 
imply a private right of action in federal court to determine the 
validity of conflicting state custody decrees. The Court rejected 
the pleas of the petitioner and amici that, unless state court deci­
sions could be appealed to federal court, the state courts would 
not give the PKPA either consistent interpretation or unbiased 
422 484 u.s. 174 (1988). 
423 See PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii)) (emergency jurisdiction); UCCJA § 3(a)(3)(ii), 9 
U.L.A. pt. 1, at 144 (same); Joint Appendix, supra note 411, at 24-28 
(Louisiana pleadings). 
424 Brief for Petitioner at 18, Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 
(1988) (No. 86-964). 
425 !d. at 18-19. 
426 484 U.S. at 178. 
427 Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 
u.s. 174 (1988). 
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application.428 Relying on Congress's refusal to amend the diver­
sity statute and other legislative history,429 the Court concluded 
that Congress had not intended to institute such extraordinary 
federal supervision of state courts.430 
The parties in both Thompson and Smolin seemed to share with 
the Court an unspoken assumption that there are "correct" statu­
tory answers for child custody jurisdiction disputes; they differed 
only as to which court should impose the answer. Yet, as we have 
seen, the statutes are indeterminate at almost every pressure 
point, susceptible of many equally valid interpretations. At least 
since its decision in May v. Anderson,431 the Supreme Court has 
been blamed for creating or exacerbating the problem of the 
interstate child, although in fact its role there was merely to clar­
ify a dilemma inherent in our federalism. Perhaps these two deci­
sions should be seen in that light as well. They can only be 
accused of making things worse if "correct" interpretations of the 
UCCJA and the PKPA are possible. Given the actual state of 
affairs, perhaps all they have done is to clarify our view of a disas­
ter the Court had no part in creating and no power to remedy. 
VI. CRITIQUE OF THE REFORMS AND Two PROPOSALS FOR 
FURTHER REFORM 
A. Critique 
Although the UCCJA and the PKPA were developed after care­
ful study and wide consultation, and were adopted with great 
optimism, they have not succeeded in abolishing jurisdictional 
competition in interstate custody cases. Indeed, they have been 
428 Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-11, Thompson v. 
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 ( 1988) (No. 86-964); Brief for the People of the 
States of California, Hawaii, Nevada, and Texas, et al. as Amici Curiae at 14, 
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (No. 86-964); Motion for 
Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief of Amici Curiae Sacramento 
County, California, et al., In Support of Petitioner at 7-10, Thompson v. 
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (No. 86-964); and Motion for Leave to File 
Brief Amici Curiae and Brief of Women's Legal Defense Fund, et al., In 
Support of the Petitioner at 8-11, Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 17 4 
(1988) (No. 86-964) with Thompson, 484 U.S. at 187 (declining to indulge a 
"presumption" that "the States are either unable or unwilling to enforce the 
provisions of the [PKPA]"). 
429 See 484 U.S. at 183-87; supra notes 337-39. 
430 484 U.S. at 186. 
431 345 u.s. 528 (1953). 
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spectacularly unsuccessful, and have exacerbated the problem of 
the interstate child instead of resolving it. These statutes are so 
complicated that litigating any jurisdictional question takes an 
inordinate amount of time. In the worst cases, a recalcitrant party 
in possession of the children can use the delay to find yet another 
forum; in such a case, the passage of time alone will have 
strengthened her case and weakened her opponent's.432 Even in 
the best cases the delay prolongs the uncertainty, and increases 
the expense, oflitigation.433 Before these reforms, at least, courts 
were able to resolve jurisdictional issues in custody cases with rel­
ative promptness. 
These delays might be seen as the deplorable but necessary 
cost of instituting a new system. According to this view, once the 
appellate courts had settled a few disputed issues, we could 
expect the delays to diminish sharply. While this might be a valid 
way of looking at the situation if the statutes produced predict­
able and certain answers to jurisdictional issues, sadly they do 
not. 
Putting aside their rationales for the moment, and looking only 
at the pattern made by their results, the cases under the UCCJA 
and the PKPA are remarkably similar to the cases that preceded 
the Acts. They display the same patterns Professor Ehrenzweig 
found in the 1950s.434 Courts today seldom enforce foreign cus­
tody orders unless, after independently inquiring into the facts, 
they find no material change of circumstances. Courts still mod­
ify foreign orders if they think that the court that made the award 
lacked sufficient connection with the child to do so or that there 
has been an intervening change of circumstances. Courts still 
enforce foreign orders against a party who has acted "wrong-
432 Compare Nehra v. Uhlar, 372 N.E.2d 4, 8 (N.Y. 1977) (enforcing 
Michigan order granting custody to father although mother and children 
had been away for 4 1/2 years, because she had abducted them) with Nehra v. 
Uhlar, 402 A.2d 264 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (requiring best interests 
hearing because children had been with mother for most of their lives, 
although both Michigan and New York had awarded father custody and 
mother had not complied with either decree), cert. denied, 408 A.2d 807 (N.J. 
1979). 
433 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 687 S.W.2d 843 (Ark. 1985) (eighteen months 
spent on jurisdiction without reaching merits); In re B.B.R., 566 A.2d 1032 
(D.C. 1989) (four years of litigation); Archambault v. Archambault, 555 
N.E.2d 201 (Mass. 1990) (eight years of litigation). 
434 See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text (discussing Ehrenzweig's 
observations). 
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fully" (as they define wrongfulness, rather than as UCCJA section 
8 defines it), unless to do so would harm the child. Even then, in 
order to decide whether or not the child would be harmed, they 
inquire into the merits of the case. Instead of transforming the 
courts' practice, these statutes have transformed only the dis­
course used to conduct and explain the practice, leaving the 
underlying dynamics substantially unchanged. 
Many courts use the interpretive strategies discussed above;435 
many others (perhaps baffied by the UCCJA's complexity) achieve 
like results with less attention to the niceties of statutory interpre­
tation.436 Certainly, not every interstate case is characterized by 
such use of the UCCJA. In many instances, courts use the UCCJA 
as its proponents hoped they would use it: to assure that the court 
that has the best access to relevant evidence resolves custody mat­
ters, and to discourage parties from using the courts of one state 
to trump the courts of another. Even in such cases, however, 
courts generally defer to foreign decrees only after inquiring into 
the case's merits. For this reason, the interpretive strategies dis­
cussed above are not aberrations; it would be a mistake to dis­
count them as "errors" in interpreting the UCCJA. The statute 
lends itself to such interpretation, as the Oregon Supreme Court 
explained,437 because it balances the rules and principles con­
straining jurisdiction with others expanding it if "necessary" to 
the "best interests" of a child. 
If the reforms have not succeeded, it is worth asking why not. 
One possible answer is that the statutes defectively execute a basi­
cally sound plan. There is some evidence for this view. The 
UCCJA embeds the highly indeterminate, fact-intensive, "best 
interests of the child" standard in every jurisdictional determina­
tion and in the rules governing forum non conveniens and clean 
hands.438 This virtually ensures that in every interstate custody 
435 See supra part IIIB. 
436 See, e.g., Peery v. Peery, 453 So. 2d 635 (La. 1984) (refusing to enforce 
California order in case that was pending when Louisiana proceeding 
commenced, but not discussing§§ 6 or 13, and remanding for new factual 
hearing but requiring consideration of California record). 
437 See In re Ross, 630 P.2d 353 (Or. 1981) (in bane); In reSettle, 556 P.2d 
962 (Or. 1976), overruled by In re Ross, 630 P.2d 353 (Or. 1981) (in bane). 
438 UCCJA §§ 3(a)(2) ("A court of this State ... has jurisdiction to make 
a child custody determination ... if (2) it is in the best interest of the child 
that a court of this State assume jurisdiction .... "), 6 (inquiry as to whether 
the court of another state was "exercising jurisdiction substantially in 
conformity with this Act" can, by considering § 3(a)(2), become a best 
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matter each court will consider the children's best interests-that 
is, the merits of the case-in deciding whether to exercise juris­
diction or to defer to another court's decision-making. Whenever 
the forum, after examining the merits, comes to a conclusion that 
differs from the decree court's decision, it is bound to be strongly 
tempted to remedy what it perceives as a wrong, by asserting and 
exercising jurisdiction. 
The PKPA's differences from the UCCJA-its privileging of 
home state jurisdiction and its adoption of continuing jurisdic­
tion-might seem to limit the forum's threshold inquiry. In prac­
tice, however, the PKPA makes little difference. It requires the 
forum to assess the decree state's jurisdiction in order to decide 
whether a child custody decree is entitled to enforcement.439 
Moreover, it requires the forum to determine both its own juris­
diction and the decree state's jurisdiction in order to decide 
whether it may modify the decree.440 Each of these inquiries 
sends the forum to the UCCJA and thereby requires one or more 
best-interests determinations. 
If the UCCJA and the PKPA are failing because of drafting mis­
takes, it should be possible to write a statute that would succeed. 
If, however, these statutes are failing because the problem is 
insoluble, the only sensible response is radical simplification, to 
eliminate unproductive delays and transaction costs. The follow­
ing two sections explore these possibilities. 
interests inquiry), 7(c) ("In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the 
court shall consider if it is in the interest of the child that another state 
assume jurisdiction."); 8(b) ("Unless required in the interest of the child, 
the court shall not exercise its jurisdiction .... "), 12 (inquiry as to whether 
a decree was "rendered by a court ... which had jurisdiction under section 
3" can, by considering § 3(a)(2), become a best interests inquiry), 13 
(inquiry as to whether the court of another state "had assumed jurisdiction 
under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this Act" or "was 
made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of 
the Act" can, by considering § 3(a)(2), become a best interests inquiry), 
14(a) (inquiry as to whether the court of another state "does not now have 
jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance 
with this Act" can, by considering § 3(a)(2), become a best interests 
inquiry), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143, 219-20, 233, 251, 274, 276, 292. 
439 See PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570-71 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738A(c)(l), (d)). 
440 See PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3571 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § l738A(f)). 
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B. First Reform Proposal 
To be effective, any legislative solution must control the core of 
the problem of the interstate child. To do so, it must centralize 
decision-making, limit the free movement of parents and chil­
dren, substitute a rule for the best interests ideal, or use some 
combination of these strategies. My preference is for centralizing 
decision-making, because of the genuine risks to civil liberties 
inherent in other approaches. 
While it would certainly be easier to persuade Congress to 
amend the PKPA than to convince fifty state legislatures to adopt 
uniform revisions of the UCCJA, the dynamics of the problem 
and our experience under the existing statutes together suggest 
that the easier course could not possibly be effective. Congress 
lacks the power to limit state jurisdiction directly; all it can do is 
require that full faith and credit be given to specified judgments. 
Any federal statute that refers to state law to specify which judg­
ments were entitled to full faith and credit would import the 
UCCJA's weaknesses, just as the present PKPA does. Moreover, 
even a new statute establishing entirely independent criteria for 
full faith and credit would not solve the problem. At present, the 
states are enforcing too few foreign custody decrees, not too 
many. Tightening the criteria for enforcement could only exacer­
bate the problem. Meanwhile, the UCCJA would continue to 
empower the states to enter nonconforming custody orders that 
would be valid where made and that perhaps would receive com­
ity elsewhere. Revising the PKPA might alter the results in indi­
vidual cases, but it could not change the overall pattern described 
by Ehrenzweig.441 
My proposal is therefore that every state enact a Revised Uni­
form Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (RUCCJA).442 This proposal 
adapts Ehrenzweig's guardianship court idea, because I believe it 
is more important to be able to tell unambiguously which court 
has jurisdiction than to search for the "best" court. Nearly twenty 
years' experience under the UCCJA has taught that no matter 
how good a decree court's access to evidence, an asylum court 
that disagrees with the result will still relitigate the dispositive 
issues. To counter this tendency, jurisdiction to make a custody 
441 See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition, supra note 2, at 349-57; supra 
notes 72-85 and accompanying text. 
442 The complete text of the proposed RUCCJA appears in the 
Appendix. 
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decision must not be in dispute and custody decisions must be 
clearly entitled to enforcement outside the state in which they 
were made. Because a state without power over either the child 
or the losing party is unable directly to enforce its own custody 
decision, enforcement of the decision by other courts must not 
appear discretionary. 
Let one court, in the child's home state, have the exclusive 
power to make an initial decree. Let the decree court then retain 
exclusive power to modify its decision for any period it chooses, 
but no longer than five years. After that time, the decree court 
may modify its earlier decision only if it remains the child's home 
state. Otherwise, the new home state gains exclusive power to 
modify the custody determination. In genuine emergencies, any 
court where the child is found may enter a temporary order, to 
stabilize the situation. However, to prevent the exercise of such 
emergency jurisdiction from expanding into an exercise of 
broader jurisdiction, a temporary order should expire swiftly and 
not be renewable. The goal is for the temporary order to remain 
in effect no longer than is necessary for the child's home state or 
the state with continuing jurisdiction to grant supervening relief. 
This proposal could be implemented by repealing the UCCJA's 
statements of principle supporting flexibility,443 its definitions,444 
its jurisdictional provisions,445 and its provisions codifying forum 
non conveniens446 and clean hands.447 The other sections of the 
statute should be retained. For clarity and consistency, the 
PKPA's definitions448 should be substituted for the UCCJA defini-
443 UCCJA § 1(a)(2)-(3), (6), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 124. 
444 UCCJA § 2, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 133. 
445 UCCJA §§ 3, 6, 13, 14, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143-44, 219-20, 276, 292. 
446 UCCJA § 7, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 233-34. 
447 UCCJA § 8, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 251. 
448 PKP A § 8(a) provides: 
As used in this section, the term-
(1) "child" means a person under the age of eighteen; 
(2) "contestant" means a person, including a parent, who 
claims a right to custody or visitation of a child; 
(3) "custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or 
other order of a court providing for the custody or visitation of a 
child, and includes permanent and temporary orders; and initial 
orders and modifications; 
(4) "home State" means the State in which, immediately 
preceding the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a 
parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive 
months, and in the case of a child less than six months old, the 
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tions, and a definition of "initial custody determination" should 
be added.449 New jurisdictional provisions giving exclusive juris­
diction to one single state at a time, and commanding enforce­
ment of that state's decisions, should be added.450 The repealed 
statements of principle should not be revised, because to do so 
would undermine the revised statute's new bias toward certainty. 
State in which the child lived from birth with any of such 
persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons 
are counted as part of the six-month or other period; 
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody 
determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or 
otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody determination 
concerning the same child, whether made by the same court or 
not; 
(6) "person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a 
parent, who has physical custody of a child and who has either 
been awarded custody by a court or claims a right to custody; 
(7) "physical custody" means actual possession and control 
of a child; and 
(8) "State" means a State of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or 
possession of the United States. 
94 Stat. 3569-70 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)). 
449 The following provision should be added to the end of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738A(b) and enacted as part of the RUCCJA: "(9) 'initial custody 
determination' means the first custody determination made with respect to 
this child by any state." 
450 The following provision should be substituted for UCCJA § 3: 
§ 3. Ourisdiction] 
(a) An initial child custody determination may be made by a 
court in this state only if this state is the home state of the child 
on the date of the commencement of the proceeding or had been 
the child's home state within six months before that date. 
(b) Every custody determination shall specify how long the 
court's jurisdiction over the child shall last. A court may specify 
any period of time up to and including five years. Except as 
provided in section 3 (e), if a custody determination of this or any 
state fails to specify how long the court's jurisdiction over the 
child shall last, the court's jurisdiction shall be deemed to expire 
one year after the date the child custody determination was 
entered. 
(c) (1) During the period specified in section 3(b), a court in 
this state may modify any custody determination made in this 
state. 
(2) A court in this state may modify any other custody 
determination if this state is the child's home state on the date of 
the commencement of the modification proceeding or had been 
the child's home state within six months before the 
HeinOnline -- 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 944 1991-1992
 
1992] Tragedy of the Interstate Child 945 
Nor should sections 7 and 8 be rewritten rather than repealed; 
courts are fully capable of assessing and implementing equitable 
principles without legislative guidance. This proposal could be 
implemented without revising the PKPA, or that statute could be 
amended to conform.451 
If it were to be enacted in every state, this proposed RUCCJA 
would diminish jurisdictional competition sharply, because it 
unambiguously selects one court at a time as the exclusive forum 
for each custody dispute. Because it achieves this by elevating 
Ratner's certainty goals over his flexibility goals, however, I fear 
not even a single state will enact it. Moreover, even if it were 
adopted, I predict that sometimes courts would evade it. 
The UCCJA took its concern for justice in the individual case 
from existing custody law, where the concern is a fundamental 
precept. Neither courts nor legislatures seem at all disposed to 
give it up. In this they may reflect society's values. Many profes­
sionals have been convinced by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit that 
since decision-makers can make at best rough judgments about 
what individual children need and how to provide it, the better 
part of wisdom is to make custody decisions swiftly and then stick 
by them.452 Yet even those who agree in principle find it hard to 
commencement of the modification proceeding, provided that 
the period specified in section 3(b) has expired. 
(d) Except as provided in section 3(c), a court in this state 
shall enforce, and may not modify, any custody determination 
that was made by a court of this or any state during the period 
that court retained jurisdiction according to the provisions of 
section 3(b). 
(e) Notwithstanding the foregoing, a court of this state may 
make a temporary custody order with respect to a child who is 
physically present within this state and either has been 
abandoned or needs emergency protection from actual 
mistreatment or abuse. Such a temporary order may remain in 
effect for no more than six weeks and may not be renewed under 
any circumstances. A court's jurisdiction to make or modify such 
a temporary custody order expires with the order. 
451 A conforming amendment would repeal PKPA § 8(a), 94 Stat. 3570 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)-(D)), and revise PKPA § 8(a), 94 
Stat. 3570-71 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d)) to read as follows (revision 
in italics): "The jurisdiction of a court of a state that has made a child 
custody determination consistently with the provisions of this section 
continues for one year after entry of such determination, or for such longer period (up 
to and including five years) as the determination itself specifies." 
452 GoLDSTEIN, FREUD & SoLNIT, supra note 45, at 99-101. 
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put these precepts into practice when they believe an earlier cus­
tody decision was wrong. Ordinary parents and citizens find the 
advice even harder to accept. Although this proposed RUCCJA 
does not close the doors of the courthouse entirely-it merely 
limits custody litigants to one forum at a time-its enactment 
would sometimes require a local child to be returned to a foreign 
custodian against the advice of all local experts. I wonder if we 
can reasonably expect our state legislatures to command this 
result. Even if they were to do so, I wonder if we could reason­
ably expect our courts to obey. 
C. Second Reform Proposal 
To say that we cannot expect our courts and legislatures to 
accept my proposal, or any proposal that similarly chooses juris­
dictional certainty over flexibility, is to admit that we cannot solve 
the problem of the interstate child without sacrificing values 
equally important to us. If that is so, criticizing the UCCJA and 
the PKPA for preserving the very difficulties they were intended 
to cure would be foolish. Such criticism would lose sight of the 
dynamic underlying both the courts' interpretations of these stat­
utes and their pre-reformjurisprudence. Any federal system that 
commits custody decisions to sovereign states, that permits par­
ents and children to move freely among the states, and that 
decides custody according to indeterminate precepts and then 
permits modification of initial decisions according to equally 
indeterminate standards, will inevitably produce some version of 
the problem of the interstate child.453 The problem of the inter­
state child is not resolvable by the UCCJA, the PKPA, the pro­
posed RUCCJA, or by any other measures, unless our society is 
willing to choose certainty over flexibility, and to absorb the 
attendant costs. 
If it is not, we would do well to repeal both the UCCJA and the 
PKPA. Repeal would permit the courts to go directly to their 
search for justice in the individual case without wasting time 
interpreting these complicated statutes. If it feels unseemly to 
have no statutory rule at all, we could ask Congress to enact Brai­
nerd Currie's proposal that "no judgment shall preclude the 
courts of a state having legitimate interest in the matter from 
making whatever custodial decree is required, in their judgment 
453 See supra part lA. 
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and discretion, for the welfare of the child. "454 That would at 
least give the parties fair warning of the shoals ahead. 
CONCLUSION 
With hindsight it seems clear that the UCCJA should never 
have been expected to guide courts to predictable and consistent 
solutions of interstate custody disputes. Contrary to its propo­
nents' claims, the UCCJA did not choose certainty over flexibility; 
indeed, by embracing both it ensured that flexibility would pre­
vail. Choosing certainty would require courts to close their doors 
to custody disputes concerning some children with substantial 
connections to the forums' own locale, and to do so regularly, 
systematically, and in the face of allegations that the children's 
well-being was· thereby endangered. The high value we place. on 
protecting children ensures that our courts have never voluntarily 
done this, and that they might not even if they were unambigu­
ously commanded to do so. If our society lacks the resolve to 
make this command, or to carry it out, then the "problem of the 
interstate child" was misnamed. It should have been called "the 
tragedy455 of the interstate child." If we can understand a prob­
lem but cannot solve it without making matters worse, all that is 
left is pity and terror. 
454 Currie, supm note 116, at 115. 
455 See MARTHA C. NussBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GooDNESS 25 (1986). 
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APPENDIX 
PROPOSED REVISED UNIFORM CHILD CusTODY juRISDICTION AcT 
(Proposed Revisions in Italics) 
§ 1. [Purposes of Act; Construction of Provisions] 
(a) The general purposes of this Act are to: 
( 1) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts 
of other states in matters of child custody which have in the past 
resulted in the shifting of children from state to state with harmful 
effects on their well-being; 
(2) [repealed]; 
(3) [repealed]; 
(4) discourage continuing controversies over child custody 
in the interest of greater stability of home environment and of 
secure family relationships for the child; 
(5) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of chil­
dren undertaken to obtain custody awards; 
( 6) [repealed]; 
(7) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other 
states; 
(8) promote and expand the exchange of information and 
other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this state 
and those of other states concerned with the same child; and 
(9) make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
(b) This Act shall be construed to promote the general pur­
poses stated in this section. 
§ 2. [Definitions] 
As used in this Act: 
(a) "child" means a person under the age of eighteen; 
(b) "contestant" means a person, including a parent, who claims a right 
to custody or visitation of a child; 
(c) ''custody determination '' means a judgment, decree, or other order of 
a court providing for the custody or visitation of a child, and includes per­
manent and temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications; 
(d) "home state" means the state in which, immediately preceding the 
time involved, the child lived with his or her parents, a parent, or a person 
acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a 
child less than six months old, the state in which the child lived from birth 
with any of such persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such per­
sons are counted as part of the six-month or other period; 
(e) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody determination which 
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modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior 
custody determination concerning the same child, whether made by the same 
court or not; 
(f) ''person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, 
who has physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody 
by a court or claims a right to custody; 
(g) ''physical custody" means actual possession and control of a child; 
(h) "state" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United 
States; and 
( i) "initial custody determination" means the first custody determination 
made with respect to this child by any state. 
§ 3. [Jurisdiction] 
(a) An initial child custody determination may be made by a court in this 
state only if this state is the home state of the child on the date of the com­
mencement of the proceeding or had been the child's home state within six 
months before that date. 
(b) Every custody determination shall specify how long the court :S juris­
diction over the child shall last. A court may specify any period of time up to 
and including five years. Except as provided in section 3( e), if a custody 
determination of this or any state fails to specify how long the court :S juris­
diction over the child shall last, the court's jurisdiction shall be deemed to 
expire one year after the date the child custody determination was entered. 
(c) ( 1) During the period specified in section 3( b), a court in this state 
may modify any custody determination made in this state. 
( 2) A court in this state may modify any other custody determination 
if this state is the child's home state on the date of the commencement of the 
modification proceeding or had been the childs home state within six months 
before the commencement of the modification proceeding, provided that the 
period specified in section .3 (b) has expired. 
(d) Except as provided in section 3( c), a court in this state shall enforce, 
and may not modify, any custody determination that was made by a court of 
this or any state during the period that court retained jurisdiction according 
to the provisions of section 3( b). 
(e) Notwithstanding the foregoing, a court of this state may make a tem­
porary custody order with respect to a child who is physically present within 
this state and either has been abandoned or needs emergency protection from 
actual mistreatment or abuse. Such a temporary order may remain in effect 
for no more than six weeks and may not be renewed under any circumstances. 
A courts jurisdiction to make or modify such a temporary custody order 
expires with the order. 
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§ 4. [Notice and Opportunity to be Heard] 
Before making a decree under this Act, reasonable notice and 
opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any par­
ent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated, 
and any person who has physical custody of the child. If any of 
these persons is outside this state, notice and opportunity to be 
heard shall be given pursuant to section 5. 
§ 5. [Notice to Persons Outside this State; Submission to 
Jurisdiction] 
(a) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over a per­
son outside this state shall be given in a manner reasonably calcu­
lated to give actual notice, and may be: 
(1) by personal delivery outside this state in the manner pre­
scribed for service of process within this state; 
(2) in the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which 
the service is made for service of process in that place in an action 
in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; 
(3) by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served 
and requesting a receipt; or 
(4) as directed by the court [including publication, if other 
means of notification are ineffective]; 
(b) Notice under this section shall be served, mailed, or deliv­
ered, [or last published] at least [10, 20] days before any hearing 
in this state. 
(c) Proof of service outside this state may be made by affidavit 
of the individual who made the service, or in the manner pre­
scribed by the law of this state, the order pursuant to which the 
service is made, or the law of the place in which the service is 
made. If service is by mail, proof may be a receipt signed by the 
addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee. 
(d) Notice is not required if a person submits to the jurisdic­
tion of the court. 
§ 6. [Simultaneous Proceedings in Other States] [Repealed; see 
section 3.] 
§ 7. [Inconvenient Forum] [Repealed.] 
§ 8. [Jurisdiction Declined by Reason of Conduct] [Repealed.] 
§ 9. [Information under Oath to be Submitted to the Court] 
(a) Every party in a custody proceeding in his or her first plead­
ing or in an affidavit attached to that pleading shall give informa­
tion under oath as to the child's present address, the places where 
the child has lived within the last 5 years, and the names and pres-
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ent addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived during 
that period. In this pleading or affidavit every party shall further 
declare under oath whether: 
( 1) he or she has participated (as a party, witness, or in any 
other capacity) in any other litigation concerning the custody of 
the same child in this or any other state; 
(2) he or she has information of any custody proceeding con­
cerning the child pending in a court of this or any other state; and 
(3) he or she knows of any person not a party to the proceed­
ings who has physical custody of the child or claims to have cus­
tody or visitation rights with respect to the child. 
(b) If the declaration as to any of the above items is in the 
affirmative the declarant shall give additional information under 
oath as required by the court. The court may examine the parties 
under oath as to details of the information furnished and as to 
other matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the disposi­
tion of the case. 
(c) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any 
custody proceeding concerning the child in this or any other state 
of which he or she obtained information during this proceeding. 
§ 10. [Additional Parties] 
If the court learns from information furnished by the parties 
pursuant to section 9 or from other sources that a person not a 
party to the custody proceeding has physical custody of the child 
or claims to have custody or visitation rights with respect to the 
child, it shall order that person to be joined as a party and to be 
duly notified of the pendency of the proceeding and of his or her 
joinder as a party. If the person joined as a party is outside this 
state he or she shall be served with process or otherwise notified in 
accordance with section 5. 
§ 11. [Appearance of Parties and the Child] 
[(a) The court may order any party to the proceeding who is in 
this state to appear personally before the court. If that party has 
physical custody of the child the court may order that he or she 
appear personally with the child.] 
(b) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is desired by 
the court is outside this state with or without the child the court 
may order that the notice given under section 5 include a state­
ment directing that party to appear personally with or without the 
child and declaring that failure to appear may result in a decision 
adverse to that party. 
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(c) If a party to the proceeding who is outside this state is 
directed to appear under subsection (b) or desires to appear per­
sonally before the court with or without the child, the court may 
require another party to pay to the clerk of the court travel and 
other necessary expenses of the party so appearing and of the 
child if this is just and proper under the circumstances. 
§ 12. [Binding Force and Res judicata Effect of Custody Decree] 
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state which had 
jurisdiction under section 3 binds all parties who have been 
served in this state or notified in accordance with section 5 or who 
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have 
been given an opportunity to be heard. As to these parties the 
custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and fact 
decided and as to the custody determination made unless and 
until that determination is modified pursuant to law, including 
the provisions of this Act. 
§ 13. [Recognition of Out-of-State Custody Decrees] [Repealed; 
see section 3.] 
§ 14. [Modification of Custody Decree of Another State] 
[Repealed; see section 3.] 
§ 15. [Filing and Enforcement of Custody Decree of Another 
State] 
(a) A certified copy of a custody decree of another state may be 
filed in the office of the clerk of any [District Court, Family Court] 
of this state. The clerk shall treat the decree in the same manner 
as a custody decree of the [District Court, Family Court] of this 
state. A custody decree so filed has the same effect and shall be 
enforced in like manner as a custody decree rendered by a court 
of this state. 
(b) A person violating a custody decree of another state which 
makes it necessary to enforce the decree in this state may be 
required to pay necessary travel and other expenses, including 
attorneys' fees, incurred by the party entitled to the custody or his 
or her witnesses. 
§ 16. [Registry of Out-of-State Custody Decrees and 
Proceedings] 
The clerk of each [District Court, Family Court] shall maintain 
a registry in which he or she shall enter the following: 
(1) certified copies of custody decrees of other states 
received for filing; 
HeinOnline -- 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 952 1991-1992
 
1992] Tragedy of the Interstate Child 953 
(2) communications as to the pendency of custody proceed­
ings in other states; 
(3) communications concerning a finding of inconvenient 
forum by ·a court of another state; and 
(4) other communications or documents concerning custody 
proceedings in another state which may affect the jurisdiction of a 
court of this state or the disposition to be made by it in a custody 
proceeding. 
§ 17. [Certified Copies of Custody Decree] 
The Clerk of the [District Court, Family Court] of this state, at 
the request of the court of another state or at the request of any 
person who is affected by or has a legitimate interest in a custody 
decree, shall certify an~ forward a copy of the decree to that court 
or person. 
§ 18. [Taking Testimony in Another State] 
In addition to other procedural devices available to a party, any 
party to the proceeding or a guardian ad litem or other represen­
tative of the child may adduce testimony of witnesses, including 
parties and the child, by deposition or otherwise, in another state. 
The court on its own motion may direct that the testimony of a 
person be taken in another state and may prescribe the manner in 
which and the terms upon which the testimony shall be taken. 
§ 19. [Hearings and Studies in Another State; Orders to 
Appear] 
(a) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of 
another state to hold a hearing to adduce evidence, to order a 
party to produce or give evidence under other procedures of that 
state, or to have social studies made with respect to the custody of 
a child involved in proceedings pending in the court of this state; 
and to forward to the court of this state certified copies of the 
transcript of the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise 
adduced, or any social studies prepared in compliance with the 
request. The cost of the services may be assessed against the par­
ties or, if necessary, ordered paid by the [county, state]. 
(b) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of 
another state to order a party to custody proceedings pending in 
the court of this state to appear in the proceedings, and if that 
party has physical custody of the child, to appear with the child. 
The request may state that travel and other necessary expenses of 
the party and of the child whose appearance is desired will be 
assessed against another party or will otherwise be paid. 
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§ 20. [Assistance to Courts of Other States] 
(a) Upon request of the court of another state the courts of this 
state which are competent to hear custody matters may order a 
person in this state to appear at a hearing to adduce evidence or 
to produce or give evidence under other procedures available in 
this state [or may order social studies to be made for use in a 
custody proceeding in another state]. A certified copy of the tran­
script of the record of the hearing or the evidence otherwise 
adduced [and any social studies prepared] shall be forwarded by 
the clerk of the court to the requesting court. 
(b) A person within this state may voluntarily give his or her tes­
timony or statement in this state for use in a custody proceeding 
outside this state. 
(c) Upon request of the court of another state a competent 
court of this state may order a person in this state to appear alone 
or with the child in a custody proceeding in another state. The 
court may condition compliance with the request upon assurance 
by the other state that state travel and other necessary expenses 
will be advanced or reimbursed. 
§ 21. [Preservation of Documents for Use in Other States] 
In any custody proceeding in this state the court shall preserve 
the pleadings, orders and decrees, any record that has been made 
of its hearings, social studies, and other pertinent documents 
until the child reaches [18, 21] years of age. Upon appropriate 
request of the court of another state the court shall forward to the 
other court certified copies of any or all of such documents. 
§ 22. [Request for Court Records of Another State] 
If a custody decree has been rendered in another state concern­
ing a child involved in a custody proceeding pending in a court of 
this state, the court of this state upon taking jurisdiction of the 
case shall request of the court of the other state a certified copy of 
the transcript of any court record and other documents men­
tioned in section 21. 
§ 23. [International Application] 
The general policies of this Act extend to the international 
area. The provisions of this Act relating to the recognition and 
enforcement of custody decrees of other states apply to custody 
decrees and decrees involving legal institutions similar in nature 
to custody institutions rendered by appropriate authorities of 
other nations if reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard 
were given to all affected persons. 
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[§ 24. [Priority] 
Upon the request of a party to a custody proceeding which 
raises a question of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this 
Act the case shall be given calendar priority and handled 
expeditiously.] 
§ 25. [Severability] 
If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any 
person or circumstance is held invalid, its invalidity does not 
affect other provisions or applications of the Act which can be 
given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to 
this end the provisions of this Act are severable. 
§ 26. [Short Title] 
This Act may be cited as the Revised Unifonn Child Custody juris­
diction Act. 
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